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Abstract
Understanding the mechanism through which monetary policy affects real economic
activity is a very important issue for attaining macroeconomic stability. Financial innovations
during the last two decades and imperfections in the financial markets make this mechanism
more complicated. The link between policy and real activity can be better understood by taking
into consideration the variety of fmancial assets, agency costs, micro level information involved
in financial transactions and identification of supply and demand effects.
We provide a theoretical review where monetary policy affects the real activity not only
through the traditional 'interest rate channel' but also by changing the fmancial positions of
firms. In this framework, we identify the responses of firms with various characteristics to
monetary policy shocks through the fmancial accelerator where credit market conditions
amplify and propagate the impact of monetary shocks on real activity of financially weak
and small firms. Agency costs and other informational problems are more influential on the
availability and cost of financial sources and financial choices for these firms, which is very
important for the economic performance.
We test these predictions empirically by using a panel of more than fifteen thousands UK
manufacturing firm records during the period of 1990-1999. We show that the financial choices
of small, young, risky and highly indebted firms are more sensitive to tight monetary conditions
than those of large, old, secure and low indebted firms. The evidence is consistent with the
credit channel where monetary policy has distributional implications for the bank dependent
firms that face difficulties in getting external finance during tight periods.
We also test the impact of policy on firms' inventory investment and employment growth
by taking into account base rate to capture the user cost of capital, the ratio of the short term
debt to current liabilities, and cash flow in addition to other control variables across finn
characteristics by using dynamic panel estimation procedures. This framework enables us to
avoid some empirical issues, e.g. identification concerning cash flow, ad hoc sample splitting
criteria (classifying firms as fmancially constrained or unconstrained) and endogeneity problem
between finn specific variables and inventory investment and employment. Financial variables
consistently explain both inventory investment and employment growth across firm groups but
the former is more sensitive to the financial variables and the monetary policy stance. Our
results imply that the financial structure of firms makes a difference for their real activity,
therefore verifying the credit charmel for the UK economy.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Motivation
1.1. Theoretical Framework of the Thesis
Monetary policy, as an instrument for managing aggregate demand and for stabilising
prices has become more prevalent relative to fiscal policy during the last decade. The
central banks of many countries have increasingly focused on achieving price stability.
The instability of money demand in the mid-1980s that took place parallel to innovations
in financial markets and liberalization of balance of payments regimes reduced the
reliability of money-based intermediate target rules in most countries. Many central
banks, for example, adopted various forms of monetary policy rules that consider the
bank rates instead of monetary aggregates as instruments or intermediary targets for
attaining their inflation targets. In this context, understanding the mechanisms through
which monetary policy affects real activity and inflationary pressures in the economy,
namely the monetary transmission mechanism, becomes a crucial issue for the policy
makers.
The traditional money view of transmission mechanism that works through the user
cost of capital is no longer capable of explaining the complicated nature of monetary
transmission. This view is formulated in a framework of static IS-LM models where
money and bonds are the only and imperfectly substitutable financial assets, but it falls
short in being able to capture market imperfections and financial innovations in the
financial markets that are central to the modem view of monetary mechanism.
Information related to credit aggregates, financial markets and the financial positions of
firms, households and banks, has become the focus of the research in this area. In this
context, the developments on the policy side have been accompanied by a number of
theoretical and empirical studies that allow for imperfections in financial markets in the
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form of adverse selection, moral hazard and agency costs problems. The theoretical
approach allows for heterogeneous agents, informational imperfections in the financial
markets, and various means of finance. This approach complements the traditional money
view and is generally called the credit channel of monetary transmission, and is often
divided into two sub channels. The narrow credit channel (also called the bank lending
channel) deals with the impact of monetary policy on the bank loan supply, while the
broad credit channel focuses on the reactions of non-financial firms and households to
the monetary policy shocks acknowledging that informational problems persist among
lenders and borrowers in the financial markets. A general framework for these channels is
provided in the following paragraphs.
Traditional economic theory states that retained earnings, debt, bonds, and equity as
sources of finance are equivalent means of financing investment projects. This
proposition is a direct implication of the perfect information assumption of neo-classical
economics where economic agents have perfect information on the activities of their
counterparts in all economic and financial transactions. The transactions between
borrowers and lenders take place in the market, do not incur a cost, and are risk-free. In
addition, money is assumed to be neutral: a change in the money supply affects only a
proportional change in the price level. Under these circumstances, although monetary
policy may affect firms' choice of finance, it does not have any impact on real variables
in the economy (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
This theory is an oversimplification of the real world. Financial transactions may
take place through intermediary institutions (banks and other financial intermediaries) in
order to minimise transaction costs in the financial markets. The existence of such
institutions can be considered as a diversion from the theory outlined above. Therefore,
modem economic theories introduce imperfections in financial transactions in the form of
transaction costs, asymmetric information and agency costs. The new framework justifies
the role of intermediary institutions. These institutions ameliorate market imperfections
witnessed by lenders and borrowers and thus improve market efficiency. Contrary to
traditional economic theory, policy shocks may transmit to real activity by changing the
financial positions of intermediaries (banks and other financial institution) through credit
availability and capital structure. However, the existence of intermediary institutions may
2
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not prevent market failures when imperfections are severe (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Myers and Majluf, 1984).
This framework suggests that a contractionary monetary policy will reduce the
supply of bank credits (through reducing reserves and thus increasing the cost of funds) if
insured deposits and large certificates of deposits on the liabilities side of the banks
balance sheet, and loans and securities on the assets side, are not perfect substitutes. In
this framework, the extent of the reduction in the loan supply as a result of a
contractionary monetary policy depends on the degree of informational asymmetry that
exists among banks and depositors, which, in tum, affects the cost of raising new
uninsured deposits. The reduction in the loan supply will directly reduce the real activities
of those firms that predominantly depend on bank loans. This effect is known as the bank
lending channel.
Fluctuations in the activity of firms become more significant with a rise in the
degree of informational problems (moral hazard, adverse selection, and other incentive
problems). These imperfections affect the overall efficiency of economic transactions by
altering the choice of finance, investment, and employment decisions. In general, lenders
are reluctant to extend funds to financially weak borrowers at the same rates that they
offer to financially strong borrowers. Firms with less collateral and a bad reputation (poor
track records) would find it more difficult to borrow from banks or from other financial
sources at the safe rates as their probability of default would be very high. Therefore, the
managers of these firms may adopt risky projects that have high rates of return to
compensate for high borrowing costs and to maximize their private benefit. This leads to
a wedge between the cost of externally borrowed funds and of risk free borrowing, which
,
is called the external finance premium. The premium on external funds greatly influences
the financial positions of lenders and borrowers as well as their relation and activities.
This framework is studied by the financial accelerator literature in which small shocks
may lead to large cycles by a pro-cyclical variation of sales, fixed investment, inventory,
and the short-term debt of financially weak firms, which have lower net worth and thus
have limited access to funds (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997;
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996 and 1998).
3
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This line of research suggests that a contractionary monetary shock weakens the
financial position of firms and it may undermine the ability of the borrowers to finance
their investment through external funds as well as that of lenders to extend loanable
funds. It argues that poorly collateralised firms, whose balance sheets are weak in terms
of net worth, have to pay a high price for external funds relative to large well-
collateralized firms, In other words, an initial decline in economic activity as a result of a
tight monetary policy has a larger impact on the borrowing and spending decisions of
these agents facing credit market frictions, who are most likely to be small and medium
sized firms. These series of causes and effects is known as the broad credit channel.
The early 1990s recession in the US, which ended up with a 'credit crunch' and a
sharper economic slowdown than expected, has motivated research on the credit channel
of monetary policy transmission. Economists have paid more attention to the link between
monetary policy and economic recessions and they have tried to separate the supply-side
from demand-side effects. On the theoretical side, informational and agency problems
have been modelled based on the financial accelerator and micro based moral hazard and
adverse selection theories. These models allow for a heterogeneous agent approach
where the reactions of firms or banks to external shocks are not identical. On the
empirical side, this new theoretical approach has been applied by using large firm-level
panels in order to identify the channels of monetary transmission mechanism.
1.2. The Motivation
Recent financial crises confirm the importance of the financial accelerator mechanism
under conditions of severe informational asymmetries, and high agency costs. The
transmission mechanism as well as information about basic tendencies in the financial
markets is crucial for macroeconomic policy making and thus economic performance.
The characteristics of firms and the structure of financial markets are the key issues that
should be discussed in detail in order to understand the nature of monetary transmission.
Obviously, aggregation and simplification are the ways that help us to build models
in order to understand the facts and derive theoretical predictions. However,
overgeneralizations may lead to a loss of a substantial amount of micro-level information
that might be crucial for policy makers. Empirical studies on the credit channel of the
4
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transmission mechanism tend to make use of firm level panel data as they become
available over time. Panel data analysis naturally includes more information about the
credit channel than time series analysis because individual heterogeneity and asymmetric
information problems are well described by panel data. This framework allows us to
identify the impact of monetary policy shocks not only on aggregate demand but also on
its composition and wealth distribution. A tight monetary policy would be very harmful
for the economy if policy makers did not have information, for example, about the fact
that small firms are dominant and depend on external finance.
In this thesis we try to discover the nature of link between monetary policy and the
financial and economic activities of UK manufacturing firms within the framework of the
credit channel by using a large data set (a panel of over fifteen thousand firms for the
period of 1990-1999). We classify firms according to criteria that are closely related to
the informational problems they encounter. We use widely employed criteria in the
literature to group firms according to their size, rating, age, gearing, and dividend. This
methodology allows us to measure the financial and economic responses of particular
groups of firms to a change in monetary policy, which is consistent with the
heterogeneous firm approach. In addition, we split the sample, if applicable, into two
periods based on the average value of the base rate. This enables us to identify the
behaviour of firm groups in a tight versus a ben-ign monetary policy period. In fact,
monetary policy may not be fully exogenous to financial and real activity in the economy;
it affects firms' activity levels as they interact with the financial conditions of the firms.
We have introduced firm specific financial variables alongside the measure of the
monetary policy stance to control this.
Alongside the theoretical discussions and data analysis, the empirical study carried
out in this thesis produces a substantial amount of feedback about the nature of monetary
transmission in the UK. The empirical framework helps us to answer the following
questions: (i) What are the implications of a change in the composition of external funds
for real activity? (ii) Why do some firms have difficulties in obtaining external funds?
(iii) How are small and financially weak firms affected by a monetary contraction? (iv)
Does monetary policy play a role in the redistribution of the wealth through financial
markets?
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1.3. The Organisation and Structure
The thesis implicitly is made up of two parts. In the first part, we predominately study a
theoretical framework of the credit channels of monetary transmission. Our aim in this
part is to derive theoretical implications on the role of monetary policy for firms' real
activity with a special emphasis on external finance. We extend an existing theoretical
model by deriving the impact of monetary policy on firms' choice of finance based on
comparative static analysis that considers firms' financial characteristics. The second part
implements the model through empirical research. Following Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox
(1993) who use the ratio of short-term bank loans to short term bank loan plus
commercial papers issued, 'the mix', as a proxy for the choice of firm finance at the
aggregate level, we test econometrically the determinants of the choice of firm finance
across firm groups and monetary policy regime periods and find evidence for both the
bank lending and the broad credit channels. In addition, we use the mix to explain
inventory investment and employment in order to test how important the choice of firm
finance is for firms' real activity. We now outline the basic features of the chapters
briefly.
In the second chapter, we provide a broad picture of recent theoretical and empirical
literature of the credit channel of monetary transmission to clarify the issues and concepts
that are crucial for the analyses carried out in the following chapters. Therefore, the
literature review in that chapter complements the analyses in the following chapters. The
chapter overviews seminal papers on the bank lending channel, the broad credit channel,
and the choice of finance. We focus on recent theoretical frameworks that incorporate
moral hazard, adverse selection and agency costs problems into the relationship between
lenders and borrowers. We also review empirical evidence on the credit channel of
monetary transmission, putting special emphasis on the UK evidence. The literature that
we reviewed implies that the monetary policy transmission mechanism is a complicated
issue and therefore it needs more detailed micro level analyses.
In the third chapter, we derive theoretical predictions on the impact of monetary
policy on the choice of finance across heterogeneous firms. We extend the model
originally constructed by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993). This paper studies a
moral hazard model in order to examine the choice between bank and market finance. We
6
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incorporate monetary policy into the model and derive some comparative statics allowing
us to analyse the factors that determine the choice of external finance. This analysis
enables us to derive some predictions on the role of firm size, net worth, distribution of
risk, project size, and project payoff on the choice of finance as monetary policy changes.
The main messages from this chapter are: (i) a tight monetary policy increases the
demand for intermediary finance more for those firms whose net-worth ratios are more
sensitive to changes in the interest rate, (ii) firms with high net worth and low risk are
more likely to get low cost market funds.
In Chapter Four, we provide a brief discussion on macroeconomic performance and
developments in the manufacturing industry in the UK economy during the 1990s. In
addition, we give detailed information on the FAME data set that includes balance sheets,
profit loss accounts and financial ratios of over fifteen thousand firms. We discuss the
methodology by which we create our sample from the data set, and carry out a descriptive
analysis on the key variables that are used in the econometric analysis. We witness quite a
number of missing observations in the sample especially for small and young firms.
Although the nature of missing observations is consistent with the data collecting
procedure and reporting rules we make sure that our sample does not include systematic
,
errors and missing observations. Therefore, we compare the figures of some key variables
of some quoted firms in our sample with alternative data sets, namely Datastream and
One Source. We confirm that there are minor variations in some figures across data sets
because of differences in the definition of variables but we conclude that our sample
offers rich and consistent information about firms for our empirical analysis.
Chapter Five is devoted to the econometric analysis. We choose the explanatory
variables for the choice of finance regressions to control for cyclical demand effects, and
for the financial factors mainly derived from the theoretical model provided in Chapter
Three. These are the base rate, interaction terms, the rating score, the real tangible assets,
age, the gearing ratio, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the GDP growth rate, and
year dummies. We employ various panel data techniques including fixed effects, and
instrumental variable two-stage least squares (/V-2SLS) based on the fixed effects to
estimate our model. We could capture firm heterogeneity either by splitting the sample
into sub-samples representing firm types and carry out regressions for each sub-sample or
by using associated interaction terms directly in the regression without splitting the data.
7
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The former method allows us to observe the impact of monetary policy for particular firm
type without imposing restrictions on the coefficients of the explanatory variables while
the latter offers a large and unique sample for all firm groups but it requires some
restrictive assumptions on the explanatory variables where the explanatory variables other
than interaction terms are assumed to be identical across firm types. The advantages of the
latter method are a large number of observations and a more parsimonious model. By this
framework, we can capture the impact of monetary policy conditional on the particular
regime and firm characteristic.
We use three different measures of the liabilities composition of firms (or the
choice of finance). The first one is the ratio of short-term debt to current liabilities (M/Xl)
by which we tend to find evidence for the bank lending channel in the line of Kashyap et
at (1993) as well as for the broad credit channel as Oliner and Rudebush (1996) suggest.
We explain two additional variables, namely the ratio of total debt to total liabilities
(M/X2) that may exhibit a similar pattern with MIXI and the ratio of short-term debt to
total debt (M/X3) to test the impact of monetary policy on firms' debt structure. Contrary
to MIXI and MIX2, testing the impact of monetary policy on MIX3 may not provide
direct evidence for the bank lending channel but it gives an idea as to how debt structure
reacts to the policy change; the shift in the composition of short term versus long term
debt. The findings are generally supportive for the credit channel in the UK. They show
that a tight monetary policy has been more restrictive for financially constrained firms in
accessing debt finance (basically short term bank loans).
In Chapter Six, following Kashyap et al. (1993), we use MIXI and cash flow as
financial variables in addition to other variables to explain inventory and employment
growths using a framework of the financial constraint literature developed by Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). We suppose that inventory
investment is highly responsive to the financial positions of firms and monetary policy
shocks because they involve a lower adjustment cost compared to employment. We use
the lags of dependent variables and of other explanatory variables in our regressions to
capture the dynamics. The Arellano-Bond GMM procedure provides consistent and
efficient estimates for this type of model. The estimation results confirm the broad credit
channel where inventory investment and employment across firm groups react
heterogeneously to changes in cash flows and monetary policy stance. MIXI also appears
8
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to be an important explanatory variable in the sense that it has generally a significant and
positive coefficient. This result confirms the fact that choices of finn finance matter for
the firms' real activity. In addition, inventory growth is more sensitive to financial
variables and the monetary policy stance than employment growth.
As we discuss in Chapter Three, our sample includes some missing observations. If
missing observations were not randomly distributed, our estimations could potentially lead
to selectivity bias. In Chapter Seven, we discuss the theory of selectivity bias and we carry
out some tests to determine whether the selectivity bias related to our sample can be
ignored or not. We estimate the models in Chapters Five and Six with variable addition
techniques proposed by the sample selection literature. We have mixed evidence. Some of
the results do not reject the hypothesis that sample selection problems can not be ignored
while some of them reject the same hypothesis. However, the main implications of the
empirical results do not generally change across estimation techniques. That is, the results
are robust even though the coefficients change significantly. Put another way, the signs of
coefficients barely change across estimation techniques and samples.
Finally in Chapter Eight, we overview the basic findings and provide a discussion
on the contributions and limitations of the thesis to the literature. We also suggest further
research topics in this area.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Credit Channel of Monetary Transmission: A Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
During the second half of the twentieth century the main schools of economic thought
have extensively debated the role of money in the real economy. The classical quantity
theory of money implies that a change in exogenously controlled money supply does not
impact on the real variables such as real interest rates, relative prices, real wages,
consumption, investment and income but that it does result in a proportional change in the
aggregate price level. This proposition, also known as the 'neutrality of money', has been
a source of extensive debate in the macroeconomic literature. Contrary to the classical
model in which money serves as a 'veil' over real activity, monetarist and Keynesian
models attributed an important role to money in terms of its interaction with aggregate
demand.
According to monetarists, a change in the money supply has a short-run impact on
real economic activity because of mistaken expectations and nominal rigidities but in the
long run this impact disappears as agents perfectly foresee the change in money supply. In
contrast, under the traditional Keynesian model, for example, according to the theory of
liquidity preference, the real interest rate in the money market is determined exogenously
by the monetary authority through changes in reserves.' Therefore, monetary policy in the
short run has the ability of changing real interest rates, and thus investment, consumption,
wealth, income, and relative prices.
There is an ongoing debate on the link between monetary policy and economic
activity, which is known as the monetary transmission mechanism. Early Keynesian
ICentral banks of many countries tend to change reserves through open market operations rather than
through the required reserve ratio.
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researchers have used structural IS-LM models where monetary policy generally affects
economic activity (mainly investment and consumption) through an interest rate channel
which is known also as the money view. Monetarists, however, have tended to understand
this mechanism by employing reduced-form evidence that implies a variety of monetary
transmission channels. Nevertheless, both Keynesian and monetarist views imply that
money has some real effects in the short term even thought their answers to the question
of how monetary shocks affect the economy are different. In contrast, real business cycle
theory does not accept the view that money is important for understanding business cycle
fluctuations. According to this theory, real economic equilibrium is affected by real
shocks in the form of productivity shocks, not by nominal shocks as shifts in monetary
policy (Prescott, 1986).
The empirical evidence suggests that the effects of monetary policy on real activity
are systematic, significant, and sizeable even though there is still a substantial amount of
debate on this issue. There is still, for example, a gap between the perspectives of
academic researchers and policy makers about the mechanisms of monetary transmission.
Theoretical models derive systematic and simplified links between monetary policy and
real activity but policy makers still need to know more about the prices and the quantities
conceptualised in these models because they are rarely identifiable or observable in real
life. For example, theoretical models suggest that changes in real interest rates affect real
variables but policy makers cannot observe real interest rates and therefore their
subjective expectations influence the process of policy making. The aggregation is
another issue that creates some drawbacks for policy makers when they attempt to foresee
the impact of policies efficiently.
Research in this area still needs to discover more coherent answers to the following
questions: How does monetary policy transmit into real activity? Does it alter the
composition of economic activity in addition to its effect at the aggregate level? Does {he
choice of finance matter for the impact of monetary policy on real activity, and if it does,
is it possible to identify supply and demand shocks separately? Can central banks really
control broad money after a financial innovation that leads to the appearance of a number
of new money substitutes? It is also a crucial issue to identify whether central banks
11
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perform monetary policy independently or if they only react to what is happening in the
economy.
In this chapter, we discuss the basic channels through which monetary policy
transmits. We are going to concentrate more on the theoretical and empirical literature on
the credit channels of monetary transmission where the financial and real activities are
predominantly considered in a disaggregated framework rather than an aggregated one.
We aim at giving a broad picture of this literature to make sure that the reader can follow
the further discussions made in the following chapters. In these chapters we
predominantly adopt micro analyses based on models with heterogeneous firms and on
the empirical side we employ panel data techniques.
In section two, we briefly discuss basic concepts and channels associated with the
monetary transmission. Section three is devoted to the discussion of the basic theoretical
framework for the credit channel. That is, we focus on the bank lending channel and the
broad credit channel with a special emphasis on the financial accelerator theory.
Moreover, in this section we review some studies on the choice of firm finance. This
literature introduces informational problems into the relationship between lenders and
borrowers or between managers or shareholders, and has a very close connection with the
credit channel. We provide a review of some empirical studies related to the credit
channel in section four. The last section is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2.2. A Brief Introduction to Monetary Policy Channels
2.2.1. Traditional Money View
Conventional views often oversimplify the interaction between money and real activity.
As explained above, this created a gap between policy and theory. However, some recent
studies, both theoretical and empirical, seem to narrow this gap. In this section, we will
briefly discuss the traditional channel of monetary transmission as stated in the textbooks,
and provide recent evidence on the drawbacks of this channel to provide a picture of the
modem monetary transmission. This discussion will lead us to focus on alternative
channels of monetary transmission especially the credit channel.
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The traditional monetary transmission mechanism, the interest rate channel, which
was extensively studied within the standard IS-LM model, can be defined in the following
way: an expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in the money supply and a fall
in the real interest rate, which in tum lowers the cost of investment funds, thereby
increasing investment spending, and output. According to this view, the monetary
authority can control money supply and prices are assumed to be sticky in the short run.
Therefore a decline in real money balances leads to an increase in short term real interest
rates in the money market. In addition, asset holders are assumed to choose between only
two alternative instruments namely money and bonds. Bank loans, equity and other forms
of credit are viewed as perfect substitutes for the bonds (auction market credit).
This view is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem where the
performance of firms is independent of the firms' financial structure and financial markets
operate without frictions. That is, retained earnings, debts, and equity are equivalent and
perfect substitutes on the liability side of non-financial firms as implicitly assumed also by
Arrow-Debreu type models. Firms can costlessly substitute between bank and non-bank
finance and thus investment or other real activities should be independent of the sources
of finance (Modiglian and Miller, 1958).
The earlier literature beginning with Keynes emphasises that the interest rate
channel is operating through firm' decisions about investment while recent research
recognised that this channel is effective also through consumers' decisions about housing
and consumer durable expenditure. Monetary authorities use interest rates in the money
market to change expectations about the future course of real activity in the economy.
Expectations about inflation, profitability, unemployment, sales, and wages reflect the
confidence of agents about their consumption and investment decisions. Monetary
authorities try to affect expectations and confidence levels in order to attain their short
term and long term targets. The reaction of agents to an increase in interest rates in terms
of expectations formation may differ from time to time depending on targets, the stage of
business cycles, and the credibility of the central bank'
2 We will discuss the issues related with measuring monetary policy stance in section four where we review
empirical studies.
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Obviously, this view fails to explain some important aspects. We will summarise
some of them. Firstly, this channel explains the mechanisms through which monetary
policy affects aggregate demand, investment, future and current consumption, economic
competitiveness and even labour supply but it does not have much to say about the impact
of policy on wealth distribution. It is assumed that every household, firm, or bank has the
same financial position and therefore they react uniformly to a change in the real interest
rate. In reality, however, financially weak agents are more sensitive in terms of adjusting
their activities to a rise in the real interest rate.
Secondly, it underestimates the magnitude of policy effects on the real economy
without considering an external finance premium that results form market imperfections
and leads to additional increases in the cost of capital. This fact becomes more obvious as
economic recessions result in deeper contractions than economists anticipate. That is, the
business cycle is more volatile under market imperfections.
Thirdly, monetary policy affects real activity in the short-run only through short-
term interest rates because of slow adjustments in prices. Therefore this view has some
weaknesses in explaining the impact of policy on long lived assets such as housing or
production equipment, which should be primarily sensitive to real long-term interest rates.
The responses of residential and business fixed investments to monetary shocks are
realised at a different time with substantial lags. Although monetary policy has limited
control over the real long-term interest rates the residential investments are very sensitive
to changes in monetary policy because of a change in the premium on external finance
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
Fourthly, it is difficult to explain the late response of the investments (generally
between 6-24 months in the US) to monetary shocks. In fact, inventories or other forms of
investment may continue to decline due to the external finance premium as the recession
sets in even if interest rates decline. Therefore, the traditional view is not able to explain
the duration of the recessions.
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2.2.2. More on the Monetary Transmission
The monetary transmission is a complex topic because there are many channels through
which monetary policy operates. New Keynesians and monetarists developed some macro
and micro basis models and incorporated market imperfections and price rigidities into
the existing framework in the 1990s.3 In addition to money and bonds, this literature
focuses on various forms of financial assets that are subject to various degrees of
informational problems.' This literature tries to answer the question of how monetary
policy has real effects rather than the question of whether monetary policy has real effects.
This new line of research is an enhancement, and complements the money view; it is not
necessarily an independent view of the monetary transmission mechanism. Three main
channels with a number of sub-channels of monetary transmission have been mainly
discussed in the recent literature alongside the traditional view as shown in Figure 2.1;
namely the exchange rate channel, other assets price channel and the credit channel (See
also Mishkin, 1995; Bank of England, 1999).
First, as countries tend to become more open in terms of commodity trade and
financial transactions, more attention has been paid to the exchange rate channel. This
channel is very much connected with the other transmission channels. A rise in the
interest rates results in an increase in demand for domestic currency. This leads to an
appreciation of domestic currency, in tum domestic commodities in terms of foreign
currency become expensive and thus the export of goods and services as a component of
total income decline. In short, a contractionary policy reduces real activity through
changing international trade composition (Obsfelt and Rogoff, 1995).
Second, the traditional money view focuses only on bond prices and interest rates
but monetary policy may also transmit through other assets prices such as equity prices,
foreign exchange or, as in the credit channel, lending rates. Tobin's q theory explains how
monetary policy can affect the economy through its impact on the valuation of stocks. An
3 According to the rational expectation approach, monetary policy can be effective only if the monetary
authority misinforms the agents, thus creating price surprises that lead to a change in real behaviour (Lucas,
1972).
4 Bemanke calls the number of imperfectly substitutable financial assets as the Brainard number of the
theory in comment for Friedman and Kuttner (1993).
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increase in money supply leads to an increase in the demand for stocks thus stock prices
and firms' market values increase, and eventually firms invest more. On the other hand,
an increase in stock prices makes households feel wealthier and consequently they tend to
consume more.
Third, the credit channel becomes operative when the assumptions of perfect
substitutability among different forms of finance (external and internal funds for non-
financial firms, and loans and securities for banks) and of adjustable prices are relaxed.
This means that credit on the asset side of banks' balance sheet may be treated as a source
of shocks at least as important as money. This channel provides a theoretical and
empirical framework for examining some the crucial questions that have been posed
above.
Figure 2.1: Monetary Transmission Channels'
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5 The figure is adopted from Kuttner and Mosser (2002)
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During the last decade, research on the credit channel has become increasingly very
popular among theoretical and empirical researchers. Three main reasons may be seen
behind this development. Firstly, an upsurge of the literature on asymmetric information
led to the marriage of models of informational imperfections in corporate finance with
traditional macroeconomic models. Secondly, the financial crisis in the US in the early
1990s had an unexpectedly deep impact on real activity caused by the credit crunch. This
encouraged economists to concentrate more on channels of monetary transmission that
take into consideration financial imperfections and banks. Lastly, although the underlying
theory remained valid, developments like financial innovation and deregulation changed
the role of money. A stable relationship between observed money and real activity is no
longer manifested in empirical evidence (Friedman, 1995). We are going to discuss this
channel in detail from both the theoretical and empirical points of view in the rest of this
chapter.
2.3. The Credit Channel
Contrary to what the traditional money view implies, this channel devotes a significant role
to the financial positions of firms, households, and banks because of imperfections in
financial interactions," Since there are a number of financial assets that are imperfect
substitutes, banks, firms, and households cannot switch across financial assets without
incurring a cost. Monetary policy shocks are likely to change the availability, cost and
composition of financial assets. The presence of transaction costs and the asymmetric
distribution of information in financial markets creates grounds for the existence of
government regulations and banks (or other financial intennediaries) that alleviates the
extent of informational asymmetries and transaction costs, agency costs, and in tum,
improves the efficiency and productive capacity of the economy. In short, monetary policy
also transmits into real activity through a mechanism that considers the financial conditions
of agents.
6 The adverse selection and moral hazard problems may appear more often in relatively less developed
financial markets characterised by unexpected changes in the interest rates and prices (good, equity or stock)
and uncertainty. The extent of these problems is believed to have also affected the depth of recent financial
crises in developing countries.
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The external funds would be more expensive than internal funds for financially
fragile firms in imperfect markets. The expected return received by the lenders exceeds
the cost of the corresponding fund, and mainly stems from asymmetric distribution of
information among borrowers and lenders. Therefore, monetary shocks affect the financial
positions of those firms who need external finance, thus reducing the ability of borrowers
to finance their investment projects. An initial decline in economic activity as a result of a
tight monetary policy may have a significant impact on the borrowing and spending
decisions of the agents facing credit market frictions, most likely households and
financially weak firms. Therefore, in this framework, monetary shocks can have an impact
on the redistribution of sources from investors or consumers to lenders.
Theoretical and empirical studies on the credit view have concentrated in two main
channels as mentioned in previous the chapter, namely the bank lending channel and the
broad credit channel through which monetary policy shocks affect real economic activity.'
The impact of monetary policy on the bank loan supply defines the bank lending channel
while its impact on the borrowing capability of firms and households through changes in
their collateral net worth or cash flow (the balance sheet channel) defines the broad credit
channel. Some other channels can also be classified within the broad credit channel,
namely those that consider wealth and household liquidity effects.
Conflicting evidence obtained from aggregate data has played an important role in
the development of a micro basis analysis associated with the credit channel of monetary
transmission. Contrary to the reduced form models that are extensions of the standard
ISILM model and allow for the coexistence of bonds and bank loans under the
assumptions of imperfect substitutability', the models that have a microeconomic basis
allow for firm heterogeneity. These models have been built in order to understand the
interaction between the financial structure of lenders and borrowers, and real economic
activity within the framework of asymmetric information and agency cost problems. The
, See Kashyap and Stein (1993) for a review ofliterature on the lending channel literature and Hubbard
(1994) for a survey on the broad credit channel.
8 See Bemanke and Blinder (1988), Romer and Romer (1990), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Kashyap et al.
(1993) for extensions oflS-LM models. Among these, Friedman and Kuttner (1993) emphasise also the
price of financial instruments (interest rates) as well as their supply to derive implications for the monetary
transmission mechanism.
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models in this literature tend to identify supply and demand dynamics and therefore they
may be classified along two main lines of research.
The first line of research can also be classified into two groups of models. The
models in the first group tend to analyse the impact of policy shocks on the supply and
cost of funds (the lending channel) and the financial structure of fund suppliers (mainly
intermediariesj.' The second group of models is related to the credit rationing literature.
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets may lead the financial
market to fail.Io Although banks have the ability to lend and firms have a sufficient
demand for these funds, banks may ration credit to certain firms who have a high default
probability. Credit rationing is a sufficient condition for the bank lending channel but it is
not a necessary condition, that is, this channel may be operative even when markets do not
fail.
The second line of research examines the dynamics of the demand for funds within
the principal agent framework. The models in this area of research may also be classified
into two categories. The first one is related to the financial accelerator theory in which
policy shocks lead to cycles through the financial positions of borrowers and
intermediaries. I I This research area studies the impact of policy shocks on the cost,
availability, and demand of internal and external funds of non-financial firms under
informational asymmetries and incentive problems. The second group of models
examines the taxonomy of firms according to their source of external finance such as bank
debt, equity, and various forms of market finance. What distinguishes these sources of
external finance is the ability of financial institutions to monitor the activities of their
clients and thus overcome the problems due to asymmetries of information.V This
framework allows us to analyse the implications of policy shocks for borrowers' choice of
finance and real activity.
9 Stein (1998), Fisher (1999), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) and Kishan and Opeiela (2000).
10 Among others see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Eckstein and Sinai (1986)
IIBemanke and Gertler (1989), Fuerst (1995), Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Gertler, Gichrist and Natalucci
(2001)
12 Diamond (1991), Hoshi et al (1993), Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Holrnsrom and Tirole (1997), Repullo
and Suarez (2000), Bolton and Freixas (2000).
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As discussed above, since the credit quantity observed in the market is jointly
determined by loan supply and borrowers' demand it is difficult to distinguish whether the
impact of monetary policy originates from the supply side or the demand side of the
financial transactions in the credit view. The central bank can influence banks' supply of
money and credit by altering reserves but the observed quantity depends on other
influences such as the behaviour of banks and borrowers. In the next two sub-sections, we
provide a theoretical review that considers the supply or demand dynamics, respectively.
2.3.1. The Bank Lending Channel: Supply Side
2.3.1.1. Definitions and Issues
Under the money view of the transmission mechanism, banks can only change deposits on
the liability side of their balance sheets. A monetary contraction results in a reduction in
reserves and thus the nominal money balances of households and retail deposits (or
insured deposits). Banks maintain lending activity by issuing large certificate of deposits
(or uninsured deposits) or reducing their security portfolio to offset the reduction in the
insured deposits." Retail deposits and the certificate of deposits issued by banks are
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Since prices are not fully adjusted, households' real
money balances decline as real interest rates increase, and eventually investment and other
real economic activity declines. In contrast, overall bank credit supply does not change as
a reaction to monetary policy shocks.
However, loans and securities as bank assets and retail and large certificate of
deposits (wholesale deposits) as bank liabilities may be imperfect substitutes. In other
words, banks would not react to a change in reserves or interest rates by simply altering
their holdings of securities and leaving loan supply unchanged or by financing loans by
issuing large certificate of deposits. Similarly, firms would not be able to offset without
cost a change in the bank loan supply by issuing more equity. Therefore, a contractionary
monetary policy will reduce bank loan supply that affects directly economic activity of
13 Insured and uninsured deposits are perfect substitutes in this view. Insured bank deposits are determined
through the reserve requirement ratio while banks issue uninsured certificates of deposits.
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particular borrowers who cannot raise funds from alternative sources.t" In addition, a rise
in the interest rate as a result of a decline in the reserves eventually leads bank lending
rates to increase faster than bond rates.
As we may implicitly observe from the previous paragraph, there are some
important conceptual and identification issues associated with the bank lending channel.
First, a contraction in the money supply will lead to a decline in the credit volume in the
economy. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) have already modelled this fact using the IS-LM
framework and we will discuss this benchmark model in detail later. However, the
question of whether monetary policy necessarily affects bank lending as a component of
total credit still needs to be answered. For example, Romer and Romer (1990) claim that
the decline in bank deposits arising from open market sales can be offset by issuing large
certificate of deposits therefore there is not an independent bank lending channel.
Second, the evidence shows that bank credit volume declines as a result of monetary
contractions. Theoretical models need to identify the supply and demand dynamics
separately in order to provide a consistent and efficient framework for policy makers.
Romer and Romer (1990) argue that bank credits are determined more likely by demand
factors rather than by a contractionary effect of monetary policy while Kashyap et al.
(1993) claim the opposite. This issue can be resolved through further micro basis
empirical and theoretical analyses.
Third, bank loans are crucial for a set of borrowers. Some groups of firms may not
have enough internal funds and thus need to finance their projects from external sources.
Since banks have monitoring technology, they provide funds efficiently to those firms
experiencing difficulties with financing. For example, if firms are small or lack collateral
or have short track records, they have to pay a higher cost when they issue bonds or
equity. During contractionary periods, although such firms' demand for bank finance
increases, banks may be reluctant to provide funds to these firms or may not have enough
resources for this type of borrower. The bank lending channel operates when the following
14 Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002) name the normal deposits and certificate of deposits as retail and
wholesale deposits, respectively while Stein (1998) classify them as insured deposits that are subject to
reserve requirements and uninsured deposits that are not subject to reserve requirements
21
Chapter Two The Credit Channel of Monetary Transmission: A Literature Review
two conditions hold. There exist some borrowers with high information costs (primarily
bank-dependent) and there is a reduction in the loan supply following a tight monetary
policy.
Fourth, there is also a set of borrowers who have close relations with banks, other
financial institutions, or other non-financial firms. Negative shocks may not affect the
financial and real activity of such borrowers significantly because they get the necessary
finance at reasonable rates by exploiting this relationship. We come to this issue later in
Chapter Five.
Fifth, the framework given above implies that banks are subject to informational
problems as a result of issuing large certificates of deposits in order to compensate for the
decline in the retail deposits. That is, banks that do not own large capital cannot costlessly
issue certificate of deposits without cost. Financially strong banks may raise funds from
the market to continue their lending activities but small and financially weak banks may
have to reduce their lending activities as reserves shrink. Stein (1998) develops a model
where depositors charge a premium on uninsured bank debt because they can not
differentiate between good and bad bank (adverse selection). Due to a government
guarantee, there is no premium on insured deposits. Lending of poorly capitalised banks
will be more sensitive to deposit shocks because the wedge between the returns on loans
and securities is larger for these banks. Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) and Kishan and
Opeiela (2000) find evidence for these theoretical predictions.
2.3.1.2. Basic Theoretical Models
In this section we are going to go over two basic models developed by Bemanke and
Blinder (1988) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). The first model derives a general
framework for the credit channel while the second one emphasises the uniqueness of bank
loans in the sense that having a relation with banks and getting loans from them produces
a benefit for borrowers who are bank dependent. In fact, the second model is going to be a
reference point of the empirical research in this thesis.
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Bernanke and Blinder's Model of the Credit Channel
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) have formulated a theoretical model of the credit
channel by modifying the standard IS-LM model by introducing bank loans as an
imperfect substitute for bonds. The model can be formulated as follows.P
S(y, re) =Dh (y, re) + Bh (y, rB) (2.1)
where real saving, S, is the sum of household money, Dh and bond holdings, Bh and all
components depend on real income, y, and the interest rate in the bond market, rB.
Investment demand of firms, I, is financed through bonds according to the money view
while it is financed by bonds, II and bank loans, JJ, according to the credit view.
(2.2)
where ri is the interest rate in the credit market. Banks issue deposits, Db, to finance three
assets, namely reserves, R, bonds, Bb and loans, Lb.
(2.3)
In this model the quantity of money is determined exogenously by the multiplier
mechanism, Db = Rip, where u, is the required reserve ratio. Banks determine the amount
of bonds and loan as assets by optimising their portfolios.
(2.4)
(2.5)
I(rL,rB) + G = S(y, rB) (2.6)
where G is total government expenditures. The credit curve is obtained in the IS-LM
framework by defining ri in terms of re and R in the good market, ri = ¢( rs. R). The
IS The presentation of the model follows Freixas and Rochet (1999).
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reserves appear in the equation of the good market, the IS equation. The money market is
depicted by the traditional LM curve.
I(¢(rB. R). r») + G = Sty, re) (2.7)
In the model, an increase in reserves has two implications. Firstly, as in the money
view, an increase in reserves leads the money supply to rise, then the LM curve shifts to
the right, and eventually income increases and the interest rate declines. Secondly, as
credit volume, investment, and income increase, the credit curve, CC, shifts upward
(Figure 2.2).
This model implies that monetary policy can have real effects without substantially
affecting interest rates. If banks have access to reserves, they can increase the credit
supply to firms, which can in tum invest more without changing their demand for bonds.
Contrary to the money view, special attention is given to loans on the assets side of the
balance sheets of banks. Due to reserve requirements on deposits, the monetary authority
directly controls the availability of bank credit and thus the borrowing and spending of
bank dependent agents. In other words, a tight monetary policy reduces the real quantity
of bank reserves through open market sales (assuming prices are temporally sticky), thus
deposits shrink and this in tum induces banks to reduce lending. However, as we
explained above, in modem economies money creation is no longer completely
exogenous. Deposits supply depends not only on the fixed reserve requirement ratio but
also on the interest rates, which is widely used as an instrument in controlling money
supply, income, and other variables.
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Rate
Income
Figure 2.2: Credit Channel in IS-LM Framework
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox's Attempt to Identify the Bank Lending Channel
Firms benefit by having a close relationship with banks because this relationship
undermines the potential informational frictions and improves their reputation. Bank
finance is special as it includes a monitoring process and has signalling implications for
those firms that are more likely to finance their investment directly from the market.
Therefore, even financially strong firms may need bank finance to a certain extent to be
able to get finance from the market directly. In addition to the availability of internal
finance, the composition of bank finance and market finance gives information about the
extent of financial constraints that firms face and thus the severity of informational
problems (see Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992 and Boot, 2000).
Empirical evidence shows that supply of loans is procyclical -bank loans shrink
during tight periods. It is important to identify the source of reduction of bank loans -
whether it is sourced from loan supply or loan demand. A contractionary policy would
reduce loan supply under two conditions: (i) securities and loans on the assets side of
banks are not perfect substitutes; as reserves shrink banks cannot shift to securities
without incurring a cost to maintain lending and (ii) banks cannot issue large certificate of
deposits (uninsured deposits) to finance lending without paying a premium due to
asymmetric information between banks and depositors. As explained above firms
basically have two sources of external finance, bank loans, and market finance (bonds or
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commercial paper or equity). A contractionary policy may lead to an increase in the cost
of bank finance for collaterally poor firms and therefore they may reduce demand for
external finance including bank loans which are vitally important for maintaining their
investment. Issuing bonds or equity is potentially very expensive for collaterally poor
firms, thus they would rather reduce their investment activity, while for those with ample
collateral it is possible to maintain investment by issuing commercial paper, bonds or
equity. At the aggregate level, one may expect that the ratio of bank loans to bonds on the
liabilities side of corporate firms declines, as the monetary authority contracts reserves.
That is, banks reduce their loan supply in parallel to the squeeze in the reserves thus the
ratio of bank loans to market finance may decline. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993)
illustrate this prediction by constructing a model that adopts the framework proposed by
Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
Kashyap et al. (1993) tend to identify an independent lending channel by focusing
on the mix and uniqueness of banks. Suppose that firms finance a fraction of their
investment using bank funds, a. As we emphasised above, banks reduce inefficiencies in
the financial market originating from adverse selection and moral hazard by monitoring
the borrowers; therefore bank finance is unique in this sense. The investors benefit from
their relationship with banks. The benefit relationship function, (/J, is shown as
l/J= /*f(a) (2.8)
where f(.) is an increasing concave function and I denotes investment. The optimal
fraction of bank financing, a' is determined by the spread between loan rates, ri, and
bonds rates r». that is,
(2.9)
where F() is a decreasing function of the spread. Any shock, e.g. monetary shock that
changes the relative costs of loans or bonds affects the firm's financing portfolio. The
investor's net cost of capital, k, is formulated in the following form;
(2.10)
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and investment demand depends on income, y as well as on capital cost,
I =I'(Y, k) (2.11)
where income is the sum of the investment and exogenous government expenditures. To
simplify the model it is assumed that bank loans are financed completely with demand
deposits. Money can then be used as the stance of monetary policy and an increase in the
money supply, M, directly affects bonds rates as well as loan rates. Therefore the loan
supply, L, also depends on the spread of loan and bond rates and on money supply through
a reduction in the source of loans i.e. demand deposits, that is;
(2.12)
where J() is an increasing function of the spread. Loan demand, a*I, and loan supply are
in parity at the equilibrium. The following formulation enables us to observe the
relationship between money supply and investment.
a'I = J(rL - rB)M (2.13)
By taking total derivative, we can determine the conditions for the existence of the bank
lending channel.
(2.14)
dBldM = (I-a' )dIldM - Ida·ldM (2.15)
da·/dM = F' d(rL - rB)ldM (2.16)
•dI = (I/dy)*dy + Ilc<irB+ha (drL - drB) (2.17)
The nux is going to disappear from these derivatives in the case of perfect
substitution between loans and securities (bonds, commercial paper) as items of banks'
assets and of non-financial firms' liabilities, therefore the change in investment is solely
determined by income and bond rates. The hypothesis that loans and securities are
imperfect substitutes as bank assets and firms' liabilities can be tested through adding the
mix as an independent variable into the investment equation in addition to the interest
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rate. Excluding the interest rate as an explanatory variable would not aid the detection of
the existence of an independent lending channel of transmission. In other words, without
using the interest rate as an explanatory variable together with the mix variable, it is
unlikely to identify the proper impact of loans on investment.
The framework explained above provides a rather macro framework for the bank
lending channel. New research focuses more on micro dynamics of banks and non-
financial firms. Regulations concerning financial institutions, capital structure, and other
bank specific characters have been modelled under imperfect financial markets to identify
the lending channel (Fisher, 1999; Stein, 1998 and others). We will discuss this new
perspective below by reviewing the empirical evidence in section 2.4.
2.3.2. The Broad Credit Channel: Demand Side
2.3.2.1. General Framework
Monetary policy affects not only market interest rates' and the credit supply, but also the
financial position of borrowers both directly and indirectly. The direct impact may arise in
two forms. First, a rise in the interest rate as a result of an unexpected tight policy
increases the interest expenses which, in tum, weaken the financial positions of firms
through a reduction in cash flow and collateral net worth and thus firm activity. Second, a
rise in the interest rate is also typically associated with a decline in assets prices for firms
and households. The indirect impact, on the other hand, is a slowdown in economic
activity resulting from a decline in consumption expenditures, which in tum reduces cash
flow.
Firms tend to borrow from external sources (bank debts, issuing bonds and equities
or other forms of finance) when they do not have enough internal funds to finance their
investment projects. If firms (borrowers) do not have enough internal funds and collateral
net worth, lenders may be reluctant to extent funds to these borrowers at a risk free
interest rate because such transactions involve a risk: borrowers may fail to pay back
debts. For example, this will be the case if there are informational problems between
lenders and borrowers in the sense that lenders have less information about projects than
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borrowers and therefore is more likely to be defrauded by borrowers.!" Therefore, lenders
either ration the supply of funds or impose higher interest rates on loans to capture the
average risk of default. Informational asymmetries enlarge the wedge between actual
lending rates and the market interest rate (the external finance premiumj.V
In modern economies, m addition to bank finance where borrowers pay a
monitoring cost, market finance is another source of finance. Borrowers who are able to
raise funds directly from the capital market at the market rate are expected to have higher
net worth, therefore they are less likely to be subject to informational problems. On the
other hand, borrowers relying on bank finance have relatively limited financial sources
and thus have to pay additionally monitoring fees that ameliorate informational problems.
There is a hierarchy among alternative sources of finance, from the cheapest to the most
expensive; internal funds, market finance, bank finance. In practice, firms may finance
their investment projects by a mix of bank, market, and internal finance.
The literature on this area has three basic implications: (i) imperfect information
generates an extra cost for investors who borrow from the market and makes the external
finance more expensive than the internal finance, (ii) the internal finance (net worth of
firms) is not only relatively cheaper than the external finance but also reduces the cost of
the external finance (iii) a fall in internal funds reduces the borrowers' spending, holding
constant underlying investment opportunities. These results are linked to moral hazard,
adverse selection, and other incentive problems.
The broad credit channel of monetary transmission focuses on the observations
given in the previous paragraph. Internal cash flow and collateral net worth of firms are
the main determinants of the external finance premium therefore stronger financial
position undermines the impact of asymmetric information problems and reduces
premiums on the external finance. However, financially constrained firms that face a high
external finance premium tend to reduce investment and consumption spending to avoid
16 Akerlof (1970), for the fist time, introduced the asynunetric information problem into the second hand car
market, that is originally called the 'lemon problem'. Myers and Majluf(1984), Jaffee and Russell (1976),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986) and others adopted this problem to the financial transactions.
17 The market interest rate is often assumed to be risk free by theoretical models but in practice borrowing
from the capital market includes a risk premium.
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the high cost of external finance as a reaction to a tight monetary policy. This framework
implies that the reaction of firms with a heterogeneous financial structure (constrained or
unconstrained) to monetary policy shocks differ. Therefore, external shocks affect the
investment demand as well as the distribution of wealth in the economy by changing the
external finance premium.
A Simple Model on the Broad Credit Channel
We will present a simple model by Gertler and Hubbard (1988) to understand the
basic framework in this literature. The model introduces agency problems in a basic
financial framework. The model assumes two periods. In the first period, a risk-neutral
borrower uses inputs to produce output, Y, in order to sell in the second period. There are
two types of inputs, namely hard capital (say machinery), K, and soft capital, C, that is
made up of organisational or maintenance expenditures. Soft capital is supposed to
improve the productivity of hard capital. The production technology is risky and has
'good' and 'bad' outcomes. The likelihood of a good outcome increases with a sufficient
amount of soft capital in the production process where sufficient is defined by an amount
proportional to the quantity of hard capital.
Y =I(K) with probability of a good outcome, 1f and (2.18.1)
Y = af(K) with probability of a bad outcome, ,I if C ~ vK
Y = af(K) if C < vK (2.18.2)
where I(K) denotes the production function, strictly increasing, and concave, twice
continuously differentiable. K is the capital stock that is the investment in the two period
model, 1f +,1 =1, 0<a<1 and v >0.
For simplicity, it is assumed that firms use an amount of soft capital of either vK or
zero and it is always efficient to employ the soft capital «7l'g + 7l'ba)f'(K)/(1 + v) > a). If
markets are perfectly competitive, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds i.e. the optimum
level of capital is independent of the financial choice of firms. Investment is derived by
the following profit maximisation problem, (;rg + ;rba)(K) - (1+ v)rK. Solving this for
the first order condition gives the optimum level of capital.
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(2.19)
where r denotes the lending rate. Equation (2.19) tells us that the expected marginal
benefit from an additional unit of K is equal to the marginal cost of investment. The
traditional money view can be easily illustrated in this example. As the interest rate
increases the investment demand declines.
Under asymmetric information, however, the solution is more complicated. The
expenditures on hard capital are observable by lenders while only managers of firms have
proper information on the soft capital. This creates an agency problem between lenders
and firm managers because managers may be tempted to divert soft capital funds for
personal benefits by investing at a gross return rate of r. In order to discourage such a
temptation, lenders arrange the financial contract to mitigate incentives to defraud. Their
optimum level of the capital in this case would be less than the desired capital derived
under perfect information. The difference between desired capital and actual capital is
negatively related with the net worth of the firm which is made up of liquid assets, Wand
the present value of collateralizable future profits, Vir. The firm is going to borrow as
much as the amount of investment minus liquid assets, (J +v)K - Wand pay back an
amount ofp if the project has a good outcome and pb if the project has a bad outcome.
The firm is going to maximise expected profit,
(2.20)
The lender can only raise funds if the expected return is at least equal to the opportunity
cost of funds (gross interest rate times quantity borrowed),
(2.21)
The design of the contract should take into account an 'incentive constraint' so that the
manager's expected gain from the honest action exceeds the one from diverting the soft
capital funds for personal benefit. That is,
(2.22)
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Most of the time, contracts are designed in such a way that the finn has to pay all
available assets when the outcome is bad to reduce the temptation for defrauding. A
'limited liability' constraint influences the contract:
ph ~ af(K}+ V (2.23)
Expected profit given in (2.20) is maximised subject to (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) by
selecting K, If and pb. When the incentive constraint (2.22) binds, financial and
investment decisions are no longer independent. We reformulate (2.22) by eliminating
Ifand pb using (2.21) and (2.23).
(trg + trh a)f(K) - [reI + 2v)]K + r{W + V I r) = 0 (2.24)
As long as this equation holds, investment is an increasing function of a borrower's net
worth, W+ VIr. That is:
aK =[{1+2v)-{trg +trba)f'{K)lrr l > 0
a(W +VIr}
(2.25)
This model does not propose an alternative channel for the bank lending channel or
the traditional money channel. It shows that if a firm has limited internal funds, it has to
rely on external funds. A contractionary monetary policy leads to a further increase in the
cost of external finance and reduces the net worth of the firm. Therefore, the firm tends to
reduce spending on investment and the extent of reduction in the investment depends on
the financial structure of the firms. Contrary to the money view, the broad credit channel
predicts heterogeneous reactions of firms to monetary shocks.
2.3.2.2. The Financial Accelerator Theory
As we implicitly explained above agents exhibit heterogeneous reactions to external
shocks over the business cycle. There are two kinds of asymmetries in the behaviours of
the agents. First, the activities of financially constrained firms are more sensitive to
external shocks than the activities of unconstrained firms. Take monetary policy shocks:
an increase in interest rates will increase the user cost of capital for all agents in the first
stage but in the second stage, for particular firms, there will be a further increase in their
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cost of funds because of an increase in the external financial premium. In other words, the
impact of monetary policy shock is amplified and propagated by the poor financial
conditions of the firms; this mechanism is called the 'financial accelerator'. Second, firms
react differently to the external shocks whether the economy is in a recessionary or in a
recovery stage or whether there is a negative shock or a positive shock. This type of
asymmetry in the behaviours of firms is implicitly connected to the first asymmetry.
Negative shocks during recessions have a deeper impact on the activities of constrained
firms. We will overview some seminal papers associated with the financial accelerator
theory in the rest of this sub-section. The benchmark paper that will be reviewed are
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1998) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model the financial accelerator theory within the
framework of the principal agent literature. This theory implies that small shocks may
lead to large cycles by the pro-cyclical variation of sales, inventories and the short-term
debt of financially constrained firms, which have limited access to credit markets. This
model is one of the earliest examples that combines the micro foundations of business
cycles with asymmetric information. The role of interactions between borrowers and
lenders in the business cycles is analysed by introducing the 'costly state verification'
approach.l'' Since only firms (borrowers) can observe the yield of their investment,
lenders should pay a cost to verify the yield of investment. The verification cost leads to a
wedge between internal and external funds (agency costs or external finance premium).
High collateral net worth of borrowers implies low agency costs in transactions, and a
lower premium on external funds supplied by lenders, and thus high investment and
economic activity. The shocks that lead to fluctuations in the agency costs or the external
finance premium can be seen as a source of real fluctuations. In this context, not only the
productivity shocks as proposed by the real business cycle theory, but also the monetary
shocks can lead to cyclical fluctuations in real variables.
The return rates on various financial assets differ based on the extent of asymmetry
In the distribution of information in financial markets, which in tum induces the
preference of investors towards the least costly financial sources to finance their
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investment project. Since the contractual relationship between lenders and borrowers last
more than one period, the borrowers' net worth should be evaluated in terms of not only
their current situation but also in terms of expected future profits. Therefore, monetary
policy shocks affect the duration and the depth of the business cycles that are unlikely to
be predicted by the money view. The theoretical framework built by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) has actually formed the basis of the empirical studies that explain the variation in
investment of firms by the heterogeneity in their balance sheets.
Fuerst (1995) constructs and quantifies a model within the spirit of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989). He discusses the quantitative extent of the agency costs that propagate the
initial impact of shocks in a real business cycle framework. The mechanism in this model
operates in the following manner: high output implies a high entrepreneur wage and thus
low agency costs (the moral hazard problem becomes less likely when the wages of
entrepreneurs increase) and this then leads to a high capital accumulation and output
growth in the future. Incorporating the financial aspects into the real business cycle
framework does not change the implications of this approach for the propagation
mechanism. Shocks lead to a change in agency costs and redistribution of wealth. Gertler
(1995) made some modest modifications in the framework of Fuerst (1995) and produced
some interesting results where the financial frictions have an important effect on output
fluctuations as a result of technology shocks.
Similarly, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) construct a computable general equilibrium
model in which endogenous agency costs play an important role in business fluctuations.
In fact, they quantify the qualitative results of a model almost similar to the model
constructed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). An aggregate shock that transfers wealth
from entrepreneurs to lenders will lower aggregate investment. Since wealth transfer
increases the need for external finance and leads to greater agency costs, it propagates the
impact of the shock. They conclude that output displays positive autocorrelation in the
short run, that is, the investments decisions are delayed until agency costs reach the lowest
.level after a shock and this leads to a hump-shaped output behaviour.
18 Townsend (1979) introduced the costly state verification in his model as a way of capturing the
asymmetric distribution of information between borrowers and lenders in the economy.
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Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the model built by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) provide important insights about the accelerator theory even though the
implications of monetary policy are not modelled explicitly. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
attempt to understand the persistence impact of relatively small shocks on output and
asset prices. It is assumed that the borrowing ability and the capital cost are limited by the
discounted present values of the collateral value of the land. Therefore, all debts are
secured and there is no default in the equilibrium. This framework is based on the
assumption of the inalienability of human capital where the lenders would. like to
guarantee their loans back in the case of withdrawal of entrepreneurs from the project
(farmers do not pre-commit to a project). The external finance availability is directly
linked to the value of collateral assets, and current and future asset prices. Fluctuations in
the prices of the durable assets affect borrowing ability and credit availability in the
future. The shocks in the current period create cycles in future investment and output
through a price mechanism.
The transmission mechanism in this model is defined as follows: given a fixed
supply of land as collateral for debts and as a factor of production and given constrained
and unconstrained firms, a temporary productivity shock reduces the net worth of
constrained firms and therefore firms' borrowing ability and investment are limited by
their reduced net worth in the current period. Subsequently, the output and revenue of
these firms drop in the future and this impact is amplified and spills over into the whole
economy. The contractionary impact of this process will continue with a decline in land
prices that leads to a lower collateral value and thus further exacerbating borrowing
constraints in the future. A further decline in the land price and in the user cost of assets
induces unconstrained firms to increase demand for land and thus the economy enters into
a phase of recovery and land prices tend to increase again. This model predicts that in an
economy where credit limits are endogenously determined, even a sector specific
temporary shock leads to persistent fluctuations in the aggregate output and asset prices.
The model constructed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) focuses on the collateral net
worth of firms and asset prices through which external shocks create business cycles, that
is, a shock that changes the value of colleteralizable assets, influences the cost of capital
and thus investment. The model constructed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), however,
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concentrates on the agency cost (or external finance premium) arising from asymmetrical
distribution of information among investors and creditors. In addition, in contrast to
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) assume that entrepreneurs are
long-lived, thus they can examine dynamics of wealth redistribution in an environment of
imperfect credit markets. Moreover, the contract structure in Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is different in the sense that the former uses the costly
state verification cost that lead to agency cost where lending may exceed net worth and
thus default is possible at the equilibrium, while the latter assumes that borrowing is
constrained by net worth so that default cannot occur at the equilibrium.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) present a stochastic general equilibrium
model that synthesises the leading dynamic New Keynesian frameworks including those
of Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In this model,
money and price stickiness are incorporated to capture the monetary transmission given
the credit market imperfections where the link between net worth and the external finance
premium is clearly established. The model also allows for a cost of adjusting the capital
stock that affects the collateral net worth of firms, a monopolistically competitive retail
sector and heterogeneity among firms in accessing capital markets. The model simulations
also imply that the endogenous developments in the credit market in terms of prices and
quantities amplify and propagate the impact of the small shocks over the business cycles.
Based on the model constructed by Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Gertler,
Gichrist and Natalucci (2001) extend the financial accelerator approach for a small open
economy where money and nominal prices are assumed to be rigid downwards. It is
claimed that the impact of the financial accelerator is much stronger under the fixed rate
regime than the flexible exchange rate regime. Under fixed exchange rates the central
bank adjusts interest rates to satisfy the target, and frequent changes in the interest rates,
in tum, magnify the impact of the financial accelerator and thus the volatility of output
will be higher under this regime. The impact of the financial accelerator will be deeper
when domestic debts are in the form of foreign exchange because of the possibility of
devaluation that weakens the balance sheets of firms by changing asset prices. A policy
implication of this model is that a counter-cyclical monetary policy can mitigate a
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financial crisis in general by adjusting interest rates given the level of aggregate demand,
but the external conditions may constrain the stabilising role of monetary policy.
2.3.2.3. A Brief Survey on the Choice of Finance
The idea of imperfect financial markets is incorporated into the borrowing and lending
activities of agents by introducing the concepts of moral hazard, adverse selection, and
other incentive problems. Discussions on the source of finance (particularly whether it is
obtained from internal or external sources) and its impact on the investment decisions of
agents, have become an important research agenda in this context. Contrary to the
Modigliani-Miller paradigm, intermediary lending (bank finance as well as other financial
institutions' loans) and market finance (direct finance by issuing commercial papers,
bonds or equity) have different characteristics including cost, attainability etc.
The literature on the choice between intermediary finance and varieties of market
finance attempts to explain the mechanism behind the financial aspects of investment
decisions. In this context, it is assumed that intermediary finance tends to alleviate the
moral hazard problem through monitoring which is the main activity of intermediary
institutions and reduces the extent of informational asymmetry. Young and small firms
that are subject to severe informational problems face difficulties to finance their
investment through financial markets directly. Therefore, they tend to raise funds from
intermediary finance by paying a monitoring cost. In fact, these firms have difficulties in
raising funds even through intermediary finance during tight periods when the latter has a
limited supply. Overall economic activity and efficiency are very much related to the
structure of financial markets and intermediary institutions as well as the financial
positions of non-financial firms19• The model that we will develop in the next chapter is
related to this literature.
Following Bernanke and Gertler (1990) that explicitly captures the interaction
between banks' capital structure and lending constraints, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
construct a model that examines the effects of financial intermediation in a framework
19 Recently, in the UK even for small firms, as the informational frictions have become less relevant the mix
of market finance and intermediary lending has been altered in favour of the former. '
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with moral hazard where firms and intermediaries are financially constrained. All forms
of shocks that reduce the value of capital in the economy in terms of credit crunches (a
decrease in the capital of the banking industry), a collateral squeeze (a negative shock on
firms' collateral) and saving squeeze (a decline in savings in the economy) influence
negatively the lending potential of the banks and the borrowing ability of those firms that
are less capitalised.
Firms that do not have enough capital need external funds for financing their
investment project. This increases the likelihood of the moral hazard to the extent that a
manager may choose a bad project to maximise his private interests. The moral hazard
problem can be solved either by a high proportion of self-finance or by banks who
monitor the activities of their clients. Well-capitalised banks and firms mitigate the
negative impact of shocks, the intermediaries retain the lending process, and in tum the
moral hazard problem becomes less severe. This model implies that in addition to the
collateral net worth of non-financial firms, the magnitude of banking capital (the
monitoring capital) is important in reducing agency costs that amplify the business cycle.
The empirical studies that emphasise the importance of monitoring capital as well as
financing constraints in the balance sheet of non-financial firms for monetary
transmission are based on this theoretical framework.
The Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model is closely related to the models developed
by Repullo and Suarez (2000), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) who also study
moral hazard framework where the role of firms' net worth in the choice of finance is
discussed, and Diamond (1991) who emphasises the role of firms' reputation in the choice
of finance. Contrary to others, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) further assume that
intermediaries are constrained in terms of capitaf",
Diamond (1991) constructed a theoretical model in which the interaction between a
firm's reputation capital (a good track record), and intermediary and market finance is
analysed based on the idea of delegating monitoring, first introduced by Diamond (1984).
The model implies that firms that have high reputation capital (for example, in our model
20 We will discuss in detail the issue of choice of finance in Chapter Three
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firms that have a large size of collateral assets) tend to finance their investments through
financial markets by issuing commercial paper while those firms that do not have enough
reputation capital cannot even obtain intermediary finance. These firms can raise external
funds only through an angel, joint venture capital or other forms of informal finance that
are relatively expensive. Hoshi et at (1993) used this framework to analyse the role of
ownership structure for raising external funds. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) allow a mixed
finance through banks and market finance by constructing a model in which entrepreneurs
may suffer from excessive monitoring by the banks and thus they mitigate this problem by
relying on market finance.
Repullo and Suarez (2000) developed a model where the choice between market
and intermediary finance is based on the net worth value of firms. The model introduces
some aspects of the credit channel of monetary transmission and derives some empirical
implications for it. Bolton and Freixas (2000) proposed a model in which bank debt,
equity issue and bond financing coexist in an environment of imperfect financial markets.
It is emphasised that the most constrained riskier firms prefer bank financing and
unconstrained safer firms tend to borrow from bond markets, while the firms in between
prefer to issue both bonds and equity.
2.4. Empirical Evidence
Wewill discuss the empirical implications of the credit channel in details in Chapters Five
and Six where we test the impact of financial conditions of firms (interacted with
monetary policy) on the mix, inventory investment and employment. In this chapter, we
highlight some issues related to measuring the monetary policy stance and the
identification of credit channels. In addition, we provide some examples of the empirical
studies that complement the following chapters. We skip the empirical survey on the
studies that adopt time series techniques such as VAR or Structural VAR. Instead we
generally review the studies that adopt micro data analysis and panel data techniques
related to the credit channel.
Early evidence suggests that it is the poor financial positions of firms that led to a
severe economic crisis during the Great Depression (Fisher, 1933). When firms and banks
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are highly leveraged, small shocks can lead to a deterioration of financial stance in terms
of bankruptcies, which in tum generate a fall in investment, demand, and prices. This
view implies that financial intermediaries playa crucial role for the efficient allocation of
loanable funds and thereby economic development. Following Mishkin (1978), Bernanke
(1983) analyses the importance of financial factors during the Great Depression. Their
main conclusion is that monetary factors alone are insufficient to explain the depth,
persistence and the severe impact of the Great Depression.
Early evidence that was given in the previous paragraph motivated empirical
research on the link between the business cycle and monetary policy by taking into
account financial factors that are closely associated with the credit channel. The empirical
literature on the credit view of the monetary transmission may be classified into three
main areas. First, quite a number of studies that use aggregate time series have tested the
impact of credit aggregates on investment, output, and consumption by using VAR models
and other time series techniques (Bernanke and Bilinder, 1992; Keshyap, Stein, Wilcox,
1993; Friedman and Kuttner, 1992 and 1993; Dale and Haldane, 1995; Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996 and many others are the first
examples). This literature generally uses reduced form models as a theoretical base.
Second, the empirical studies on the determinants of bank lending are carried out by
using bank level micro data in the spirit of the studies on the role of financial
imperfections on investment decisions of non-financial firms (Kashyap and Stein, 1995;
Kashyap and Stein, 1997; Hatakeda, 2000; Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000; Kashyap and
Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Kakes, 2000; Bacchetta and Ballabriga, 2000).
These studies find evidence that the structure of financial markets is important for the
channels through which monetary policy transmits. Banks, for example, react in different
ways to monetary policy shocks given their capital structure and other characteristics and
this in tum affects real activity in the economy.
Third, the micro level data on the balance sheets of non-financial firms or
households are employed to test the significance of financial variables for explaining
fixed investment, inventory investment, consumption, and employment. The empirical
evidence on firm level data confirm that the investment (fixed or inventory) decisions are
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very much sensitive to firm specific financial conditions (like internal funds) as well as
macroeconomic conditions (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, 1988 and
2000, Zingales and Kaplan, 1997 and 2000, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bond and
Meghir, 1994; Guariglia and Schiantarelli, 1998; Guariglia, 1999 and 2000, Carpenter,
Fazzari and Petersen, 1994 and 1998; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998; Adung, 2000;
Ndikumana, 1999; Vermeulen, 2002; Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay, 2003).
2.4.1. Monetary Policy Stance and Identification Issues in the Credit Channel
Empirical research in the area of monetary transmission mechanism is faced with two
main challenges: measuring monetary policy stance and identifying the credit channel.
First, there are difficulties in measuring the monetary policy stance, Le. whether the policy
is tight or benign. Financial innovations and liberalisation in the capital accounts broke
the link between money and aggregate demand in many countries by the 1980s. This
resulted in an unstable money demand function and policy makers were no longer able to
derive proper policy implications by focussing on the monetary aggregates. Therefore, the
interest was focused on alternative variables that reflect monetary stance that can be used
as policy tools such as the money market interest rate, the lending rate, the exchange rate,
and the volume of credit.
Since the link between monetary aggregates and aggregate demand disappeared, in
developed economies, the interest rate that is derived from the central banks' interactions
in the money market is generally used as a policy tool and it is expected that this rate
affects relative prices and real activity through a number of channels. Empirical studies
also suggest this rate as a variable that reflects the monetary policy stance. Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) suggested the Federal Funds rates and the spread between Federal Funds
and Treasury bonds as good indicators of monetary policy stance in the US. In addition,
Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1993) found evidence that the spread between the
commercial paper rates and the risk free Treasury bill rate contains highly significant
information about future movements of real income. Kashyap et al. (1993) confirm that
the spread between prime commercial paper and Treasury bill rates have forecasting
abilities for real activity. On the other hand, Romer and Romer (1990) developed an
alternative technique called 'Romer dates' to measure monetary policy stance. Romer
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dates show the particular times when the monetary policy is tight based on information
derived from the Fed minutes.
The second challenge is related to some difficulties in identifying the monetary
policy channels independently in empirical studies. First of all, there is a lack of proper
data to test different channels of monetary policy. For example, theoretical models
generally use real interest rates rather than nominal interest rates in analysing the link
between money and real activity even though we may not observe real interest rates
directly in the actual data.
Secondly, even if all theoretically relevant pnces and quantities were readily
observable, empirical inference about monetary policy would be still problematic because
of the difficulty of distinguishing the actions of the monetary authority from their
consequences. In other words, the monetary authority endogenously responds to the
economic cycles; it loosens policy when the economy weakens, and tightens when the
economy strengthens. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the impact of exogenous policy
actions. The evidence shows that the correlation between the Fed rates and GDP in the US
is weaker in recent years. One may think that monetary policy has become less effective.
However, this evidence may also imply just the opposite because of simultaneity in the
relation, that is, monetary policy has actually become more effective in the sense that it
has dampened the GDP fluctuations (Kuttner and Mooser, 2002).
Thirdly, the identification of credit channel is empirically cumbersome. It is difficult
to distinguish between supply and demand dynamics in the movement of credit
aggregates. Kashyap et al. (1993) tend to identify the bank lending channel by considering
demand and supply effects. Using US data they provide some empirical evidence that a
tight monetary policy leads to a shift in the firms' external financing from bank loans to
commercial papers. The decline in the banks' loans is due to a reduction in the supply of
loans rather than a reduction in the demand for bank loans. This study tends to show that
an increase in the volume of commercial papers (CP) relative to total short-term external
finance after a tight monetary policy can be evaluated as evidence for the bank lending
channel. Although the demand for external finance increases generally as a result of a
contractionary policy, a decline in the bank loans is associated with a reduction in supply
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rather than demand. In addition, according to the money view, the lending rate would
decline due to an output-induced decline in the demand for credit, but this rate actually
rises during tight periods. Espezel and Mizen (2000) apply the same framework to the UK
data and confirm the existence of a bank lending channel in the UK.
The decline in bank loans and the rise in the issuance of non-financial firm's CP
may be noted as evidence of the bank lending channel and an increase in the issuance of
CP cannot be interpreted as a decline in the demand for bank loans. However, this
argument does not explain the fact that most of the CP issuance is realised by large firms
and not by small firms where a tight monetary policy constrains the activities of those
firms mainly through balance sheet effects. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) comment on
Kashyap et al. (1993) and find new evidence by using micro data that does not confirm
the bank lending channel. We will discuss this issue in detail in Chapter Five.
2.4.2. Further Evidence on the Bank lending Channel
Recent empirical studies have tended to use micro level information of economic agents
to test the bank lending channel. This method allows researchers to incorporate
informational problems and agency costs into the analysis. More specifically, as we
explained above the reactions of banks with different financial positions to monetary
policy are going to differ. The theory that we discussed in section 2.3.2 is valid not only
for non-financial firms but also for banks. The lending behaviour of banks very much
depends on their financial positions given monetary policy shocks, that is, the monetary
transmission is very much related to the structure of the financial sector.
Hancock and Wilcox (1998) estimate the impact of changes in the capital conditions
of banks and aggregate economic conditions on bank loans and the real activity of small
firms by using US data for the 1989-1992 period. They document that a decline in small
banks' loans, known as 'high powered loans', has a greater impact on economic activity
than a decline in the large banks' loans. Similarly, a decline in the capital of small banks
produces larger changes in economic activity than a decline in the capital of larger firm.
Small and bank dependent firms, (high information-cost firms) are affected very much by
bank loan contraction contrary to large firms that have high flexibility to switch between
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banks and other external finance. Evidence shows that small firms are more likely to have
a close relationship with small banks.
Kishan and Opiela (2000) find evidence supporting the credit channel in general and
the bank lending channel in particular by using US data. In practice, it is difficult to
identify whether, for example, a contractionary monetary policy reduces the loan supply or
the loan demand. Kishan and Opiela tend to segregate banks by asset size and capital
leverage ratio to provide evidence that small and undercapitalised banks may not be able
to offset a drain in reservable deposits by selling large time deposits. A decline in the
money supply through open market operations will then lead to a decline in demand
deposits. If there are no informational asymmetries between banks and time deposit
purchasers, the decline in demand deposits is compensated for by an equal increase in
time deposits, therefore the loan supply remains at the same level. If, however, there are
informational asymmetries between banks and time deposit purchasers, a risk premium
appears on non-reservable or uninsured deposits issued by banks - deposit purchasers
then expect higher return on their deposits. A credit channel becomes operative because
some banks are unable to completely offset a Fed-induced drain of reserves with an
increase in time deposits. It is found that loans of undercapitalised banks are the most
responsive to monetary policy, and time deposits of these banks do not increase enough to
compensate for the decline in reserves as a result of a contractionary policy, and therefore
they do not extend new credits.
Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) emphasise that bank loans are constrained by the
availability of insured deposits given informational frictions in the uninsured liabilities
market. If information about bank loans is hard to observe by the supplier of the funds
(households) then the banks face an extra cost in the capital market. This approach has
some common points with the cash flow-investment model, which applies to non-
financial firms. The insured deposits as balance sheet items of banks might be treated as
cash flow (internal finance) while loans and uninsured deposits are considered as the
investment and external funds of typical firms; respectively. Existence of a positive
correlation between loans and insured deposits stemming from credit market frictions may
be interpreted as a sign of a lending channel given an inelastic supply of uninsured
deposits. This study claims that, in general, reliance on insured funds decreases and
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issuance of uninsured funds increases as bank capital rises. Unlike large banks, the
relationship between loans and deposits is very much determined by the leverage level of
the small banks, since low capital banks depend more on insured deposits to finance
loans.
Fisher (1999) develops a quantitative general equilibrium model to analyse the bank
lending channel under the assumptions of an imperfect market and heterogeneous
response of firms to monetary shocks. The study reports that in addition to a decline in the
borrowing and sales of small firms, the spread between interest rates on loans paid by the
bank-dependent firms and on those firms using the public debt market to finance
investment rises during monetary contractions. Based on the model, some parameters that
support the bank lending view are replicated by using US data whereas some others are
not. However, in general, the steady state results of the calibrated models give reasonable
parameters for the lending view. The differences in the results between small and large
firms cannot be interpreted directly as evidence for the bank lending channel.
Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 1997) found evidence for the bank lending channel by
using panels of balance sheet indicators of US and European banks, respectively. Kashyap
and Stein (2000) used quarterly data of every insured US commercial bank from 1976 to
1993 to test the bank lending channel. In the US, small banks, which constitute a large
proportion of these banks, have a low ratio of liquid assets. In order to avoid identification
difficulties concerning the bank lending channel, this study tends to analyse the micro data
at the individual bank level. To evaluate the impact of monetary policy on banks that
differ in financial position and size may provide some valuable information in this
context. This study generally supports the existence of a bank lending channel of the
monetary transmission. The empirical evidence is summarised below.
Small banks generally have higher securities relative to loans on their assets side
mainly because of precautionary intentions. This result may explain financial constraints
that they encounter during a tight monetary policy period. On the liabilities side, they have
very simple capital structure, mainly deposits and common equity and very limited
borrowing from the Federal Fund market, whereas the large banks liabilities include a
large amount of borrowing from the market in addition to deposits and common equity.
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The study captures the impact of monetary policy on bank loans with a two-step
procedure. Within the class of small banks, changes in monetary policy affects more the
lending of those banks with the lowest ratio of liquid assets Le. banks with a low ratio of
securities to assets
Hatakeda (2000) claims that in the absence of intermediary institutions, problems of
asymmetric information make financial markets incomplete. Financial intermediaries or
banks contribute in reducing market imperfections and improve the allocation of
resources by specialising in gathering information about loan projects. This study is based
on Bernanke and Gertler (1987), who have shown that the availability of bank's internal
funds should be an important determinant of bank loans when there are problems of
asymmetric information between banks and depositors. In addition, they assumed that
there is no substitute for bank loans as a source of finance for non-financial firms. This
study, however, includes direct financing methods as well as bank loans, and these forms
of financing are endogenously determined. It is found that bank loans depend on
economic activity, bank capital, collateral value, and the market interest rate. When the
liquidity constraint is binding, an increase in economic activity may affect bank loans
negatively and a rise in the collateral value of bank has a positive effect on bank loans. An
increase in the real activity may increase the likelihood of direct finance that leads to a
decline in the demand for bank loans. In short, the study emphasises that the existence of
informational problems in bank finance and its uniqueness are perceived as further
evidence for the bank lending channel in Japan.
It is generally claimed that the bank lending channel is no longer effective because
the reserve requirement ratio as a monetary policy instrument is becoming less important
in determining deposits mainly due to the instability of money demand and financial
innovations. As a result of financial deregulation and innovations, the importance of the
traditional bank lending channel has most likely diminished over time (Romer and Romer,
1990). In addition, Bemanke and Gertler (1995) pointed out that the impact of monetary
policy on housing has weakened because of the phasing out of interest rate ceilings and
the introduction of innovations such as a liquid secondary market for mortgages in the US
economy. Therefore, recent empirical studies on the impact of monetary policy on the
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borrowing and spending capabilities of the agents that are subject to financial constraint
focus on their balance sheet positions.
2.4.3. Further Evidence on the Broad Credit Channel
The empirical literature on the broad credit channel tends to use panels of firms, banks or
households and test their reactions to monetary policy shocks considering their balance
sheet positions, informational problems and agency costs. Quite a number of empirical
studies have investigated the impact of financial frictions on the investment decisions of
firms. As it is noted above, in imperfect financial markets, a real or monetary shock leads
to changes in the balance sheets of firms, banks, and households and thus their activities.
More specifically, a contractionary monetary policy reduces asset prices and cash flow,
and in tum, degrades their financial positions by changing the collateral value and
borrowing ability, which directly influence their investment and consumption decisions.
A line of empirical literature has developed around the debate between Fazzari,
Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and Zingales and Kaplan (1997). The former study confirms
the financial accelerator theory in the sense that investment of financially constrained
firms is more sensitive to a change in internal funds made possible by a monetary policy
shock. However, Zingales and Kaplan (1997) criticise this proposition and find opposite
evidence. On the other hand, international evidence shows that investments are more
sensitive to cash flow in relatively market-oriented economies like the UK and the US
(Schiantarelli, 1996; Iturriaga, 2000; Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay, 2003). These
studies provide a useful discussion of international evidence on the impact of capital
market imperfections on investment decisions. They use a variety of measures of financial
positions like dividend pay-out behaviour, association with business groups, banks size,
agency problems, and concentration of ownership. We provide detailed empirical
literature on the cash flow-investment hypothesis in Chapter Six where we test the impact
of monetary policy on inventory investment and employment by considering financial
factors. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition we will not review this literature here.
On the consumption side, the permanent income hypothesis (PIll) implies that
monetary policy can only influence consumption to the extent that it affects permanent
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income. In fact, there is no evidence that monetary policy has a direct impact on
permanent income and thereby aggregate consumption. However, it is argued that
consumption is very much affected by the availability and the cost of credit. Financial
liberalisation in the 1980s led to a consumption-led boom by creating new credit
possibilities at lower cost in many countries. The recent empirical literature rejects the
PIH, and emphasises that consumption is very much correlated with income (excess
sensitivity) because of liquidity constraints. Therefore, the variables associated with credit
conditions reflecting availability and cost of liquid assets tend to be used by empirical
studies in order to explain variations in consumption.
Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) test the impact of consumer credit on consumption by
using time varying coefficient estimates for some major industrialised countries like the
US, the UK, Canada, Japan and France. In multivariate regressions, credit growth is found
to be a more important determinant of consumption than income growth. Ludvigson
(1998) uses a VAR model to test whether the composition of automobile finance changes
in response to innovation in the Federal Funds rate, and whether variation in this
composition affects the sales of new automobiles. A mix variable parallel to Kashyap et
al. (1993) - the ratio of bank automobile credit to bank automobile credit plus finance
company automobile credit - is constructed for identifying the credit channel. The
evidence presented in that paper supports the bank lending channel of monetary
transmission rather than the balance sheet channel. In addition, Ludvigson (1999) employs
a time varying liquidity constraint model in which the optimal consumption behaviours of
individuals are analysed in the context of stochastically varying borrowing constraints. By
using US aggregate data this study finds that ex ante consumer credit growth has a
significant influence on consumption. The impact of forecasted credit growth and
forecasted income growth on consumption are independent. In short, contrary to the life-
cycle hypothesis, this study concludes that credit conditions that create a financial
accelerator in the consumption sector, as observed in the corporate sector, play an
important role in the consumption behaviour of households.
2.4.4. ABrief Review of Empirical Literature that Uses UKData
The empirical studies of the credit channel literature for the UK give more weight to the
balance sheet channel rather than the bank lending channel. More specifically, they
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generally test the effect of financial constraints on investment decisions of non-financial
firms, The studies generally focus on the relationship between the behaviour or structure
of intermediaries and non-financial firms under different monetary policy regimes. More
research is needed on the monetary transmission channel that captures the financial choice
and structure of agents by adopting a micro level analysis in the UK.
Asymmetric information problems are very much relevant for the financing of small
businesses. It is generally argued that while the owners of small firms have more
information about the project return than creditors, the situation is different for larger
firms where the information about financial performance of these firms is relatively
available. Melanie and Wright (1999) examine the developments over the past decade in
the financing of small business in the UK. They conclude that contrary to the theoretical
expectations empirical studies provide little evidence to support the market imperfection
theory for small firms since the recession in early 1990s. It is noted that small firms are
now less dependent on the external sources, and in fact many the smallest businesses are
net creditors to the banking sector and businesses can easily access a variety of financial
products. On the other hand, Kohler, Britton and Yates (2000) use a panel of firms quoted
on the UK stock exchange to test the importance of trade credits for monetary
transmission. This paper shows that firms with direct access to capital markets extend
more trade credit and receive less during recessions. That is, quoted firms supply net trade
credit to unquoted firms. Therefore when monetary conditions tighten, trade credit may
offset the contractionary impact of the reduction in bank loans. In short, the contractionary
impact of monetary policy through the credit channel on real activities tends to be
balanced by the trade credit extended by those firms having access to the capital market to
the firms not having access to financial market and being financially weak.
Bond and Meghir (1994) investigate the response of investments to the availability
of internal funds by applying the financial hierarchy approach to corporate finance. The
empirical model uses a panel of UK firms to estimate an investment equation based on the
Euler equation. The theory implies that internal finance is cheaper than external finance,
and therefore investment and financial decisions are not independent. One problem with
this approach is the assumption that firms should not simultaneously pay dividends and
issue new shares. This assumption is found to be not valid for UK manufacturing firms.
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For those firms paying fewer dividends, investments are more sensitive to the financial
variables. This study emphasises that cash flow also affects the inventory investments of
unconstrained firms. Their main finding is that there is no unique criterion for identifying
financially constrained firms.
Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1998) Guariglia (1999) Guariglia (2000) analyse the
link between internal finance and inventory investment using samples of UK
manufacturing firms. It is found that financial constraints are important for inventory
investment. Small (2000) uses a panel of UK manufacturing firms to test the impact of the
cash flow on inventory investment for various types of firms. This study concludes that
cash flow affects inventory investments of both constrained and unconstrained firms.
Brigden and Mizen (1999) employ a structural dynamic model to analyse the interaction
among investment, credit, and money for the non-financial sector. The study concludes
that real decisions of the firms are very much dependent on their financial structure. It is
found that lending is very much affected from the balance sheet items of the firms but not
much from the lending spreads. This study confirms the existence of a credit channel for
UK data and suggests that money, credit and investments should be modelled as a system.
2.4. Conclusion
As we discussed earlier, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy becomes a very
complicated issue when we consider financial interactions within the asymmetric
information and agency cost framework. Empirical and theoretical research show that
informational problems and agency costs concerned with financial interactions are
important sources of economic fluctuations. Financial innovations and institutional
changes altered the nature of monetary transmission in developed economise during the
last two decades.
Theoretically, there are many channels through which monetary policy transmits but
the significance of these channels varies across economies and time. There are some
difficulties in identifying these channels empirically because of simultaneity in supply-
demand dynamics, the endogenous nature of policy actions, and in difficulties observing
certain variables that are crucial for the analysis. Recently, theoretical and empirical
attention has focused on the channels that consider micro level dynamics to identify these
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channels. Especially, the credit channel both in its narrow and its broad sense has been
studied very often to understand the link between policy shocks and business cycles.
Among the two main channels of the credit view, the broad credit channel plays a
more significant role in business cycle fluctuations. Recent financial crises in relatively
less developed financial markets confirm the importance of the financial accelerator
mechanism that performs through underlying severe informational asymmetries, and high
agency costs. In this context, monetary policy and the underlying transmission mechanism
as well as information about the basic tendencies in financial markets become crucial in
terms of macroeconomic stability and economic efficiency. The credit channel framework
provides substantial insight for the analysis of business cycles and financial crises.
The theoretical and empirical studies on the credit view improved our understanding
of the monetary transmission relative to those that followed the interest rate channel.
Especially, the research in this area produced important policy implications for managing
aggregate demand (macro aspect) and for efficiency of financial markets (micro aspect).
First of all, studies that consider micro dynamics show us that monetary policy shocks, in
imperfect financial markets, have some implications for the redistribution of wealth
among agents. More specifically, the empirical evidence shows that the relative size of the
banking sector expands during hyperinflation periods and shrinks during monetary
stabilisation (Li, 2000). In addition, a substantial amount of empirical literature
emphasises that the agents with relatively weak capital structure are more vulnerable to
monetary policy, that is, small firms or banks encounter severe financial constraints
during the recessions and this, in tum, leads to a redistribution of wealth. In this context,
the studies that use micro level panel data on non-financial firms, banks and households
may enable us to identify the implications of monetary policy properly. The studies that
incorporate heterogeneous agents are extremely helpful for deriving implications about
the redistribution of resources among agents that have different spending attitudes and
financial structures.
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CHAPTER TIIREE
External Finance and the Monetary Transmission: A Theoretical
Framework
3.1. Introduction
The Modigliani-Miller's irrelevance theorem asserts that the performance of non-financial
firms and thus aggregate demand is independent of the financial system. The standard IS-
LM model is constructed based on the premise that asset holders choose between two
alternative assets, namely money and bonds. In these models, bank loans and other forms
of credit are viewed as perfect substitutes for bonds and it is assumed that financial
markets operate without any friction. Therefore, early theoretical frameworks allowed
only for the money view of the transmission mechanism according to which monetary
policy generally affects investment and other economic activities through the interest rate.
Imperfections in financial markets have been analyzed within the context of
asymmetric information and the incentive problem literature. Within this new framework
the financial position of firms and households are important for understanding the impact
of monetary policy on economic activities. The research in this area concentrates on more
complex views of monetary policy transmission where financial market conditions playa
central role. More specifically, recent literature has been increasingly focusing on the
monetary transmission channels that work through the price of other assets and the credit
channel.
Informational asymmetries and agency cost problems lead to a wedge between the
costs of external and internal funds. This implies two basic results; (i) firms cannot
without cost substitute external funds for internal funds and, (ii) debt, bond, and equity, as
forms of external finance are not perfect substitutes. In fact the imperfect substitution
among financial instruments has important implications for both the capital structure and
the real activity of firms. The return rates on various financial funds differ according to
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the extent of informational asymmetries in the corresponding financial markets. This
gives rise to efinancial hierarchy where firms choose the least costly source of finance to
finance their investment projects.
In this chapter, we use a microeconomic framework that offers some insights into
the coexistence of market and intermediary finance and also allows us to discuss the
factors affecting the choice among various types of external finance. More specifically,
we derive some implications for the monetary transmission mechanism through which the
change in market interest rates affects intermediate finance versus market finance for
firms with various characteristics. The model introduces intermediary finance following
the spirit of Diamond (1984, 1991) where the role of intermediary institutions is to
monitor their clients. Repullo and Suarez (2000) also discuss the credit channel in an
environment where intermediary and market finance coexist, and their model has some
similarities with the one in this study.
We will extend the model built by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) in which
the optimal choice between market finance and intermediary finance is made within a
financial environment where informational asymmetries are due to a moral hazard
problem. In our version, we allow for a positive opportunity cost of finance (positive
market interest rate instead of zero) so that we can examine the effects of monetary policy
on the firms' choice of finance by altering the market interest rate through open market
operations. With this new version of the model, we carry out some comparative statics
that enable us to derive some implications about the impact of firm size, collateral assets
(net worth), distribution of risk, project size, and project payoff on the choice of
alternative types of finance. Analyzing the impact of a monetary policy shock (through
changing the interest rate) on the financial choice of non-financial firms and its
implications for real activity is the concern of this study.
In section two we develop the theoretical framework where we discuss the
assumptions and basic features of the model. In section three, some predictions are
derived from the model following some comparative static exercises. The last section is
devoted to some concluding remarks.
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3.2. Modelling the Choice between Intermediary Finance and Market Finance
In this section we present a model adapted from Hoshi et al (1993) to derive some
implications regarding the types of firms that borrow from intermediary institutions and
the types that borrow from financial markets. Hoshi et al (1993) analyse the role of
ownership structure for raising external funds in Japan, and although our application is
different. we adapt their approach for analysing the impact of monetary policy on firms'
choice of finance and also the variation of this impact across firm characteristics.
This model uses the same framework as Diamond (1991) where the interaction
between a firm's reputation capital (a good track record) and the choice between
intermediary and market finance is analysed in the context of delegating monitoring
setting. The model allows for coexistence of intermediary finance and external finance
based on the idea that a financial intermediary monitors a firm more efficiently than
numerous individual lenders. In other words, individual investors tend to delegate the
monitoring activity to intermediary institutions that enable investors to diversify the
investment risk. Suppose an entrepreneur borrows from numerous investors in the market.
If all investors tend to monitor the borrower, the monitoring cost would multiply.
However, if some investors tend to monitor, the problem of free rider appears and the
remaining investors will benefit without paying any cost. In contrast, intermediary
institutions have the incentives to monitor. This result was demonstrated by Diamond
(1984) and Chant (1992) who showed that banks have incentives to monitor while
individual investors do not.
We assume that the firm owns a certain amount of total assets and debt before it
carries out an investment project that is completely financed by external funds. Total firm
assets (Ar) consist of tangible collateral assets (Ad and intangible assets. The firm's
existing debt (Dd is less than the collateral assets and thus it is risk free. Potential
investment projects generate financial payoffs of 1t to shareholders as well as private
benefit, fJ, to the managers. The manager's expected utility consists of a fraction, a, of the
financial payoffs ofthe project, and the private benefit, aJr+{3. If the manager is the owner
of the firm (a=1), he jointly maximises the financial payoff and private benefit and if his
equity share is zero (a=O), he maximises only the private benefit. There are two types of
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projects, i = 1,2 and each project has a payoff X with probability Pi and zero with
probability (I-pi). Project 2 (the good project) has a higher expected financial payoff than
Project I (the bad project), P2X > PIX, and the manager's private benefit is zero in Project
2 and it is a positive number, B, in Project 1. Both projects require an initial investment
(project size), F. The private benefit is proportional to firm size (B=bAT), where b>Ol.
The manager chooses the type of project that maximises his/her expected utility. All
parties are risk neutral. Finally, we impose the condition (P2 - PI)X>B, which implies that
Project 2 is the socially efficient project.
Depending on the parameters of the model, the manager chooses the type of
projects and type of finance. There are cases where the manager prefers Project 2, and the
firm borrows from the market directly by issuing bonds or equity and thus the firm will
not be monitored. However, there are also possibilities where the manager avoids being
monitored and chooses bad projects that are financed directly through financial markets
(the moral hazard problem). In the other case, the manager will borrow from an
intermediary institution with a commitment of taking the good project. These two types of
external finance are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Market Finance without Monitoring
In this case, the firm has only the market as a source of finance. The manager raises funds
from the market without being monitored. Suppose the firm borrows F, and promises to
repay D, where the existing debt is assumed to be senior to the new debt.2 If the firm
cannot meet its commitments, the lender can liquidate tangible collateral, Ac.
The manager's payoff from Project 1 is
a[pdX - D + Ar- Dd + (J - PI)(Ar- Ad) + bAr (3.1)
and the corresponding payoff from Project 2 is
IWe follow Hoshi et al. (1993) by assuming that the private benefit is proportional to the size of the project
and the size of the project is proportional to the size of firm.
2 This assumption implies that existing debt rather than new debt is paid first in the case of default.
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a[P2(X-D +Ar-De) + (J -p2J(Ar-AcJ] (3.2)
If the manager's expected utility from Project 2 is more than his expected utility from
Project 1, he will choose the good project which is socially efficient. That is, if the
difference between the shareholders payoffs for the good project and the bad project is
not less than the private benefit from the bad project, the good project will be the socially
efficient choice, that is,
(3.3)
If debtholders believe that the manager will choose Project 2, the lender's zero profit
condition requires that.'
(3.4)
Hoshi et at (1993) assumed that the opportunity cost of finance is zero (r=O). We
introduce a positive market interest rate, (r>O), as the opportunity cost of funds. This is
important since a major issue in this Chapter is the interaction between the monetary
policy stance and firm-specific characteristics in determining the access to external
finance.4 Substituting (3.4) into (3.3) we find that the manager will have a proper
incentive to choose the good project ifand only if the following condition is satisfied.
a(p2 - PI) (X _ F(l+ r) +DE - Ac) ~ b
Ar P2
(3.5)
Depending on the parameters, if (3.5) is satisfied the firm chooses the good project,
borrows from the financial market and makes an efficient investment decision. If the
incentive constraint (3.5) is not satisfied, the firm chooses the bad project and the new
debtholders require a higher repayment, DJ. The lender's zero profit condition is
(3.6)
3 Whether the repayment D to the new debtholder, who earns zero-profits, satisfies condition (3.3) is a
critical question.
4 Hoshi et al. (1993) assumed that the opportunity cost of finance is zero but this does not allow us to
investigate the influence of monetary policy, which operates through changes in interest rates.
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At this value of DJ the manager would choose the bad project (the inefficient project) and
his payoff would be
a[PJX+ Ar-DE-F(l+r)} + bAr (3.7)
In short, in a world without intermediary finance, if the incentive constraint (3.5)
holds, the manager chooses the good project and if it does not hold he chooses the bad
project. In both cases, the manager borrows from the financial market.
Intermediary Finance
In this section a new group of investors endowed with a monitoring technology is
introduced into the model. This technology enables them to observe the manager's project
choice at a cost of m per project. Since the monitoring technology is costly for individual
investors, the investors deposit their money in monitoring intermediary institutions,
mainly banks. If incentive (3.5) is not satisfied, the firm will choose the good project by
borrowing from intermediaries. Then if the manager chooses to borrow from an
intermediary institution, the repayment of the loan, L must satisfy the following
condition':
(3.8)
In this case, the manager's payoff is
a[P2X +Ar- DE- (F+m)(1 +r)} (3.9)
and the manager prefers the intermediary finance if his payoff in (3.9) exceeds that in
(3.7). Then, the incentive for intermediary finance can be written as
a(p2 - PI) [x _m(l + r)] ';? b
AT P2 - PI
(3.10)
5 In this case, the repayment to the monitoring institution includes return on loan as well as monitoring
costs.
6 In this case, the repayment to a monitoring institution includes both the loan return and the monitoring
cost.
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The firm issues public debt (borrows from the market directly) if either (3.5) holds
or (3.10) does not hold, otherwise the firm borrows from intermediary institutions. The
conditions for market finance can be rewritten as:
(3.11)
(3.12)
The conditions given in (3.11) and (3.12) are derived from (3.5) and (3.10) respectively,
provided that the monitoring cost is sufficiently low. This requires
(3.13)
Below, the new equilibrium expression where intermediary finance feasible in an interval
defined in terms of Tobin's q, is derived, given that the condition in (3.13) holds and the
conditions for market finance in (3.11) and (3.12) are reversed. That is,
(3.14)
we will use P2X/AT as a profitability measure for our purpose. AdAr and DE/AT are the
proportions of collateral assets and the firm's leverage ratio, respectively.
Let us denote the lower critical point of the interval as QI and the upper critical
point as Q2. Then we can define the critical points as:
QI = m(l + r)P2 + P2b
(P2 - PI )AT aip, - PI) (3.15a)
(3.15b)
58
Chapter Three External Finance and tlte Monetary Transmission: A Theoretical Framework
Those firms with profitability measures below QI use public debt to finance their
investments in bad projects, while those firms with corresponding values above Q2 use the
same source to finance their investments in good projects. Firms with profitability
measures between Ql and Q2 use bank debt to finance their investments in good projects.
The value of the critical points may depend upon the financial structure of firms and
the financial environment where lending and borrowing activities take place. Where the
finn's financial structure is strong (i.e. characterized by high value of total assets and low
gearing ratios, high probabilities of success of good projects, high manager's shares of
equity, low private benefits, monitoring cost and market interest rates etc), the critical
values would be low. In these cases the moral hazard problem is not serious and therefore
the choice of socially efficient projects is likely. It is obvious that large and well-
capitalized firms, whose critical points are relatively low, are more likely to choose the
good projects that could be financed by either market or intermediary finance. On the
contrary, small and poorly capitalized firms are expected to have high critical points that
make the moral hazard problem more serious. The relative magnitude of demand for
intermediate and market finance also depends on the distribution of firms according to
their profitability.
3.3. Implications of the Model
This model enables us to observe only the change in the composition of external finance
in terms of demand effects, which is associated with non-financial firms' financial
structure. Firms with a high profile in terms of size, reputation, collateral etc., managers
prefer good projects, while those in the middle profile, prefer again good projects but are
monitored given a sufficiently low monitoring cost. In the monitoring case, the profits
from the good project balance the cost of monitoring and the opportunity cost of private
benefits. Since the good project is no longer optimal for the manager of a low profile
finn, he borrows from the market directly and chooses the bad project. The firm that
carries out the bad project through borrowing from the market is expected to be
confronted with a higher borrowing cost and the possibility of default than the firm
choosing the good project. The manager who wishes to obtain the private benefit has
more information about the project than the individual investors and other shareholders.
Therefore, he is more prone to borrow at a high cost relative to the manager that chooses
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the good project. It is implicitly assumed that shareholders pay a high cost for external
finance when the bad project is selected. In short, one can easily observe the link between
the attractiveness of the project and the types of finance from the model. A firm with
higher profitability is more likely to choose the good project. Therefore, a shock that
influences the attractiveness of the project alters the composition affirm finance.
One important feature of the model is the prediction that both good and bad projects
can be financed through the market directly; however, only good projects are financed
through intermediary finance. The model predicts that a firm that does not have access to
intermediary finance may issue bonds to finance its bad project. However, in the
literature, it is generally assumed that the firm that does not meet the condition for
intermediary finance is not able to issue bonds, because bond issuing is costly for
financially weak firms that potentially choose bad projects. These predictions imply that
the financial sources for good and bad projects are expected to be significantly different.
Evidence shows that financially weak firms that do not get access to intermediary finance
tend to finance their projects through informal or formal capital ventures, trade credit or
through other informal ways such as family support.
The goal in this chapter is to determine the implications of changes in monetary
policy on the financing options of firms. We are especially interested to know how these
effects vary with firm characteristics, such as size, collateral, debt, risk and profitability.
In the first part of this section we examine the impact of firm characteristics and in the
second part the response to monetary policy conditions and the variation of this response
with variations in firm characteristics. The former signs the partial derivatives and the
latter signs the cross-partials.
3.3.1. Firm Characteristics
Firm Size
It is generally claimed that large well capitalized firms are able to finance their
investment projects through financial markets at a relatively low cost, while small firms
that have fewer collateral assets depend more on intermediary finance and have to pay a
high external finance premium because they are more likely to be subject to a moral
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hazard problem. The empirical literature has widely discussed the role of finn size in the
monetary transmission mechanism through a credit channel (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994;
Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). Small firms that have relatively limited collateral assets
and weak balance sheet positions are negatively affected by a tight monetary policy. This
is because they are unable to obtain external funds when they experience a decline in the
present value of collateral assets that is a reflection of a finn's reputation. Since it is not
costless to shift among different forms of finance, a shock that changes the composition
of finn finance is likely to be especially influential over the investment and production
decisions of small firms.
It is assumed that the private benefits to the manager are increasing in proportion to
a finn's total assets. A finn that has relatively large assets includes also a large potential
private benefit for the manager. In the case of market finance, this gives an incentive to
the manager to choose bad projects as total assets increase at a given level of collateral
assets, existing debt, and project payoff, the distribution of the risk, and project size. In
other words, as the size of intangible assets relative to collateral assets increases it is more
likely to choose bad projects, everything else remaining equal.
The impact of firm size on the equilibrium condition for intermediary finance can
be analyzed using the model explained above. Suppose that firm size (S) is captured by
total assets as well as by collateral assets and existing debt (AT. Ac, Dd. A proportional
increase in these variables (increase of firm size) will cause both the lower and the upper
critical points of the equilibrium conditions given in (3.14) to shift leftward if all other
variables as well as the project size are kept constant. The decline in the upper critical
point would be larger than that of the lower critical point at a sufficiently low monitoring
cost.
(3.16)
Suppose that firms are distributed normally in terms of firm profitability and
intermediary finance is concentrated around the average of profitability, as in Figure 3.1,
then an increase in the firm size will reduce the intermediary finance (N) relative to
market finance for good projects (Mg). That is, the demand for intermediary funds
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declines and more firms get direct finance at a lower cost and relatively fewer firms
finance their projects from market funds by selecting bad projects (Mb).7
aM g
--~>O,
as
aM b < 0
as
aN
and--<O
as
(3.17)
Distribution
of Firms
Market Finance
with Bad Project
(Mb)
Intermediary
Finance
(N)
Market Finance
with Good Project
(Ms)
Figure 3.1: The impact offirm size on the type of finance
(Project size is fixed)
However, if the project size is proportional to total assets as assumed in the original
model, the upper critical point does not change while the lower critical point decreases,
that is, the interval for profitability that satisfies intermediary finance expands (Figure
3.2). In both cases, whether the project size is proportional to asset size or not, an increase
in the firm size raises the number of firms that choose good projects given a relatively
low monitoring cost.
> 0
7 Total market finance (M) is the sum of direct finance for good and bad projects (M= Mg+M,).
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Distribution
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Market Finance
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Finance
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Market Finance
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Figure 3.2: The impact of change in firm size on the type of finance
(Project size is proportional to total assets)
Probabilities of the Success of Projects (Distribution of Risk)
A relative change in the project success probabilities may be interpreted as variability in
the risk distribution. Let us then denote the risk factor term (P2 _ Pt) by p> O. In the
formulation given in (3.14), an increase in the probability of success of the good project
(Project 2), relative to the probability of success of the bad project (Project 1), an increase
in p, (or a decline in risk) leads the critical points to shift to the left (Figure 3.3).8 The
decline in the lower critical points will be larger than the upper critical level in absolute
value. This implies that a lower level of risk reduces the number of bad projects while it
increases the interval for intermediary finance. The share of intermediary finance depends
on the relative movement of critical points as well as on the distribution of firms. In short,
in an environment where the risk is substantial, firms tend to choose the inefficient
project, which in tum impedes investment and overall real activity.
8Q, _
--_
8p
(3.18)
(3.19)
8 Similar results are obtained for P=P2 -Pl' An increase in risk (a decline in p) causes the moral hazard
problem to be more serious and this increases the incentive to select the bad project.
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The above imply that ceteris paribus a lower level of risk increases the number of
firms that have access to low-cost market finance. In our model, under a uniform
distribution, there is an increase in the interval of intermediary finance.'
Distribution
of Firms
Market Finance
with Bad Project
(Mb)
Intermediary
Finance
(N)
Market Finance
with Good Project
(M,)
Figure 3.3: The impact of a change in probabilities of success on the type offinance
Collateral Assets and Debt
An increase in collateral assets relative to total assets is expected to improve the net worth
as well as the cash-flow positions of all firms, which in tum stimulates real economic
activity. A higher level of collateral assets, everything else remaining equal, causes the
upper critical point to decline and thus intermediary finance diminishes in favour of Mg.
In other words, a finn that has relatively abundant collateral assets can finance the good
project directly from financial markets with a low cost (it tends to choose socially
efficient projects). Since collateral assets do not appear in the lower critical point,
intermediary finance will decline independently of the shape of distribution as a result of
a rise in collateral assets and the firm with a high value of collateral assets will borrow
directly from the market and avoid the monitoring cost (Figure 3.4).
Small firms' financial positions are relatively more sensitive to a change in their
collateral assets. That is, the magnitude of the change in the upper critical point would be
larger for small firms as a result of a marginal change in collateral assets. In relatively
9 This point is dependent on the relative movement of critical points, and therefore the assumptions about
the distribution of firms.
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rich countries with developed financial markets where firms on average have large assets,
the share of bank finance gets smaller, as only highly financially constrained firms raise
funds from intermediary institutions. Similar results are reached when the net worth (W =
Ac- DE) is used instead of collateral assets.
BQ2 = __ 1_ and BQ, = BQ, = 0
BAc AT BAc BW
(3.20)
BM g > 0 and BN < 0
BAc BAc
(3.21)
Distribution
of Firms
Market Finance
with Bad Project
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Intermediary
Finance
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Market Finance
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P,xIAr
Figure 3.4: The impact of a change in collateral assets on tile type of finance
Existing debt is another important variable that determines the strength of the
balance sheet of firms. A firm that has a large debt is more likely to finance its good
project through intermediary finance. The impact of debt on the equilibrium condition
given in (3.14) is just the opposite of collateral assets. That is, an increase in existing debt
causes the upper critical point to increase, thus the demand for intermediary finance
relative to market finance increases. As in the case of collateral assets, the existing debt
does not affect the lower critical point.
(3.22)
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In addition to the variables discussed above, the interest rate, the project size, and
the distribution of risk are the other variables that appear in the upper critical level and
thus also play an important role in differentiating the external cost among forms of
finance for a given project. These variables enable us to derive some empirical
implications about the composition of external finance. Finns with profitability just below
the upper critical point are no longer paying a monitoring cost as a result of an increase in
the value of collateral assets (or net worth) of the firms. This leads to a reduction in the
investment cost and thus to an increase in investment and real activity.
A shock that affects the net worth of firms positively induces them to issue
commercial or corporate bonds that reduce the interest cost of firms by the amount of the
liquidity premium. On the other hand, a negative shock reduces the present value of
collateral assets while it increases the real value of existing debt. This increases the cost
of issuing commercial paper for short-term finance, thus the demand for intermediary
finance, which is more flexible for finn relative to bond finance, increases.
Project Payoff
By using an alternative presentation that is derived below, one can observe the impact of
a change in the project payoff (AJ on the critical points of the collateral ratio (AdAr).
Good projects are chosen as the project payoffs rise, everything else remains equal. If P2
is sufficiently low the composition of external finance changes in favour of bank finance
as the project payoff increases.
(3.23)
ec ,
-=
ax
bA c (p I - P 2 )
--~----~~~~~~-----<0
a {( p 2 - pi ) X - m (1 + r)}2 (3.24)
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aC2 = _.l!..2...< 0
ax AT
(3.25)
Suppose that firms can be differentiated in terms of project revenue or profitability
(P2X) and the high technology firms are defined in such a way that their payoff is high but
their probability of success of the good project is low relative to the average firm. Then,
these firms are expected to be more bank-dependent, everything else remaining equal. As
firms' payoff rises above the average the number of good projects increases, but if the
risk is high enough (or there is a low P2), bank finance is preferred. Especially in
developed economies where the number of high technology firms has been increasing, the
need for bank finance is expected to increase over time. However, since banks are not
specialized in evaluating high technology projects (high risk-high growth projects), it is
difficult for firms to raise intermediary funds by choosing such projects.
Project Size
The size of the investment project undertaken by the firm also determines the type of
external finance. Since the project size appears only in the upper critical point, it does not
affect the choice between bad and good projects while it affects the choice between
intermediary finance and market finance for good projects. The model implicitly implies
an optimal project size that satisfies F(l+r) > Ac - DE. That is, the future value of the
project evaluated in terms of market interest rate at the end of next period should be
higher than the present net worth of the firm. This implies that intermediary finance is
optimal for the firm when its net worth is less than the investment. If the project size is
smaller than the minimum level satisfying F(J +r) > Ac - DE, the firm no longer needs
external finance and the project can be fully financed by internal funds.
If the project size is large relative to total assets, the firm is most likely to finance
the project through intermediary finance. A firm that has relatively few assets cannot
finance a large project through market finance. An increase in the project size leads the
upper critical point to move upward. The movement in the critical point as a result of a
marginal change in the project size would be limited for large firms (LF) relative to small
firms (SF) in terms of total assets. That is, the selection of project size is more critical for
small firms for raising funds through the market.
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aQ 2 = (l + r) > 0
aF AT [a
Q2] [aQ2]
aF SF > aF LF
(3.26)
Expected Profitability
It is clear from (3.14) thatp2X1Arplays a central role in the model. The numerator is equal
to expected revenues while the denominator is equal to total assets thus the ratio is a
measure of the expected rate of return or profitability". The model predicts that firms fall
into three groups according to their profitability (after controlling for other firm
characteristics) profitability affects their access to various financing options. High-profit
firms finance their projects by borrowing directly from the capital market at a low interest
rate. Firms with moderate profits do not have access to low interest financing in the
capital market and borrow from banks. Finally, low-profit firms that cannot raise funds
from banks must find alternative forms of finance, if available. Empirical evidence among
UK firms suggests that there is heterogeneity in the investment returns of firms when the
distinction is drawn between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (see Basu
and Guariglia, 2002).
This logic implies that there is a link between sources of finance and rate of return
or profitability. An empirical test that confirms the link between profitability, as a proxy
for P2X1Ar, and forms of finance would offer some initial support for the theoretical
framework.
3.3.2. Introducing Monetary Policy
It is generally accepted that the central bank controls monetary stance by altering market
interest rates through open market operations. In the traditional money view of the
monetary transmission, the interest rate affects real activity only through an increase in
the cost of capital. However, according to the credit channel it also affects the present
value of internal funds (net worth), which in turn determines the cost and the type of
external finance given the informational asymmetries and incentive problems between
lenders and borrowers.
10 H~s.hie~al. (1993) refer to this term as Tobin's Q because they use the Tobin's Q measure in the
empirical implementation of their model.
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The interest rate is introduced into the model in order to examine the implications of
monetary policy for the transmission mechanism. First, we introduce a market interest
rate as a measure of the opportunity cost of finance that allows us to measure the impact
of monetary policy on the choice of finance. Second, the traditional balance sheet channel
indicates that higher interest rates result in higher repayments, lower retained profits and
therefore weaker balance sheets of firms (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). Therefore we assume that the net worth ratio, (Ac- DF:)/Ar,
denoted OJ, is a decreasing function of the interest rate, oOJ(r)/o r < O. An increase in the
interest rate requires a high repayment to the lender while it weakens the balance sheet of
the firm (a decline in cash flow or net worth), which makes external finance more
expensive!',
m(l+r)p2 + P2b ~P2X ~ P2b +F(1+r)_OJ(r)
(P2 - PI)AT a(P2 - Pt) AT a(P2 - PI) AT
(3.27)
A higher interest rate implies an upward movement of the upper and the lower
critical points. The relative movement of the critical points depends on the sensitivity of
the net worth ratio to the interest rate, the distribution of risk, total assets, the project size
and the monitoring cost. If the net worth ratio were sufficiently sensitive to the interest
rate, the change in the upper critical point would be larger. This implies that a higher
interest rate increases the demand for intermediary finance more for those firms whose
net-worth ratios are more sensitive to changes in the interest rate. If the net worth ratios of
a group of firms are not sensitive to the interest rate (those firms that hedge against the
policy changes), the demand of these firms for intermediary finance would be less relative
to those that are financially weak':'. This result confirms the financial accelerator theory
in which the credit market conditions amplify and propagate the impacts of monetary
shocks on firms' real activity when balance sheet variables are sensitive to these shocks
(Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996)
II See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), or Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) for evidence consistent with the
balance sheet channel of monetary policy.
121t is generally claimed that large and relatively strong balance sheet firms are not affected very much by
policy changes.
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OQI =
or
___ m_:p:.,_..::.2 > 0 ,
(P2 - PI)AT
F 0 (j)
= ---> 0
AT or
(3.28)
Intermediate and market finance co-exist if the following expression, holds even when net
worth is independent of the interest rate,
(3.29)
This means that as interest rates decrease, firms that experience an increase in the ratio of
market to intermediary finance should have higher rates of return compared to those firms
that experience a corresponding decrease'<. In addition, the above expressions suggest
that since net worth affects only the upper limit, the more sensitive net worth is to interest
rate changes. i.e. the higher \:\. the greater the effect of a change in interest rates on the
upper limit. The firms whose net worth is more sensitive to interest rate changes are more
likely to switch the sources of finance. Since the shift in the upper critical point is larger,
few firms will have access to the market as the interest rate increases conditional on firm
distribution. More specifically, an increase in the interest rate leads to a decline in the
number of good projects while it increases the range of profitability values for the
intermediary finance (Figure 3.5).
However, as the interest rate increases, the mix (ratio of intermediary finance to
market finance) may rise or fall depending not only on the distribution of firms but also
on the original values of the critical points that contain information about the
characteristics of the firms and financial markets.
13 A change in the interest rates affects both the upper and the lower critical points therefore without
knowing the exact distribution we cannot make any claims about the changes in total market and total
intermediary finance. However, we know that firms around the lower critical point (Q,) are firms who have
a .lowexpected return from good project and firms around the upper critical point (Q;) are firms who have a
high-expected return from the good project. Therefore, after a decrease in the interest rates, firms around Q,
should substitute intermediary finance for high-cost market finance and firms around Q2 should substitute
low-cost market finance for intermediary finance.
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Figure 3.5: The impact of the interest rate on the type of finance
(Normally distributed firms ill terms of profitability)
If, for example, firms are distributed uniformly in terms of their profitability, the
demand for intermediary finance is expected to increase as a result of a tight monetary
policy whatever the values of the critical points are. That is, the ratio of intermediary
finance to total external finance tends to increase as a result of an increase in the interest
rate (Figure 3.6). However, banks avoid supplying loans to the firms that have financial
difficulties during the tight policy periods, which leads to a 'credit crunch'.
8MIX
8r
> 0 (3.30)
Monetary Policy and Size
This model supports the proposition that in economies where large and well-capitalized
firms are dominant, a contractionary monetary policy is expected to have only a limited
impact on overall economic activity. In fact, small poorly capitalized firms are more
subject to default and their financial positions are more sensitive to policy shocks.
Specifically, the change in critical points stemming from a tight monetary policy is
relatively high for small firms and thus they are more likely to be subject to financial
constraints. That is, they confront relatively more difficulties in satisfying the conditions
for intermediary finance. This fact is supported by empirical evidence that indicates that
small and poorly capitalized firms are more subject to financial constraints in tight
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periods and thus their investments (especially inventory) slow down significantly more
relative to that of large and well-capitalized firms.
mp 2
__;;'_:2;'" < 0 ,
pAr
=
F
A 2
T
< 0 (3.31)
IOQIIor SF OQII d IOQ2 OQ21>-- an >or LF or SF or LF (3.32)
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Figure 3.6: The impact of the interest rate on the type of finance
(Uniformly distributedJirms in terms of their profitability)
Assuming that the project size is proportional to asset size as in the original model,
the impact is going to be only on the lower critical point, that is:
=
_
m~p__:2.... < 0 ,
pAi =
o
As firm size increases, the impact of a rise in interest rates on the composition of firm
finance will be less significant. Smaller firms are more sensitive to the tightening of
monetary policy and are more likely to switch from intermediary finance to other sources
lower down the pecking order.
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Monetary Policy and Riskiness
Access to intermediary finance when monetary policy is tight depends very much on the
risk factor. The sensitivity of the lower critical value to a change in interest rates falls
with p, (a higher p implies lower risk). The impact of monetary policy is more substantial
for risky firms. For high-risk firms (HR). i.e. high-technology firms, the change in the
lower critical point with a policy shock will be higher relative to low-risk firms (LR). That
is, the demand for intermediary finance will be low for high-risk firms and thus the
relative share of bad projects is expected to be higher for these firms.
8Q 2I _
8r8p
mp 2 < 0 or
P2AT
(3.33)
As the risk factor increases, i.e. p declines, firms are more likely to adopt socially
inefficient projects. That is, the decline in the ratio of intermediary finance to market
finance would be more severe for high-risk firms as a result of an increase in interest
rates.
Monetary Policy and the Mix
The impact of monetary policy on the bank loan supply has been discussed in literature on
the lending channel of monetary policy transmission. The credit channel becomes
stronger when the bank loan supply is sensitive to policy changes. In fact, whether an
independent lending channel exists or not, the broad credit channel implies that a
monetary policy shock affects real activity by changing the wedges between external and
internal finance as well as between intermediary finance and market finance. These
effects on the cost of finance in tum substantially influence the investment decisions of
firms that have to use external finance. In other words, as the collateral assets of firms
that have profitability measures just over the upper critical point decrease (say as a result
of a tight monetary policy), the firms that are on the margin tend to shift from market
finance to intermediary finance where monitoring costs are lower (M, declines). If the
bank loans supply does not satisfy the increase in the demand for bank loans, then bank
loans become more expensive as a result of rising lending rates.
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Contrary to the theoretical framework so far discussed, the evidence from aggregate
data shows that the mix variable (ratio of bank loans to the sum of bank loans and
commercial papers) decreases with a tight monetary policy (Kashyap et aI, 1993). This
result can be interpreted as confirmation of the lending channel (a decline in the bank
loans relative to bond issue). The present model may support the results of Kashyap et al
(1993) if one allows for an increase in the premium related to the monitoring cost during
contractionary periods when the lower critical point shifts up leading to a large volume of
market finance. In other words, suppose that the monitoring cost is a decreasing function
of economy-wide collateral assets, then a decline in the value of collateral assets may
induce the mix to decrease and this fact does not necessarily imply the existence of a
bank-lending channel. In countries where intermediary institutions are well organized and
regulated in such a way that shocks have a limited impact on the monitoring cost, the
impact of a negative shock on real activity is expected to be less significant.
aM > 0 oMIX
oAe • oAe
(3.34)
The argument that the volume of commercial paper (market finance) decreases
(procyclical) or increases (countercyclical) during contractionary periods depends not
only on the bank loan supply but also on monitoring costs, bank capital, the probabilities
of success of good or bad projects, the project payoff, total assets size as well as the
distribution of wealth and profitability. In fact, it is generally claimed that despite the
counter-cyclicality of aggregate commercial paper, firm level commercial paper is pro-
cyclical. That is, the characteristics of the commercial paper issuers play an important role
in this contradiction. Firms with strong balance sheets and high cash flows can serve as
intermediaries for small and financially weak firms that do not get access to bank loans
during downturns through extending trade credits. This argument is supported by the fact
that the portfolio demand for commercial paper (highly liquid and safe assets) issued by
financially strong firms increases during contractionary periods - flight to quality.
3.5. Conclusion
The model that we used in this study is based on a simple moral hazard problem
between entrepreneurs and suppliers of external funds, i.e., direct finance from the market
74
Chapter Three External Finance and the Monetary Transmission: A Theoretical Framework
and intermediary finance in which the moral hazard problem is ameliorated through
monitoring. The credit market equilibrium is based on the investment opportunities of
firms. We derived some comparative statics allowing us to analyse the factors that play an
important role in determining the composition of external finance. Since it is not costless
to shift among different forms of finance, a shock that changes the composition of firm
finance is likely to be influential over the investment and production decisions of firms.
Incorporating firm heterogeneity into this framework enriches the predictions of the
model where the distribution of firms in terms of their profitability is the cornerstone of
our analysis.
In general, during tight monetary policy periods, the net worth of firms tends to
contract because of a decline in the present value of collateral assets and an increase in
interest payments. This expands the demand for intermediary funds, and in tum, distresses
the firms that need external funds and, eventually, the lending rate increases for the given
supply of intermediary funds. The moral hazard problem potentially becomes more severe
as the lending rate goes up and finn managers tend to prefer bad projects to maximize
their private benefits. Banks or other intermediary institutions overcome the moral hazard
problem to some extent by rationing loans and by monitoring their clients.
Firm size, collateral assets, and the probability of success (distribution of risk) are
found to be important factors that determine the form of finance. Small firms with few
collateral assets depend more on intermediary finance that lessens the extent of the moral
hazard problem. The model implies that an increase in the firm size, collateral assets and
higher chances of success of the good project raise the possibility of financing the socially
efficient project through market finance which is less costly. More specifically, the model
supports the evidence that small and poorly capitalized firms that have few collateral
assets and high risk are more subject to financial constraints under a tight monetary
policy. Small firms' managers have a tendency of selecting socially inefficient projects
(bad projects) to avoid paying the monitoring cost as a result of an increase in the interest
rate (a change in monetary policy). Therefore, during recessions, a slowdown in the
activities of small firms will be more severe relative to that of large and well-capitalized
firms.
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A tight monetary policy increases the demand for intermediary finance more for
those firms whose net-worth ratios are more sensitive to changes in the interest rate. If the
net worth ratios of a group of firms are not sensitive to the interest rate (those firms that
hedge against the policy changes), the demand of these firms for intermediary finance
would be lower relative to that of financially weak firms. However, financially weak
firms are more likely to be subject to the moral hazard problem. Therefore, intermediary
institutions are reluctant to extend funds to these firms.
In this chapter we employed a model that allows for a wide range of factors
affecting the demand for external finance. That is, the model is generally based on the
variables related to the financial positions of corporations. On the supply side, however,
the financial positions of the banks and households become crucial for deriving a
complete picture about the implications of financial market imperfections for the real
activity. The inclusion of the financial structure of banks or households and the factors
that affect fund supply behaviours will improve the framework that aims to understand
the impact of monetary policy on firms' financial positions and thus real activity.
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CIIAPTER FOUR
A Descriptive Analysis of the UK Corporate Sector and tile Datal
4.1. Introduction
The corporate sector plays an important role for the performance of real economic
activity. Business fluctuations in this sector have close links with the overall business
cycle. Specifically, the corporate sector has an important influence on the real economy as
well as on the stability of the financial system through its links with the banking sector
and financial markets. A healthier corporate sector in terms of collateral implies a well
functioning financial sector and vice versa. For example, in the recession of the early
1990s in the UK, small non-financial firms that could not pay their bank loans back
disrupted the functioning of the banking system. The literature investigating the link
between monetary policy and corporate sector performance has been growing very
rapidly as we discussed in other chapters.
Understanding the link between the corporate sector, economic performance and the
financial system is an important step towards understanding business cycles. The
theoretical and empirical literatures have intensively focused on this link and concluded
that the depth and duration of recessions are very much related to reactions of corporate
firms to external shocks, which depend very much on the financial positions of individual
firms. Fisher (1933), Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) presented evidence that the
indebtedness of non-financial firms played an important role in the Great Depression.
More specifically, according to the debt deflation theory firms that are highly indebted
during a phase of economic slow down, in order to avoid bankruptcy, tend to either sell
their assets to compensate for the reduction in cash flow or to repay their debt, which in
tum, leads to a decline in asset prices and net worth.
1 By corporate sector we mean non-financial firms.
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By adapting moral hazard and adverse selection approaches to the credit markets, a
number of micro and macro credit market models investigate the role of corporate financial
structure for macroeconomic fluctuations. Mankiw (1976) shows how an increase in interest
rates could cause a failure of financial markets and thus provoke financial crises in the
presence of asymmetric information. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) conclude that firms
without access to credit markets would reduce investment demand if their net worth were not
high enough. In addition, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that the extent of collateral assets
determines the amount of external finance that firms can obtain.
In section two, we highlight some stylised facts about the UK macroeconomic
environment, and their interaction with overall economic performance. We overview basic
developments in the manufacturing industry and its importance for the UK economy based on
some real and financial indicators during the 1990s. In section three, we provide information
on the methodology by which we create the sample by using the FAME data set. In the same
section, we also explain the basic trends and problems in the FAME sample used in the
empirical analyses of the following chapters. In the last section we summarise.
4.2. Business Fluctuations and the Manufacturing Industry
4.2.1. Some Observations
The growth cycles of the overall economy and the manufacturing industry exhibit quite
similar patterns in the UK. The correlation coefficient between the manufacturing industry
and the overall economic growth rates has been historically high, 0.85 during the 1949-2001
period and 0.90 during the 1970-2001 period.i A similar pattern can be observed among the
growth rate ofGDP, manufacturing inventories and business investments. As it is clear from
Figure 4.1, the change in inventories is generally pro-cyclical as the empirical and theoretical
evidence suggests.' Fluctuations in GDP are smoother than those of investment and the value
added of manufacturing industry. This result implies that manufacturing industry as a
component of aggregate activity is one of the most important sources of business cycle
fluctuations in terms of sectoral decomposition. A large part of manufacturing output is
made up of the goods whose demand has cyclical characteristics.
2 It would not be wrong to derive some implications about the source of business cycle in the whole
~conom~ by analysing ~n~y the impact of external shocks on the manufacturing industry.
S~e Blinder and Maccini (199.1), ~arpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994, 1998), Kashyap, Lamont and
Stem.(1~94) and Gertler and Gl~chnst (1994) for empirical evidence on US inventory investments and
Guariglia (1999, 2000) and Schiantarelli and Guariglia (1998), Small (2000) for evidence on the UK.
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Figure 4.1: Gn:mthRates of Total andManufactwing Value Added, (hmge in
Manufactwing Inventories, at 1995 prices
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Monetary policy is an instrument in managing aggregate demand and smoothing the
fluctuations in the economy. The Bank of England loosens the money supply by reducing
interest rates when the economy weakens and it tightens it as the economy strengthens. The
endogenous character of the policy response makes it difficult to identify the effects of
monetary policy separately from cyclical effects. Figure 4.2 shows the correlation between
quarterly lags and leads of the base rate and the GDP growth rate. A negative correlation
between lags of interest rates and the GDP growth rate may imply that an increase in interest
rates is followed by a decline in the GDP growth rate. The negative correlation reaches its peak
point after a one-year lag and diminishes gradually as the lag increases.
On the other hand, a positive correlation between at least a one-year lead of interest rates
and the GDP growth rate may be considered as evidence that a boom in the economy is
followed by an increase in the interest rate. This is consistent with a demand managing policy
that undermines inflationary pressures. In addition, policy changes sometimes affect the
economy more deeply than expected in the sense that a surprise rise in interest rates may lead to
a recession whose deepness depends on the extent of inherited information asymmetries in the
economy.
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Hgure 4.2: Correlation Berneen aPG-cMthRate am l.agiam Leads of
Base Rate, QJarteriy, 1985-2001
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The factors explaining business investment fluctuations have been an important
topic in both the theoretical and the empirical literature. According to the Modigliani-
Miller theory, financial factors do not influence investment decisions. Recent literature
that introduces imperfect information concludes that financial positions of corporate firms
play a crucial role for investment decisions. This literature clearly implies that the
financial positions of individual firms are very much sensitive to macroeconomic policies
either directly or through financial markets. Well-organised and efficient financial
markets are expected to smooth the negative impact of macroeconomic shocks on
business investments (Leahy et al., 2001; Tsuru, 2000).
Figure 4.3 gives an idea about the movements of investment and the interest rate.
These variables exhibit opposite patterns especially before the recession of the early
1990s, but the pattern seems to be mildly pro-cyclical after the recession. In addition,
there is also a noticeable shift in the amplitude of the cycle from 1990 onwards i.e. it is
very muted and has a lower mean value. Business investment growth is highly subject to
fluctuations compared to GDP growth, that is, the standard deviation of the former is
calculated to be four times higher than the one for the latter during the period of 1978-
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2001. Alongside a decline in the price of capital goods, the low interest rate is another
factor that supported the rise in business investment after the recession. The real user cost
of capital in the second half of the 1990s declined substantially parallel to a five
percentage point fall in the real interest rate since 1994 (CBI, 2001).
Figure 4.3: Business Investments and GDP Growth, Inter-Bank Rates
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More specifically, a lower and stable inflation environment led to a fall in the cost
of finance through the decline in the equity and the inflation risk premiums during the
second half of the 1990s. Financial liberalisation let firms raise funds in a more
competitive environment where monitoring cost declined, as a result of the improvement
in the operations of the financial system and the fact that the corporate bond market
became more liquid. In addition, a decline in government consumption has created
additional funds in the capital market for business investment in the same period (Bakhshi
and Thompson, 2002).
The theory of asymmetric information implies that the reactions of firms to the
external shocks in an imperfect market environment are not homogeneous. In fact, firms
that are financially strong in terms of net worth are supposed to be less vulnerable to
negative shocks compared to financially weak firms who are highly dependent on
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external funds. It is generally claimed that financial factors played a major role in the
recession of early 1990s, because small non-financial firms were substantially dependent
on external borrowing before the slowdown in the economy. Therefore, insolvency and
liquidity problems that became serious during the recession in the early 1990s led to an
increase in business failures. The financial position of corporations then played an
important role in these business failures because it influenced banks' willingness to lend
(Vlieghe, 2001; Lund and Wright, 1999; Hoggarth and Chrystal, 1998).
Two main reasons for corporate failure can be forwarded: firstly, a decline in the
investment demand as a result of the reduction in cash flow (liquidity constraint),
secondly a reduction of the net worth of firms as a result of increases in the real interest
rates and in the cost of intermediation (insolvency). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 give information
about the VAT registration-based business closures and start-ups during the recession in
the early 1990s. Net business start-ups (start-ups minus closures) declined substantially
and business closures increased proportionally compared to the total number of registered
firms. These figures give a rough guide as to the extent of the destruction of small-scaled
businesses during the recession. The closures were more widespread among young and
small firms who encountered financial difficulty more frequently than large and mature
firms. Another stylised fact is worthy of emphasis here: the slowdown in the business
Figure 4.4: Difference Between Business Startups and Closures
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investments during the early 1990s was more dramatic compared to the one during the
early 1980s recession. This fact is generally attributed to the high indebtedness of the
corporate sector in the early 1990s relative to the previous recession (Hall, 2001;
Hoggarth and Chrystal, 1998).
Since the real activity of small firms is more sensitive to financial constraints and to
general economic slowdown, the small firm sector is important for understanding
economic fluctuations. In fact, small firms make a significant contribution to overall
economic production in the UK. For example, firms with 49 or fewer employees
(including self-employed businesses) accounted for 38 percent of total turnover and 44
percent of total employment in 1999. These figures are relatively low for the
manufacturing sector, that is, small firms accounted for only 29 percent of manufacturing
employment and 19.3 percent of manufacturing turnover (Table 4.1).
There are also links to the financial sector since in the early 1990s recession, the
banking sector suffered large losses from its loans to the small business sector. This fact
highlighted that many small and young firms have been financed inappropriately in the
past. In other words, although it is not easy to clarify the extent of business failures
resulting from credit constraints or credit rationing, it is obvious that the failures are
Figure 4.5: Share of BusinessStartups and Closures in Total Stock at Year
Start in Manufacturing Industry
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widespread among small and young firms that are more likely to be subject to moral
hazard and adverse selection problems (Lund and Write, 1999).
4.2.2. Financefor Small Manufacturing Firms
Small firms operate mainly in real estate business activities, construction, wholesale,
retail and repairs sectors while only nine percent of them are in the manufacturing
industry. It is obvious that macroeconomic conditions and the financial position of the
corporate sector improved significantly after the early 1990s recession. It is generally
claimed that small firms have been financed more appropriately recently compared to in
the early 1990s. The rate of liquidation and bankruptcies in the period of 1993-1999
remained significantly below that of the period of 1990-1992. Firms tended to be more
dependent on internal finance and became net creditors to the banking sector. While the
proportion of debt finance declined as a source of finance, the proportion of asset-based
and receivables finance increased significantly. In short, macroeconomic stability,
diversification of financial products and high profitablity have improved the financial
positions of small firms in the second half of 1990s.
Table 4.1:Businesses, Employment and Turnover ill Manufaauring and H'hole Economy (1999)
Distribution of Total Based on Employment (Percent)
Total None 1-49 50-249 250+
Manufacturing Industry
No. of Businesses 332070 56.3 40.4 2.5 0.8
Employment (OOOs) 4334 5.3 23.6 20.7 50.4
Turnover {Em, Exl. VAT) 470427 1.5 17.8 16.3 64.4
All industries excluding finance
No. of Businesses 3676940 63.2 35.9 0.7 0.2
Employment (OOOs) 21746 12.5 31.5 11.5 44.5
Turnover (Em, Exl. VAT) 1943880 4.7 33.0 13.3 49.0
Share of Manufacturing ill Total (Percent)
No. of Businesses 9.0 8.0 10.2 32.3 36.1
Employment (ODDs) 19.9 8.5 14.9 35.9 22.6
Turnover (Im, Exl. VAT) 24.2 7.7 13.1 29.7 31.8
..
Source: http.z/www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase
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Traditional bank finance (overdrafts and term loans) remains the main component
of external finance for small firms even though its share tends to decline as they
increasingly diversify their source of finance. In the period of 1987-1990 bank finance
accounted for 61 percent of external finance, while it declined to 47 percent in the period
1995-1997 (ESRC Center for Business Research, 1998). Outstanding small business loans
declined gradually during the period 1992-1999, while small business deposits increased
during the same period. In addition, overdraft lending declined gradually and term
lending increased slightly during the same period. The net indebtness of small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) fell and the ratio of deposits to lending increased from
56 percent in 1992 to 94 percent in 1999. Competition in the area of bank charges is
fierce and the Bannock Bank Charges Index shows that, in real terms, bank charges have
come down by over 30 percent since 1992 (Bank of England, 2000).4
Asset-based finance includes leasing and hire purchase and other products. The
leasing industry exihibited a rapid expansion in the 1970s due to changes in the tax
regime that encouraged leasing. In fact, the flexibility provided by leasing and hire
purchase was the main reason for the rapid expansion of asset-based finance. Since the
last recession, the proportion of external finance to small businesses accounted for by
leasing and hire purchase has grown signifiacntly, and has been a substitute for debt
finance in the commercial sector. Leasing and hire purchase provide businesses with
access to finance without reducing their capital reserves or increasing their gearing levels.
It is reported that this industry constitute 30 percent of external finance for SMEs and this
proportion is lower for the large firms (Figure 4.6). Some surveys showed that a higher
proportion of SME use asset-based finance in the UK than in any other EU country except
Ireland (Bank of England, 2000).
Trade credit is another important source of external finance especially for small
businesses. The trade debtors item of the corporate balance sheet constituted 35 percent of
total assets (Bank of England, 2000). It is calculated that stocks and flows of trade credits
were twice the size of bank credit in the UK and the US. Finns use trade credit as
substitutes for bank credit when they reach their bank finance limit. Businesses may offer
trade credit to their customers even when banks are not prepared to extend finance
4 An index that is produced by Bannock Consulting shows bank charges for the banking services.
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Figure 4.6: Sources of External Finance for Manufacturing SMEs,
1995-1997
HP/Leasing
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because they have more information about their costumers and want to keep their
costumers financially strong for their competitive advantage.
4.3. Data
4.3.1. A Brief Background
The FAME database will be used for the econometric analyses carried out in the next
chapters. ' The FAME covers all UK registered companies including those that have
recently formed and up to 13 years of detailed information (modified accounts) about
500,000 British companies and summarised information for a further 1.3 million
companies. The detailed information includes company profiles, profit and loss accounts,
balance sheets, cash flow statements, ratios and trends, credit scores, complete lists of
holding companies, subsidiaries and directors, shareholders, addresses, activity
information, and miscellaneous information. The legal framework for the FAME database
is summarised in the following paragraph.
5 FAME stands for Financial Analysis Made Easy and is produced by the Bureau van Dijk lectronic
Publishing.
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The 1967 Companies Act introduced for the first time a requirement that all
companies must file their annual accounts at Companies House. This Act abolished the
previous exemptions about fileing accounts and auditing. However, in 1981, in
implementing the EC Fourth Company Law Directive, the British Government introduced
an exemption regime allowing small and medium-sized firms to file so called short-form
accounts (abbreviation). After consultations the audit requirement for all companies was
retained. A further consultation in 1993, following implementation of the provisions of
the EC Eighth Company Law Directive, led to the first serious step in exempting very
small private companies (with a turnover of £90,000 or less) from auditing, and
introduced an intermediate exemption regime for private companies with a turnover of up
to £350,000. Companies with a turnover between £90,000 and £350,000 were given the
option of filing a simpler Audit Exemption Report (AER) instead of the full audit report.
However, AERs were abolished in 1997 leaving two types of companies - those with a
turnover above £350,000 who are subject to a full statutory audit, and those with a
turnover of £350,000 or less who are exempt. The account-auditing threshold for small
firms was increased to £1 million by July 2000. However this threshold is being
reconsidered and a figure of £4.8 million has been suggested, the maximum amount for
small firm threshold allowed under EU law (Department of Trade and Industry web site,
DTI, 1999 and 2003 )
Small charitable companies may claim audit exemption if their gross income is
£90,000 or less. These firms are supposed to report accounts if their gross income is in the
range of £90,000 and £250,000. In addition, parent companies do not need to prepare
group accounts if the group of companies headed by that parent company is made up of
non-public small or medium sized companies (DTI, 1999, 2003). There were 750,000
companies whose accounts were filed at Companies House by the end of 1999. Almost 70
percent of these companies have turnover below £350,000, which is the threshold for
audit exemption (Table 4.2).
We now tum to the characteristics of the data. The FAME data set consists of
balance sheets, profit-loss accounts and some important ratios based on firms' accounting
thresholds referred to in the section 248 of the Companies Act 1985. In this framework,
certain companies are permitted to deliver modified accounts to the Registrar of
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Companies. Individual companies, which meet the criteria of small and medium-sized
status, have some advantages of not preparing detailed accounts compared to large
companies. For small-sized companies, filing a profit and loss account or details on
turnover, and on the number of employees are not obligatory, however, they have to file
abridged balance sheet information that obviously includes some items of assets and
liabilities. On the other hand, medium-sized companies do not have to disclose turnover
details. Currently, companies should satisfy two out of the three criteria given in Table
4.3 to be classified as small or medium sized companies." These criteria are based on
turnover, balance sheet (total assets) and number of employees.
Table 4.2: Distribution of Companies Registered with Companies House by Turnover
Turnover Interval Number of Companies Percentage Distribution
Up to £350 000 520,000
110,000
69.3
Over £350,000 to £lm 14.7
Over £1m to £2m 40,000 5.3
2.7Over £2m to £3m 20,000
15,000 2.0Over £3m to £4.2m
Over £4.2m 45,000 6.0
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
One may expect that this exemption system, which can be considered as a basis for
the selection rule, allows for some missing observations in the company's accounts in the
FAME sample. In fact, we observed some diversions in the selection rule explained
above. For example, there is a number of missing observations in turnover even though
firms are classified as large firms based on employment and balance sheet criteria. In
addition, some small firms report almost complete information even though they are not
obliged to do so. These diversions in the selection rule should be considered in the
estimations. In Chapter Seven, we test the hypothesis of whether the problem of
incomplete data significantly affect empirical results in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.
6 The British government completed a consultation study that is aimed at adopting new criteria for small
and me~ium-sized compani~s, which is ~ons~stentwith EU law. New thresholds are supposed to be
supportive for the small busmesses by widening the range of firms subject to audit exemption.
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There is no single definition for a small finn, mainly because of the wide diversity
of businesses. The best description of the key characteristics of a small finn was given by
the Bolton Committee in its 1971 Report on Small Firms. This states that a small finn is
an independent business, managed by its owner or part-owners and having a small market
share. The Bolton Report also adopts a number of different statistical definitions. It is
recognised that the size is relevant to the sector, i.e. a finn could be considered small in
relation to one sector where the market is large and there are many competitors, whereas a
firm with similar proportions could be considered as large in another sector with fewer
competitors. Similarly, it is recognised that it may be more appropriate to define size by
the number of employees in some sectors but more appropriate to use turnover or assets in
others.
Table 4.3: Definitions of Small and Medium Sized Firms
Criteria Small Size Companies Medium Size Compo
Turnove/ Maximum£2.8 million Maximum£ 11.2million
Balance Sheet Maximum£ 1.4 million Maximum£5.6 million
Number of Employees Max 50 Max 250
Source: DTI web page.
Of the entire business population of 3.7 million firms in 2000, only 25,000
enterprises are medium sized (50 to 249 employees) and less than 7,000 are large (250 or
more employees). Small businesses, including those without employees, accounted for
over 99 percent of businesses, 44 percent of non-government employment and 37 percent
of turnover. In contrast, the 7,000 largest businesses accounted for 45 percent of non-
government employment and 49 percent of turnover. The stock of enterprises is now at
the same level for the sixth successive year following falls in 1992 and 1993. The
business stock is 1.3 million higher than in 1980, the first year for which comparable
figures are available. Most of the moderate growth in the business population between
1995 and 2000 has been in the number of 'micro' businesses employing fewer than ten
people and in the number of one-person companies.
7 We use turnover and sales interchangeably.
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In February 1996 the European Commission recommended a single definition for
SMEs to the member states. The European Investment Bank and the European Investment
Fund adopted the same definitions for their programmes (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: European Commission Firms Size Classification8
Criterion ft-ficro Small Medium
Maximum number of employees 9 49 249
Maximum annual turnover - 7 m. euro 40 m. euro
Maximum annual balance sheet total - 5 m. euro 27 m. euro
Maximum % owned by one, or jointly by several,
-
25% 25%
enterprisers) not satisfying the same criteria
Source: DTI web page.
4.3.2. Constructing the Sample and Some Key Observations
We have constructed a sample from the FAME Database that allows us some flexibility in
analysing some aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism and the role of non-
financial firms' financial positions for corporate sector activity. We limited the sample
only to the firms in the manufacturing industry, which has quite a similar pattern of
business cycles to the overall economy as explained in the earlier part of this chapter. We
provide information on the financial accounts and ratios for more than 15 000 UK
manufacturing firms using the web site of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing,
http://fame.bvdep.comlcgi/tempiate.dll.This sample is extracted from the FAME
Database based on the following criteria':
• Firms whose primary activity IS classified III the manufacturing industry
according to 1992 SIC UK CodelO.
8 To qualify as an SME, both the employee and the independence criteria must be satisfied and either the
turnover or the balance sheet total criteria.
9 The sampl~ is based on ~o~loaded figures during October and November 2001. The sample size is likely
to change with downloadmg time because of the monthly revision of firm accounts.
10 The sample also includes 940 firms (5.7 percent of total sample size) whose secondary activity rather than
primary activity is classified in the manufacturing sector.
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• All firms in the sample are established before 1990 and we want to make sure
that firms are alive at the end of the sample period. This allows us to observe the
maximum number of firms who report their balance sheet continuously over the
period thus to identify the impact of monetary shocks on firms' choice of finance
and real activity in the tight versus loose monetary policy regime periods. I I
• All active firms in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are included.
• We trim some variables used in the econometric models that we use in Chapters
Five and Six. Details for trimming are explained in the Appendix.
Although the extracted sample includes some rrussmg observations especially
during the first couple of years of the sample period, it is consistent with the framework
explained above. In other words, the sample is not a balanced panel, and we can not
observe information about most of the firms whose turnover is under the threshold. In
fact, there are quite a number of missing observations across variables, firms and years.
The sample represents the upper tail of the population in terms of firm size distribution
and this may limit the extent to which the sample represents the population. This sort of
limitation in the sample can be evaluated using the framework of 'truncated and censored
samples'. In our case we do not observe information of all firms in the manufacturing
industry but only those that have their turnover over the exemption threshold.
Nevertheless, the sample does include some information about some firms whose
turnover is under £90,000, which is the upper threshold for totally exempted firms. In
general, the FAME sample is an incomplete panel in nature: it is truncated and it includes
missing observations even when some firms are in the limit of the selection rule or vice
versa.
11 ~nly thr~e percent of the fi~ in t~e manufacturing industry stopped reporting during the 1990-1999
penod. This ma~ stem from either failure of the company or stopping reporting to the Companies House.
An .upd.atedversion of FAME data set shows that the share of firms that liquidated or bankrupt during this
penod IS very low.
91
Chapter Four A Descriptive Analysis on Corporate Sector in tire UK and Data
Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of firm size based on total assets. One can easily
observe that the number of firms that report their balance sheet details increased sharply
Figure 4.7: Distribution of the Flrrrs Across Size Based on Balance Sheet
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in the first three years of the sample period. In the meantime, while the proportions of
large firms and medium-sized firms increased, the proportion of small firms declined after
1993. Because this period coincided with a substantial improvement in the performance
of the corporate sector after the recession, there was a change in the distribution of firms
toward large firms category. There was also a change in the exemption regime in 1993.
This might explain why the proportion of large firms in the sample increased.
Potential reasons for poor reporting observed for the period of 1990-1992 may be
attributed to the following facts:
• As explained above the regime of exemption thresholds changed in 1993 and
became effective by 1994. Before 1994, the exemption regime entai led auditing
for all firms even though some initiatives had been taken to change this regime
in the 1980s.
• The recovery in the economy by 1993 led to an increase in the size of firms and
thus the number of firms eligible for reporting. The impact of the recession in
the early 1990s is supposed to have affected the reporting efficiency for the
firms that were financially in trouble.
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• The company that collects the data possibly increased the efficiency of the data
collection in the meantime. We contacted company experts and they confirmed
again that published company accounts were taken from Companies House12•
By the end of the sample period, only 9.4 percent of all firms reported for less than
eight of those years. These firms generally belong to the small firm group in terms of
average turnover and average employment. On the other hand, firms that reported every
year in the sample (18.7 percent of sample size) are large firms with high turnover, total
assets and employment. In addition, those firms that have large assets, employment and
turnover are made up of relatively old firms. The correlation coefficient between age and
firm size is positive even though it is not high during the sample period (0.08). Among
the firm size criteria, employment has the highest correlation coefficient with the firm age
(0.13) percentage point. While 58 percent of firms that reported for less than eight years
have employment figures, 75.5 percent of them report turnover. The distribution of firms
according to industry that report less than eight years is not significantly different from
those of firms which reported eight years or more.
The time when firms report their balance sheets during the year also varies
significantly. Almost 42 percent of firms with eight-year observations reported in
December, while 18.2 percent and 8.6 percent of them reported in March and September
respectively (Table 4.5). For consistency, we regard information provided by firms during
12 There may be many reasons explaining the presence of missing observations. We got the following
explanations from the Bureau van Dijk that organises data collection for the FAME Database .
• The company may not have been registered with Companies' House until more recently (i.e. traded in a
non-limited form for several years prior to becoming a registered company) .
• Data would not be available prior to registration. The company has not been legally required to file
information until more recently - legislation in the period of 1994-1999 states that firms are only legally
required to file if their turnover exceeds £350 thousands. Some companies falling outside these
parameters still choose to file financial information, others do not. There can be a multitude of reasons;
it is necessary to look at each example individually, as broad generalisation can be quite misleading .
• The company in question has not submitted that figure (it may not have to), that figure is not relevant to
their operations (certain balance sheet items) or in a very few cases it may be a mistake. lfthe figure is
given as zero that simply means the company in question has filled in that space with that figure. Some
companies for example who don't have to file a turnover figure may put the figure zero whilst others
may leave it blank. Some companies who are allowed to file abbreviated accounts chose not to file
everything .
• There will always be mistakes with any database, and the FAME is not infallible. However there are
also a number of companies who do not comply with the filing regulations, who file their accounts late
and who generally make life difficult for information providers. Companies' House has also been
known to make a few mistakes.
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the first half of the calendar year as relevant for the previous year, while we kept the
information for the current year for those firms that report after June. For instance, we
used the annual information of the firms that report their balance sheet by the end of May
in 1995 for the year of 199413•
Although the distribution of turnover and employment across asset size remains
stable during the sample period, as we emphasised above, the sample is biased in the
sense that the largest 10 percent of the firms in terms of assets size realised around 85
percent of total turnover and 80 percent of total employment. Figure 4.8 shows the
cumulative distribution of turnover share percentage across asset size percentile range.
This figure confirms that the distribution of firms in terms of size is almost identical in
the recession and recovery periods.
Table 4.5: Firms with at least Eight Observations by the End of 2000
No of Firms Share itt Total
January 383 2.6
February 278 1.9
March 2685 18.2
April 758 5.1
May 422 2.9
June 1103 7.5
July 418 2.8
August 449 3.0
September 1271 8.6
October 462 3.1
November 315 2.1
December 6233 42.2
TOTAL 14777 100.0
13Thereporting date is called 'statement date' when firms publicise their balance sheets.
94
Chapter Four A Descriptive Analysis on Corporate Sector in tire UKand Data
Figure 4.8: Cumulative Distribution of Turnover Based on Asset Size
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By comparing the sample and the population distribution of turnover, employment
and businesses, one can easily observe the extent of the differences between the whole
manufacturing industry and the Fame sample. Based on 1999 figures, while the turnover
share of large and small firms in terms of the employment criterion constitutes 65.4
percent and 18.1 percent of the total industry, they were calculated to be 89.7 percent and
1.9 percent respectively for the FAME sample, respectively." Similarly, while the
employment shares of large and small firms are 53.2 percent and 24.9 percent in total
manufacturing employment, these figures are 88.0 percent and 1.4 percent for the
sample, respectively. In addition, the number of businesses employing at least 250
employees and less than 50 employees in manufacturing constitute only 1.8 percent and
92.4 percent of the total. These figures are quite different for the sample, that is, 21.9
percent and 27.8 percent, respectively. This result confirms Figure 4.7 where medium
sized firms constitute the largest share of total firms in the sample.
Our database contains quite rich information about the credit ratings of firms.
QuiScore is produced by Qui Credit Assessment Ltd. and measures the likelihood of
141nTable 4.1, the turnover, employment and businesses shares have been recalculated for films in the
manufacturing industry employing at least one worker in order to make possible comparisons with the
sample.
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company failure in the twelve months following the date of calculation. The QuiScore,
hereafter rating score, is given as a number in the range 0 to 10015• For ease of
interpretation, that range may be considered as comprising five distinct bands'", The
rating score is intended to be a measure of the financial healthiness of the companies, and
should be interpreted in conjunction with other information such as seasonal trends,
product life cycles, competition, interest rates and other micro and macro-economic
factors.
Band Name Score Band Descriptio"
The Secure Band 81-100 Companies in this sector tend to be large and successful public
companies. Failure is very unusual and normally occurs only as a
result of exceptional changes within the company or its market.
The Stable Band 61-80 Again company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about
if there are major company or marketplace changes.
The Normal Band 41-60 The sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some that
do.
The Unstable Band 21-40 There is a significant risk of company failure: in fact companies in
this band are on average four times more likely to fail than those in
the Normal Band.
The High Risk Band 0-20 Companies in the High Risk sector are unlikely to be able to continue
trading unless significant remedial action is undertaken, there is
support from a parent company, or special circumstances apply. A
low score does not mean that failure is inevitable.
Source: Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD) web site.
The number of firms that report a rating score during the recession is relatively low
and is consistent with the reporting of asset size. While only nine thousand firms reported
this figure in 1990 it increased to fourteen thousand in 1992 and almost sixteen thousand
firms reported it in the period of 1993-1999. The distribution of firms across rating score
bands highlights the impact of the recession in the early 1990s on firms' financial health.
While the shares of the firms in the bands of unstable and high risk arc higher during the
recession than the recovery period, the share of the firms in the secure and stable bands
are higher during the upswing period. In other words, firms face a higher risk during
recessions (Figure 4.9).
IS Firm's analysis reflects the current economic conditions and includes post mortcms on failed companies.
16 The rating score is based on statistical analysis of a random selection of companies. To ensure that the
model i~ not distorte~, t~e: categories are screened out from the initial selection: major public companies,
companies that have insignificant amounts of unsecured trade credit and liquidated companies that have a
surplus of assets over liabilities.
96
Chapter Four A Descriptive Analysis on Corporate Sector in the UKand Data
Large and old firms have, on average, high ratings confirming the fact that small
and young firms having inadequate collateral assets and a poor track record and are more
likely subject to financial difficulties during the period of slowing down. Figure 4.10
shows two stylised facts. Firstly, firms in the upper tail of total assets (large firms) have
relatively a high credit score during the business cycle. Secondly, the average rating
during the recession is lower than it is in the upswing period and the margin between the
periods becomes wider as we move towards the lower tail of the size distribution.
Figure 4.9: Distribution of Firms across Rating Score Bands
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Large firms in terms of asset size consist of generally old firms, and the average age
of firms versus their size does not vary with the business cycle, except for the firms in the
lowest tail of the size distribution. In other words, the average age of small firms during
the recession is lower than during the recovery period implying that age may be an
explanatory variable for the poorer performance of these firms (Figure 4.11).
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Figure 4.10: Rating Score across Firm Size in the Business Cycle
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Figure 4.11: Average Age Across Firm Size in the Business Cycle
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Variables such as profitability, capital gearing and liquidity of the firms are
frequently used as indicators of financial health. Parallel to Benito and Vlieghe (2000)
whose data consist of all quoted UK non-financial finn, we use the return on capital (the
share of profit before tax in total assets less current liabilities) as a proxy for profitability
which is expected to be equal to the risk-free real interest rate plus risk premium. On
average, the return on capital for small firms is calculated to be higher than that of other
categories during the 1990s. During the recession period, this variable was on average
low for all categories of firms (by size) and has been declining since 1997 (Figure 4.12).
The profit margin, which is another proxy for profitability and reflects market
power, is calculated to be higher for large firms except during the last two years of the
period when profit margins of small firms exhibited an upward jump. As for the return on
capital, the profit margin is low for all size categories during the period of the recession
and has been declining since 1997. In addition, this database confirms Benito and Vlieghe
(2000) results in the sense that the margin between distributions of upper and lower tails
of profitability has been widening in recent years. This can be attributed to the high
profitability performance of small firms who have a low capital stock.
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Figure 4.12: Return on Capital across Firm Asset Size
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The distribution of profitability across age shows a quite interesting result; while the
average profitability of old firms exhibited a flat pattern with a slight decline in recent
years, the profitability of young firms increased during the period except for a slight
decline recently. This result for young firms can be interpreted in the following way. First
of all, young firms are more subject to informational problems implying that they are
more prone to choose risky projects. Second, young firms may be more flexible in
choosing new profitable technologies relative to old firms.
We extracted the profitability figures of firms across rating scores from the
database. Figure 4.13 shows the extent of variation in the capital return across risk groups.
Unsecured firms have consistently negative profitability implying that these firms involve
a high risk of bankruptcy. On the other hand, normal firms have a very flat and positive
return on capital while secure firms have very high positive and increasing return on
capital during the period. This result implies that the rating scores variable is strongly
linked with profitability.
Figure 4.13: Return on Capital across Rating Score Bands
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Evidence suggests that the lack of liquid assets has been an important cause of
business failures. Keeping more liquid assets on the balance sheet as a financial buffer
may avoid the risk of failure for the corporate sector. In this context, small firms with few
liquid assets are more vulnerable to the risk of failure and thus it might be expected that
they tend to keep more liquid assets. We used the liquidity ratio, the ratio of current assets
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minus stocks and work in progress to the current liabilities, to compare the liquidity of
firms across different size, age and rating groups. The data confirms the result that small
firms tend to have a high liquidity ratio. Figure 4.14 shows that the average liquidity ratio
of small firms (in the lowest 25 percentile of the size distribution) is higher than that of
large firms (firms in the highest 25 percentile of size distribution) during the whole
period, except 1994. An increase in the small firms' solvency ratio (the ratio of
shareholder's fund to total assets) implies that small firms' ability to repay debts has
improved since 1994. This result is consistent with the idea that small firms tended to
improve their financial positions during the second half of the 1990s.
The relative liquidity of firms in the upper and lower tails of the age distribution
remained more ore less the same even though the average liquidity ratio of old firms is
calculated to be higher than that of young firms throughout the period. Similarly, the
solvency ratio of old firms remained high, while that ratio for young firms increased
rapidly during the period. In addition, secure firms in terms of rating score have very high
liquidity and solvency ratios and the correlation coefficient between solvency ratio and
rating score is over 0.50 on the average. However, the liquidity and solvency ratios of
risky firms increased faster than that of secure firms during the sample period.
Figure 4.14: liquidity and &lIvmcy: Ratios for Small and U1rt,JC l<bmi
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Finn indebtedness is the concern of our empirical study that will be carried out in the
next chapters. The data contains a wide range ofinfonnation about the finance composition of
firms, that is, firms liabilities are decomposed in terms of maturity as well as bank and non-
bank debt classification. This variety enables us to compare the term structure of bank debt
and gearing among various finn categories in terms of size, age and rating. Figure 4.15
indicates some features of finn fmance across small and large firms.
The gearing ratio is defmed as the share of total debt to shareholder equity and exhibits
an increasing trend in favour of small firms during the period even though the average
gearing ratio of large firms remained above that of small firms (the series in the figure are the
gearing ratio of small firms relative to that oflarge firms). This figure implies that large firms
can borrow larger amounts of debt relative to their equity. However the gap between the two
groups has been narrowed. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that banks are reluctant to
extend credit to small firms who are weak in terms of net worth during slowdowns. The data
implies that small firms improved their conditions in accessing bank funds, leasing and hire
purchase and banks were more prone to lend to them during the 1990s. Some survey studies
support the idea that small firms in recent years have not been confronted with serious
constraints when attempting to access debt finance!".
Figure 4.15: Comparing Some Debt Ratios of Small and Large Firms
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17Keams and Young (2002) conclude that although sma_llquoted companies do not generally have access to
bond markets and long term bank loans and they have difficulties in raising equity there is no clear
evidence of those having difficulties getting short-term bank finance. '
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Short-term debt finance relative to bonds, equity and long-term debt has been the
most important source of finance for small firms in recent years. Issuing bond and equity
involves a high cost for small firms in the sense that small firms are subject to greater
informational problems. The average share of short-term debt in total debt for small firms
was 60.5 percent in 1991 while it increased to 75.4 percent in 1999. In addition, the share
of short-term debt finance has been higher for small firms, especially after 1992, and
increased compared to that of large firms during the same period.
We observe that the share of short-term debt in current liabilities (including debt
and non-debt finance) for small firms declined sharply during the recession compared to
large firms. This implies that small firms faced more difficulties in having access to short
term debts during this period. After the recession this figure increased sharply but
declined steadily over time, confirming the fact that small firms rely more on internal
funds or other forms of finance rather than short term debt in recent years. Large firms
tend to prefer short-term debt finance relative to other short-term finance compared to
small firms. In addition, the share of total debt finance increased faster for the small firms
in recent years implying that small firms are not confronted with financial constraints in
accessing short-term debt finance.
Young firms had a high gearing ratio during the period; the ratio also increased for
old firms significantly over time. This result may imply that recently incorporated firms
became less dependent on debt finance in recent years, and this may be attributed to the
rapid growth of young firms' equity in a stable macroeconomic environment. The share
of short-term debt in total current liabilities and of total debt in total liabilities did not
change significantly for both young and old firms during the period even though a slight
decline in these figures for young firms was observed by the end of the period. However,
the relative share of short-term debt in the total debt witnessed a gradual rise for young
firms during the period (Figure 4.16).
It is calculated that the average gearing ratio for risky firms is found to be fifteen
times larger than the average gearing ratio for secure firms and it increased rapidly for
risky firms in 1999. Although the short debt-total debt ratio for risky firms remained
above that of secure firms during the period, these figures did not change much for risky
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and secure firms. In addition, risky firms had a high average short term-current liability
and total debt-total liability ratios during the period, but these ratios exhibited a declining
path for risky firms relative to secure firms, implying that risky firms tended to substitute
non-debt finance compared to secure firms (Figure 4.17).
Figure 4.16: Comparing Basic Debt Ratios across Age Groups
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Figure 4.17: Comparing Some Basic Debt Ratios Across Rating Score
Bands
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The sensitivity of the composition of external finance to the monetary stance is one
of the main concerns of this study. We summarise the distribution of the liability items in
Table 5.1 in Chapter Five across asset size bands for the early 1990s recession period and
the following recovery era. Although the average figures do not reflect information
involved with the sample perfectly, this type of analysis gives us some preliminary results
before carrying out econometric analysis.
4.3.3. Missing Observations Problem in the Sample
We discussed the incomplete nature of the FAME sample above. This motivated us to
crosscheck key variables for some quoted firms in the FAME database with their
corresponding figures in Datastream and One Source data sets. We extracted the figures
for some basic variables of nearly 300 quoted firms from these data sets. These firms are
mainly large with detailed reports and with a few missing observations compared to the
rest of the sample. We compared the values of selected variables for these firms across
the data sets to make sure that the figures from the FAME sample are not significantly
different from those from Datastream and One Source'", The following points need to be
brought to the reader's attention .
• Variables such as employment, profit, total sales, depreciation, trade debt and
inventory investments are almost perfectly matched in all databases. Only two
percent of 280 firms have different figures in FAME and Datastream. We
crosschecked these mismatched figures with One Source; the evidence is mixed; in
some cases the figures from the FAME were identical with One Source, while in
some other cases, the figures were identical with the corresponding figures in
Datatream (but employment and turnover figures in One Source are generally
identical with those reported in Datastream). We may conclude that figures in the
three data sets match for over 95 percent for most of the variables that we are going
to use in the empirical study.
• Almost half of the firms have different total assets figures in FAME and
Datastream. The difference between the total assets figures is generally very small
18 Contrary to Datastream, the FAME and One Source data sets contain information also for unquoted firms.
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and biased upward in FAME (it is expected that the difference generally originated
from definitions) 19. However, for some firms, this difference is large and biased
upward in Datastream. This is because of missing observations for intangible assets
in FAME. More specifically, the difference in total assets between the two
databases is either zero or a very small negative number if intangible asset figures
appeared in both databases, and it is positive and almost equal to the figure for
intangible assets reported in Datastream when the corresponding figure is missing
in FAME. 20 One Source's total assets figures are generally identical to those in
FAME. The definition of total asset varies between Datastream and FAME, further
aggregation as in total assets and total liabilities lead to a differentiation between
data sets because of either definitions used or missing variables among components.
On the other hand, for specific items such as employment, sales, profits,
inventories, trade debt, the two data sets have almost identical figures.
• The impact of missing observations in intangible assets can be observed in
shareholder equity i.e. the difference between total assets and total liabilities. For
many firms shareholder equity is larger in Datastream as much as the missing value
of intangible assets in FAME and therefore the two data sets seems to match quite
significantly. This result also supports the definitional difference between the two
data sets for total assets and total liabilities. It may be convenient not to use total
assets in FAME as a variable reflecting firm size; instead turnover, tangible assets
or employment may be better options.
• On the liabilities side, long-term debt and trade credit variables arc almost identical
in both databases, but there are some differences in short-term debt and total current
19 In Datastream, total assets are defined as the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, investments
(including associates), other assets, total stocks &WIP, total debtors and equivalent, cash and cash
equivalents. Common adjustments to the as reported figure are - deferred tax, if shown as an asset, is offset
against any deferred tax liability at item 312 - goodwill carried in reserves is transferred to intangible assets
at item 344.- for European countries and Japan, treasury stock is shown as an asset rather than deducted
from share capital and reserves. - advances on work in progress if disclosed as a liability by the company
has been offset against stocks and work in progress (see also definition of item 364).- the as reported figure
for current liabilities is increased by the amount of proposed dividends for those countries showing a
balance sheet before profit appropriation. For total assets, the difference between the two data sets is
expected to be originated from the contents of cash and cash equivalent in Datastream and bank and
deposits, investment and other current assets.
20 All variables are either zero or different from zero in the Datastream, while in FAME we cannot
differentiate between zero and missing variable though there are many missing observations.
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liabilities between the FAME and Datastream especially for relatively larger firms
(firms are ranked by total assets from top to bottomr", For long term debt, trade
credits, short-term debt and current liabilities, as in the case of total assets, the One
Source figures are generally identical to those in FAME especially for firms whose
figures in FAME are not identical to those in Datastream.
• Variations in short-term debt among data sets seem also to be originated from the
definitions used for this variable. For example, in Datastream, it is defined as the
sum of bank overdrafts, loans and other short-term borrowing and the current
portion of long-term loans, while in FAME it is the sum of bank overdrafts, group
and director loans, hire purchase and leasing and other short term loans.
In short, for liabilities side figures, a few mismatches in long-term loans and trade
credit, and quite a number of mismatches for current liabilities and short-term loans are
observed between FAME and Datastream. One Source has similar figures to FAME for
these variables. This is valid for total assets if intangible assets are not missing in FAME.
For inventories, trade debtor, employment, profit and sale, both data sets have almost
identical figures. In general the FAME data are quite close to Datastream for the given
sample except for some variables for which the two data sets usc different definitions
(total assets, current liabilities, and short-term debt) and some missing variables such as
intangible assets. The definitional difference between data sets does not imply that a
particular data set is superior relative to others.
There is one problem with One Source although intangible assets for some firms are
not missing in Datastream, they are missing in both FAME and One Source, but One
Source puts zero for the missing observations while FAME puts blank. That is, not only
FAME, but also One Source has some weaknesses relative to Datastream, but the former
databases have some advantages compared to the latter in terms of the varieties of firms
across size, risk, age, indebtedness, profitability etc.
21 In Datastr~a~ current liabilities includes current provisions, trade and other creditors, borrowings
~epayable within one year and any othe~c~~~nt liabi~ities. After one year, trade accounts payable are also
included. In FAME, however, current liabilities consist of trade creditors, short-term debt and overdraft and
other current liabilities.
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Since the sample used for comparing the three data sets are made up of mainly large
firms that provide almost complete information, it does not represent the FAME sample
that has many missing observations and variables for smaller firms. To understand the
extent of the missing observation problem, as a first step we tested the empirical models
by removing firms that are more likely to have missing observations from the sample. We
found that this process did not change significantly the main implications of the empirical
model compared with estimations that used the full sample. In addition, we replaced zeros
with missing observations: although the coefficients changed slightly, the main
implications of the models were still the same. Conversely, when we treated them as
missing instead of using zeros, again the results revealed from the new sample were very
similar to those of the original sample. In addition, to improve the FAME sample, we
proposed to drop the year 1990 as it has a lot of missing observations and variables. More
importantly, the estimation methodology that we use in Chapter Five and Chapter Six,
consider firm specific effects that are expected to capture selectivity biases to some extent
(Meghir, 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994).
To see the extent of the number of missing observations or zeros in the data we give
information about the observation rates for some key variables. In Table 4.6 we
summarise the observation rates of some basic variables, for each size group, that are
most likely to be employed in the empirical models in the next chapters. Almost 95
pe_rcentof firms in the sample reported some basic variables like total assets and rating
score in the 1993-1999 period, while only 82 percent of them reported these variables in
the 1991-1992 period. Around six thousand firms (on average approximately 40 percent
of the unbalanced sample) reported all basic variables over the period. In Chapter Seven
we use these sub-samples for estimating the empirical model with sub-balanced data in
order to test for selectivity bias. We expect that high risky, small, young, highly indebted
firms are less likely to report the basic variables relative to secure, large, old, low
indebted and highly profitable firms, respectively. Particularly, firms that are in the high
risk group reported less often basic variables over the period. In fact, this may help in
understanding the selection mechanism where firm specific characteristics seem to be
correlated with an unobservable selection mechanism. For example, less than 30 percent
of risky firms reported the basic variables, while more than 60 percent of the large firms
reported these variables.
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Chapter Four A Descriptive Analysis on Corporate Sector in the UK and Data
We created binary variables by putting one, if the respective variable is not missing
and zero otherwise for selected variables, namely employment, total assets, sales,
investment, inventories, credit rating, cash flow, the tangible assets-total assets ratio,
apparent interest rate, the short tern debt-current liability ratio, the total debt-total
liabilities ratio, and the short term debt-total debt ratio. We calculated correlation
coefficients between these binary variables and the firm type dummies to find evidence
on the link between firm characteristics and missing observations", Firm type dummies
reflect the upper and lower tails of distribution according to size, dividend payout ratio,
credit rating, age, and indebtedness. In other words, two dummies are constructed for
each firm type and respective definitions of these dummies are provided below. We report
the correlation coefficients between selected variables and firm type dummies in Table
4.7 and those among firm type dummies in Table 4.8. The following highlights some of
the findings.
• We calculate positive and relatively high correlation coefficients between the large
firm dummy and the key variables. This correlation is generally positive but lower
for small firms. The correlation between highly indebted firms and the same key
variables are negative and relatively high. This result implies that large firms are
more likely to report while highly indebted firms are less likely to report .
• Generally, the correlation coefficients between variables and firm characteristics are
higher during the period of 1990-1992, namely the tight period when the data were
reported poorly compared to the period of 1993-1999 when the sample is almost
complete for most of the firms.
• Small firms are less likely to report employment and investment figures relative to
large firms. Investment figures were generally reported very poorly, thus a very low
correlation is observed among these variable and firm characteristics.
• In general, negative correlation coefficients for secure, young and highly indebted
firms were obtained while positive correlation coefficients were observed for small,
large, risky, old and low indebted firms. One may have predicted negative
22 We classify firms into groups based on some criteria defined below.
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coefficients for risky firms and positive coefficients for secure firms, but we have
observed just the opposite.
• The correlation coefficients between small firms and finn groups such as risky
firms, young firms, low indebted firms are positive and relatively high during tight
periods except for the correlation between small firms and young firms while the
correlation coefficients between small firms and firm groups such as large, secure,
old and highly indebted firms are negative and high for secure firms during the
tight period.
• The correlation coefficient between large firms and secure firms is negative as in
the case of small firms implying that there is no clear relation between finn size
and risk in terms of reporting figures.
• The correlation coefficients between risky firms (secure firms) and firm groups
such as highly indebted and young are positive (negative) while they are negative
(positive) between risky firms (secure firms) and finn groups such as old and low
indebted firms,
• A negative (positive) correlation between young and low indebted (highly
indebted) is observed.
Table 4. 7: Correlation Coefficients between Finn Characteristics and Biliary Variables
Small Large Risky Secure Young Old Ifindebt Llndebt
Empdisc -0.051 0.357 0.052 -0.180 -0.141 0.141 -0.231 0.002
Assetdisc 0.156 0.193 0.155 -0.315 -0.122 0.122 -0.389 0.160
Turnoverdisc 0.261 0.289 0.093 -0.217 -0.097 0.097 -0.221 0.020
Investdisc -0.087 0.189 -0.035 0.001 -0.153 0.153 -0.135 0.052
utxta« 0.152 0.202 0.057 -0.234 -0.096 0.096 -0.424 0.174
MIX2disc 0.133 0.224 0.106 -0.282 -0.070 0.070 -0.354 0.019
MIX3disc 0.063 0.266 0.121 -0.299 -0.059 0.059 -0.322 -0.056
Tangdisc 0.143 0.197 0.064 -0.240 -0.094 0.094 -0.405 0.157
Stockdisc 0.108 0.193 0.068 -0.244 -0.092 0.092 -0.383 0.139
Scoredisc 0.126 0.186 0.175 -0.345 -0.131 0.131
-0.411 0.168
Cflowdisc 0.222 0.275 0.083 -0.228
-0.117 0.117 -0.295 0.058
Aintrdisc 0.057 0.227 0.122 -0.288 -0.030 0.030 -0.222 -0.128
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Table 4.8: Correlation Coefficients Among Firm Characteristics
Whole Period (1990-1999~
Small Large LDiv HDiv Risky Secure Young Old Hb,debt Llndebt
Small 1.000
Large -0.334 1.000
Ldiv 0.007 -0.125 1.000
Hdiv -0.007 0.125 -1.000 1.000
Risky 0.062 -0.020 -0.093 0.093 1.000
Secure -0.023 -0.007 0.078 -0.078 -0.479 1.000
Young 0.131 -0.144 -0.049 0.049 0.111 -0.125 1.000
Old -0.131 0.144 0.049 -0.049 -0.111 0.125 -1.000 1.000
Hindebt 0.066 -0.005 -0.167 0.167 0.458 -0.327 0.100 -0.100 1.000
Lin debt 0.011 -0.080 0.083 -0.083 -0.240 0.398 -0.086 0.086 -0.379 1.000
Tight Period (1990-1992~
Small Large LDiv HDiv Risky Secure Young Old Hindebt Lindebt
Small 1.000
Large -0.358 1.000
LDiv 0.109 -0.117 1.000
HDiv -0.109 0.117 -1.000 1.000
Risky 0.085 -0.048 -0.102 0.102 1.000
Secure -0.044 0.020 0.102 -0.102 -0.497 1.000
Young 0.159 -0.148 -0.047 0.047 0.156 -0.157 1.000
Old -0.159 0.148 0.047 -0.047 -0.156 0.157 -1.000 1.000
ll;ndebt 0.074 -0.021 -0.172 0.172 0.463 -0.322 0.142 -0.142 1.000
Llndebt 0.017 -0.079 0.100 -0.100 -0.255 0.400 -0.104 0.104 -0.382 1.000
Loose Period (l993-1999l
Small Large LDiv HDiv Risky Secure Young Old llindebt Llndebt
Small 1.000
Large -0.327 1.000
LDiv -0.028 -0.127 1.000
llDiv 0.028 0.127 -1.000 1.000
Risky 0.054 -0.010 -0.090 0.090 1.000
Secure -0.015 -0.016 0.070 -0.070 -0.474 1.000
Young 0.127 -0.146 -0.048 0.048 0.101 -0.119 1.000
Old -0.127 0.146 0.048 -0.048 -0.101 0.119 -1.000 1.000
llindebt 0.066 -0.002 -0.164 0.164 0.458 -0.329 0.089 -0.089 1.000
Lindebt 0.004 -0.077 0.077 -0.077 -0.236 0.400 -0.080 0.080 -0.378 1.000
112
Chapter Four A Descriptive Analysis Oil Corporate Sector in the UK and Data
4.4. Conclusion
The British economy experienced a deep recession III the early 1990s. The high
indebtedness of firms by the end of 1980s relative to the previous recession in the early
1980s made this recession more destructive in terms of economic activity. Monetary
policy is an instrument in managing aggregate demand and smoothing the fluctuations in
the economy. Although the endogenous character of the policy response makes it difficult
to identify separately the effects of monetary policy from other cyclical effects, the
increase in the base rate in the early 1990s contributed to this slow down. Eventually the
economy was squeezed with a substantial decline in corporate investment and value
added. Financially weak firms, especially small and young non-financial firms were hit
more deeply by this slowdown. Small and young firms that could not pay their bank loans
back disrupted the functioning of the banking system.
The recession early last decade was followed by a stable economic environment:
lower and stable inflation led to a fall in the cost of finance through the decline in the
equity and the inflation risk premium during the second half of the 1990s. Financial
liberalisation let firms raise funds in a more competitive environment where monitoring
costs declined as a result of the improvement in the operations of the financial system and
the corporate bond market became more liquid. In addition, a decline in the government
consumption created additional funds in capital markets for business investment during
this period. Potentially fragile firms improved their positions and were supported by a
relatively loose monetary policy during this period.
We use the FAME sample that offers information on a variety of firms in terms of
size, age, risk, age, profitability etc. for these particular periods. This sample contains
quite rich information that allow us to analyse the reaction of firms with different
characteristics to the policy shocks even though there are problems of missing
observations. The FAME sample is incomplete not only because of the selection
mechanism but also because of the non-response nature of data. A close study of the
sample shows that there is a correlation between firm characteristics and missing
observations. Risky, highly indebted, small, young firms are less likely to report basic
variables. In fact, this result is not surprising since the selection mechanism implies tha.t
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relatively large and mature firms are obliged to report. In other words, the sample is
biased towards large and financially healthy firms.
We cross-checked key variables of some quoted firms extracted from FAME with
their corresponding figures in Datastream and One Source data sets. We found some
differences among data sets for some of the variables. The differences are mainly due to
definitions and missing observations. The difference between the data sets does not imply
that a particular data set is superior to the other. For our purpose the FAME sample is
more useful in the sense that the number of firms and their variety allow us to test our
hypotheses.
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Binary Variables (one if observed. zero otherwise)
Empdisc
Assetdisc
Saledisc
Investdisc
MIXldisc
MIX2disc
MIX3disc
Tangdisc
Stockdisc
Scoredisc
Cjlowdisc
Aintrdisc
Employment
Total Assets
Sale
Investment
Ratio of Short Term Debt to Current Liabilities
Ratio of Total Debt to Total Liabilities
Ratio of Short Term Debt to Total Debt
Ratio of Tangible Assets to Total Assets
Inventory Investments and Work in Process
Rating score
Cash Flow i.e. profit before tax plus depreciation
Apparent Interest Rate i.e. ratio of interest payment to total debt
Firm Chategories (one ifsatisfv criteria. zero otherwiswe)
Small Based on Criteria of Department of Trade and Industry
Large
LDiv
HDiv
Risky
Secure
Young
Old
Hindebt
Lin debt
HReturn
LReturn
Based on Criteria of Department of Trade and Industry
Upper 25% of dividend payout ratio distribution
Lower 25% of dividend payout ratio distribution
Rating score (under 40 out of 100)
Rating score (over 60 out of 100)
Lower 25% of age distribution (age<13 years)
Lower 25% of age distribution (age>43 years)
Upper 25% of gearing distribution
Lower 25% of gearing distribution
Upper 25% of return on capital distribution
Lower 25% ofretum on capital distribution
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CHAPTER FIVE
Financial Structure, Firm Characteristics, and Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy
5.1. Introduction
The monetary transmission mechanism has traditionally focused on money, the liabilities
side of the banking sector's balance sheet, rather than credit; yet a considerable body of
literature has built up to explore the credit channel, operating through the assets side of
banks' balance sheets. There are two principal lines of argument. The first is the
traditional credit channel view supported by the twin-pillars of the balance-sheet channel
(or broad credit channel) and the bank lending channel.' The balance-sheet channel argues
that business cycles may be propagated to the extent that the state of firms' balance sheets
affects their ability to borrow and to spend, and can give rise to the possibility of
'endogenous credit cycles' and accelerator effects (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1995;
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996 and 1998; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
The bank lending channel focuses upon bank loans as the primary source of
loanable funds; the effects of a monetary contraction would be magnified by the reduction
in loans supplied by banks as well as through the traditional money channel on output and
loan demand (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993;
Kashyap, Stein and Lamont, 1994; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Bank lending is often
regarded as special because firms, and particularly small firms, are constrained in their
ability to draw credit from other external sources. The absence of available substitutes
gives rise to dependence on sources of funds from banks and imparts a particular leverage
from bank lending to real activity. This is thought to amplify the demand side effects on
expenditure decisions of the private sector. Therefore, the extent to which the traditional
bank lending channel is important depends on the substitutability between internal and
external sources of funds and between bank lending and other forms of external finance.
IThe Bank of England provides a full exposition of the transmission mechanism for the House of Common
Treasury Select Committee, see Bank of England (1999).
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The second argument on the credit channel stresses the importance of relationship
banking (see Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992 and Boot, 2000). Banks can be regarded as
special because they form relationships with firms over time to diminish the effects of
information asymmetries. Relationship banking involves forming multiple lender-
customer interactions in order to collect and evaluate customer-specific information, often
of a proprietory nature. The advantages this brings over arm's length lending allows for
cross-subsidisation of loan rates in bad times (Berlin and Mester, 1999). Although this
does not necessarily advantage banks over non-bank intermediaries, it can be used to
justify the existence of banks (see Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998; Berger, 1999; Boot,
2000). The upshot of this theory is that far from amplifying the monetary cycle, bank
lending may mute it. Older firms may have had time to establish these relationships with
banks and the banks may gain from their relationships with these firms. They can then use
the informational advantages to maintain bank lending during a monetary contraction at
low risk and low cost to themselves.
Differentiating between these two views of the credit channel is an empirical matter.
At the macroeconomic level, it has been hard to identify either the traditional bank lending
channel or the relationship banking model because bank lending is influenced by loan
supply and loan demand, which are hard to distinguish with aggregate data. Positive
correlations between bank loans and indicators of economic activity could arise from the
demand side rather than from the supply side. Attempts to resolve this issue have led
researchers to identify robust indicators of monetary policy shifts, which allow them to
separate demand and supply effects. Since most of the studies use US data, these have
been based on indicators such as the spread of the Fed Funds over Treasury Bill rates
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992) and the careful reading of Fed minutes (the 'narrative'
approach leading to 'Romer dates', Romer and Romer, 1990)_2 Comparisons of the
behaviour of bank loans with other sources of external finance ain time points when these
indicators show that monetary contractions have taken place, have been a useful means of
2 The bulk of the empirical studies are addressed to the United States, where a well-developed commercial
paper market offers an alternative (non-bank) source of funds for corporations. A few studies have
investigated Japanese firms, which draw loans from insurance companies as the main form of non-bank
financing (see Hoshi, Schafstein, and Singleton, 1993), but firms in other countries have not received much
attention.
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determining whether bank lending and other sources of funds are substitutes (see
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993 and Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996).
This chapter examines the evidence during tight and benign periods of monetary
policy in the UK corresponding to the tightening of 1990-92, where interest rates were
increased in order to meet the external objective of monetary policy, and the period 1993-
99, where the objective of monetary policy was inflation targeting, and interest rates were
reduced as inflation fell to low levels by historical standards. It is possible to differentiate
between firms according to size, credit rating, age, and indebtedness, and therefore, we
can identify whether monetary policy tightening influences firms' liabilities composition
according to their type. By using finn type dummies interacted with the exogenously
determined monetary policy stance, one can then identify whether the effects of monetary
policy tightening operate through a traditional credit channel, amplifying the effects of the
direct money channel, or whether bank-finn relationships mute the effects. Firm type
dummies separate the firms in to groups that represent the extremes of the distribution
according to characteristics such as size, risk, age, and indebtedness. It is expected that
firms at each extreme of the distribution will behave differently, because they are more, or
less, likely to obtain credit from banks.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section two outlines the traditional bank
lending channel argument, the concept of relationship banking and the explanations for
the growth of non-bank finance. Section three explains the data sources and properties.
Section four explains the methodology, and section five presents the empirical evidence.
Section six concludes.
5.2. Corporate Credit and External Finance
5.2.1. Two Views of the Credit Channel
The Modigliani-Miller theorem asserts that a firm cannot increase its value by changing
the composition of its liabilities. Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the marginal
investment decision depends only upon the expected rate of return of the project relative
to some 'constant' average cost and not on the source of finance. There should not be a
bias towards internal finance or any suggestion that firms should have preferences
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between different forms of external finance. The Modigliani-Miller theorem holds within
the context of perfect capital markets - it is a 'benchmark' framework - but if it holds
there is nothing special about banks, no hierarchy of finance, and no bank lending
channel.
Researchers have sought to investigate the behaviour of agents in imperfect capital
markets relative to this special case. Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that in a less
perfect world firms may have a preference ordering over alternative sources of finance
which ranks internal sources, based on retained earnings, above external sources, such as
trade credit, bank borrowing, and non-bank finance. The reasons for this rank ordering are
likely to be the additional costs associated with external sources of finance, which can be
pecuniary or non-pecuniary, in the form of non-price terms and conditions which external
providers of finance attach to credit provision.
Attention has focussed on the distortions introduced by taxation, transaction costs
and imperfect information that give rise to an external finance premium. The first two of
these explanations are plausible but difficult to justify empirically without specific
knowledge of individual and institutional circumstances facing firms. Falling rates of
corporation tax rates could potentially explain the shift away from bank finance towards
equity finance, and one could also consider other taxes, but the explanatory power of taxes
(such as capital gains taxation, affecting the return to shareholders, and investment tax
credits) are 'highly sensitive to assumptions about the marginal investor's tax rate' p.
1441, Rajan and Zingales (1995). Equally, transaction costs, which arise because of the
need to match the size, maturity and liquidity of funds and to meet the diversification
requirements of (risk-neutral) lenders, could explain why external finance is more
expensive than internal finance and why there may be cost differentials between bank and
non-bank finance, but they are difficult to quantify.
Instead, concentration has focused on the uniqueness of bank finance. Under
imperfect information borrowers have a better idea of their likelihood of defaulting on a
loan than do lenders, see Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This
leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems that create an external finance
premium, which can vary in degree since some lenders (banks) may have information
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advantages over others. Banks (as opposed to non-banks) can overcome the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems because they can gain from ongoing depositor-lender
relationships with firms. They can match their liability structure to the term to maturity of
loans and gather information on financial background of companies (see Leland and Pyle,
1977; Fama, 1985; Himmelberg and Morgan, 1995). This reduces their exposure to costs
incurred through adverse selection, Diamond (1984).
A further argument for the uniqueness of banks is the dispersion argument. Chant
(1992) argues that holders of the marketable securities for any firm tend to be more
dispersed than banks. The co-ordination and monitoring problems may result in higher
costs of funds and even the possibility that funding may not be fulfilled at all. since those
that incur the cost of monitoring only reap a share of the benefits. A bank, as a single
entity providing a large proportion or all of the external funds for a project, would not face
this problem to the same degree. Again banks would have advantages over non-banks in
being able to co-ordinate lending to firms. Some firms can overcome these problems if
they are willing to make information available to potential holders of marketable
securities in order to alleviate the need for monitoring. The existence of a 'track record'
may allow larger and more established firms to obtain funds from external sources at a
lower premium than smaller firms. To the extent that small firms are disadvantaged in this
way, we could explain the heterogeneity in bank dependency for different sized firms.
Even large firms may be dependent upon bank finance if making information available in
order to obtain non-bank finance compromises informational advantages they may possess
over competitors.
Imperfect substitutability can also arise on the supply side since banks themselves
might not regard bank loans and securities as perfect substitutes in their own portfolios, if
the former are held for return whilst the latter are held for liquidity. When securities and
loans are imperfect substitutes the response of the banking sector to a monetary tightening
has a direct effect on the provision of loans. If this theory is correct, interest rate spreads
do not represent true differentials in prices in substitutable sources of funds that can be
exploited by firms. Rather, imperfect access to other sources of finance restricts
substitution away from bank lending preventing arbitrage and allowing differentials
between loan rates and other borrowing rates to persist. Under certain circumstances firms
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may need to borrow from banks, even at higher rates if they cannot obtain funds
elsewhere. Small and medium sized firms may be unable to access other markets for funds
and therefore have a certain dependence on banks for external sources of funds (see
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This provides a special place to
banks in the credit market.'
5.2.2. The Effects ofMonetary Policy Tightening on Firms' Financial Choice
Market imperfections can generate cycles in economic and financial activities.
Fluctuations in the activity of financial and non-financial firms become more significant
with a rise in the degree of informational problems. A contractionary monetary shock is
expected to weaken the financial positions of financial and non-financial firms and it may
undermine the ability of the borrowers to finance their investment through external funds
as well as that of lenders to extend loanable funds. Poorly capitalized firms, whose
balance sheets are weak in terms of net worth, will have to pay a high cost for external
funds relative to large well-capitalized firms. In other words, an initial decline in the
economic activity as a result of a tight monetary policy will have a large impact on the
borrowing and spending decisions of the agents facing credit market frictions, such as
small firms (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
Monetary policy may have some influence on the lending ability of banks not only
through the broad credit channel but also through a lending channel in which banks
cannot recover (without incurring a cost) the loss of insured deposits that tend to decline
following a reduction in reserves by issuing large certificate of deposits to finance bank
credits (uninsured deposits). In other words, a tight monetary policy is expected to reduce
the supply of bank credits if insured deposits and large certificates of deposits on the
liability side of the banks' balance sheet, and loans and securities on the asset side, are not
perfect substitutes. In this framework, the extent of the reduction in the loan supply as a
result of a tight monetary policy depends on the degree of informational asymmetry
3 The classic statements of this view are given by Fama (1985). A contrary argument to this view is that
deposit-taking intermediaries such as banks tend to hold a large proportion of their assets as non-marketable
securities (loans) w~ereas other intermediaries e.g. mutual funds acquire mainly marketable securities
(corporate debt, equity), For non-marketable securities, information acquisition is the responsibility of the
lender whereas for marketable securities information provision is the responsibility of the borrower. This
might suggest that banks would face more severe information asymmetries, not less.
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between banks and the depositor, which, in tum, affects the cost of raising new uninsured
deposits. As in the case of non-financial firms where financial position, net worth, and
size affect their investments, these factors will also change the lending behaviour of banks
and thus their loan supply (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Stein, 1998; Kishan and Opiela,
2000). All this is to argue that with informational asymmetries, and the lack of close
substitutes, monetary policy contractions will be amplified by credit market effects
implemented by banks through the loan supply.
A contrary argument is proposed by Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), who suggest
that far from the credit channel amplifying monetary policy, it may in fact mute it. They
argue that it is in the interests of both banks and firms to form workable relationships that
can endure the cyclical variations of monetary policy. Indeed the raison d' eire of banks
is to provide such relationships. Relationship banking involves multiple lender-customer
interactions over time and across products that allow the collection of customer-specific
information (often of a proprietory nature), and the evaluation of the profitability of
lending through multiple financial services. This creates conditions by which gains can be
made over arm's length lenders, but the split does not necessarily correspond directly to
that of bank/non-bank intermediaries (see Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998; Berger, 1999;
Boot, 2000). It may involve investment as well as commercial banks, and other financial
intermediaries that can make use of proprietory information to offer favourable terms on
loans, and offer other financial services such as letters of credit, cheque clearing, and cash
management services. In assessing the impact of credit provision over the monetary cycle,
relationship banking may allow the lender to offer cross-subsidisation of loan rates in bad
times by charging marginally higher rates in good times (Berlin and Mester, 1999). It is
assumed that banks primarily offer these facilities and this gives them a special place in
the market for loans. Thus, the contraction brought about in monetary policy by higher
interest rates may in fact be offset by the banks who allow lending rates to move counter
to the policy rate over the cycle. Instead of bank lending declining with the monetary
policy contraction, the relationship between bank and finn will allow the bank to maintain
its lending (access to proprietory information lowers the risk of this activity and cheap
funds e.g. deposits obtained through multiple financial services avoid the need to resort to
costly wholesale sources). In short, there will be no amplification of monetary policy
from the credit market.
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The interaction between the change in the composition of firms external finance and
monetary policy stance is investigated by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Oliner
and Rudebush (1996). The first study tests the impact of a tight monetary policy on the
ratio of bank loans to the sum of commercial paper and bank loan, 'the mix', using
aggregate data for the US. The monetary policy tightness is determined by reference to
Romer dates (Romer and Romer, 1990), the Federal Funds rate and the spread between
Federal Funds and Treasury bonds. The empirical evidence shows that the tight monetary
policy leads to a shift in the firms' external finance from bank loans to commercial paper.
The decline in the banks' loans is due to a reduction in the bank loan supply rather than a
reduction in the demand for the bank loans. This result implies that loans and bonds as
bank assets and loans and other forms of finance as corporate liabilities must be imperfect
substitutes.
The main criticism of the Kashyap et al. (1993) paper is that it uses aggregate data
and thus fails to allow for firm heterogeneity. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) are able to
analyse the different responses of small versus large manufacturing firms to monetary
policy in an imperfect financial environment. The study emphasizes a substantial decline
in the activity of the small size firms (mainly inventory demand) during a tight monetary
policy. In other words, the responses of small and large firms to monetary policy differ
considerably. The informational frictions that increase the cost of external finance apply
mainly to younger firms with a high degree of idiosyncratic risk, and to those firms that
are not well collateralised. Small firms rely on intermediary credits, while large firms
generally use direct credits, including equity, public debt, and commercial paper. The
financial constraints are likely to bind for small-scale firms during the recessions rather
than in boom periods. Prior to recession periods, the short-term debt growth for large firm
rises before declining as a recession sets in.
Based on the idea of firm heterogeneity, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) comment on
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and find new evidence from using micro data. Oliner
and Rudebusch (1996) conclude that there is no evidence that monetary policy reduces
the bank loan supply relative to non-bank finance after the mid-1970s. Although Oliner
and Rudebusch (1996) confirm that the broad credit channel functions through
informational asymmetries faced by firms for all loan types rather than only bank loans,
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they argue that it is large firms rather than small firms relying more on bank finance, that
-----issue~ommercial papers during a contraction. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1996) reply to
this comment and conclude that a contractionary monetary policy, which reallocates
funds away from small firms towards large firms, based on the results of Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), does not work against the bank lending channel. In other words,
distributional impacts of monetary policy should not be seen as an argument that rejects
the bank lending view.
5.3. Data
5.3.1. Properties of Data
We construct a sample from the FAME Database that allows us substantial flexibility in
analysing some aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism and in emphasising the
role of non-financial firms' financial positions for corporate sector activity. We limit the
sample to the manufacturing sector, which has a similar business cycle to the overall
economy.
The data has an exemption structure that allows some missing observations in the
company's accounts held on the FAME data set, and these are prevalent in the first three
years of the sample period", This means that the sample is not a balanced panel, in the
sense that one cannot observe information about most of the firms whose turnover is
under the threshold explained in Chapter Four. The sample also tends to represent the
upper tail of the population in terms of finn size distribution because we do not observe
information for all firms in the manufacturing sector with turnover below the exemption
threshold. However, the sample does include some information about certain firms whose
turnover is under £90,000, which is the upper threshold for totally exempted firms. This
characteristic of the sample requires us to ensure that we cope with truncated and
censored samples. The selection bias problem related to the sample and the tests used will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. We will report the selection bias tests for
the empirical model used in the same chapter.
4 We provide details on exemption in Chapter Four.
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Only two third of the firms in the sample reported their balance sheets in the period
of 1990-1992, while balance sheet information was available for almost all of the firms
(more than 15,000 firms) in the period 1993-1999. The distributions of firms across size
categories in the sample and the number of reported firms by year are shown in Figure 4.7
in Chapter Four. The number of medium and large firms grew over the sample period in
parallel with the increase in the number of firms that reported balance sheet items, while
the number of small firms grew in the early 1990s but declined after the mid-1990s.
Figure 4.9 in Chapter Four records the distribution of firms across rating score
bands and highlights the impact of the recession in the early 1990s on the firms' financial
health. As expected the shares of the firms in the fourth and fifth bands, i.e. risky firms
are higher during the recession (black column) than during the recovery period (shaded
column), that is, the share of the firms in the secure and stable bands are higher during the
upswing period. In other words, in the sample there are more risky firms during the
recession than during the recovery. Other priors can be confirmed within the sample. For
example, large and old firms have on average higher ratings than small and young firms,
which have inadequate collateral assets and no track records. Small and young firms are
more likely to be subject to financial difficulties in the period of slowdown, and this is
reflected in the rating score. Similarly, Figure 4.10 in Chapter Four shows how the
distribution of rating scores varies with the business cycle. First, there is a downward
slope from right to left, indicating that the firms in the upper tail of total assets have
relatively higher credit scores than those in the lower tail irrespective of the business
cycle. Second, there is a noticeable downward shift in the entire distribution of rating
scores during the recession when compared to the recovery period, with lower average
scores evident throughout. Third, the margin between the curves grows as the asset size
declines, with the largest firms virtually unaffected by the recession but small and
medium sized firms significantly affected in accordance with their size.
Measuring the response of firms' external finance composition to the monetary
stance is the main concern of this study. Some aggregated figures for the liabilities
composition of firms in the sample are given in Table 5.1 across size (small versus large),
rating (risky versus secure) and age (young versus old) for the early 1990s recession
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period and the following recovery eras. This type of analysis provides us with some
preliminary results that we might expect to obtain when a more rigorous econometric
analysis is carried out in the following sections. The following stylised facts were
uncovered from Table 5.1.
Current liabilities constitute the largest part of total liabilities for all firm groups and
the share of current liabilities for small, risky and young firms is higher than their
counterparts, namely large, secure, and old firms respectively. The share of current
liabilities increases slightly after the recession for all firm groups. That is, the decline in
trade credits has been over-compensated by an increase in short-term debt and other
current liabilities. The increase in the share of short-term debt is more significant for
small firms after the recession. The share of short-term debt is significantly higher for
risky firms than that of the other firm groups, while secure firms have the lowest share of
short-term debt among the other firm groups. These findings may confirm the fact that
firms generally compensate the decline in the short-term debt, which is made up of
mainly bank overdrafts, by switching to other short-term liabilities such as trade credit
during the recession and this process is reversed as the economy recovers; the share of
trade credit goes down during the recovery period.
Financially weak firms that are subject to moral hazard or adverse selection
problems (as perceived by lenders; banks or other financial institutions) are less likely to
have access to external finance especially in the period of a general slowdown in the
economy. It is more likely for these firms to have access to bank finance during the
recovery phases of the economy than during recessionary periods. Therefore, the ratio of
short-term debt to total current liabilities for financially fragile firms is likely to decline
during the recession, either because of the decline in the potential supply of bank loans
for these firms or because of an increase in alternative finance (such as trade credits) to
keep firms in operation. Financially strong and large firms may supply trade credit to
their small financially weak customers (firms) to undermine the negative impacts of lack
of credit supply on their customers and activity. In short, it is expected that a tight
monetary policy resulting in a high external finance premium for financially weak firms
would lead to a decline in the ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities.
S Details about the classification of firms across size, rating and age are given in the following subsection.
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Table 5.1: The Composition of Firm Liabilities across Firm Groups (Percent)
Small Large Risky Secure Young Old
1990-1992 Average (1)
Current Liabilities 85.31 78.05 83.48 81.65 80.86 79.96
Trade Creditors 29.73 31.44 26.50 30.90 32.29 29.34
Short-TermDebt 21.31 27.19 36.02 15.59 23.81 22.29
Total Other Current Liabilities 34.27 19.42 20.96 35.16 24.75 28.33
Long Term Liabilities 14.69 21.95 16.52 18.35 19.14 20.04
Long TermDebt 10.96 14.37 12.61 11.10 10.52 13.18
Total Other Long TermLiab. 3.73 7.58 3.91 7.25 8.62 6.87
1993-1999 Average (2)
Current Liabilities 86.08 79.87 85.16 82.58 80.95 81.93
Trade Creditors 25.39 25.14 22.56 22.79 25.08 24.80
Short-Term Debt 24.79 28.46 38.48 17.56 25.12 24.30
Total Other Current Liabilities 35.91 26.27 24.12 42.23 30.74 32.83
Long Term Liabilities 13.92 20.13 14.84 17.42 19.05 18.07
Long TermDebt 10.40 14.40 11.83 10.89 11.18 11.31
Total Other Long TermLiab. 3.52 5.73 3.01 6.52 7.87 6.75
Ratios (1)/(2)
Current Liabilities 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98
Trade Creditors 1.17 1.25 1.17 1.36 1.29 1.18
Short-Term Debt 0.86 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.92
Total Other Current Liabilities 0.95 0.74 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.86
Long Term Liabilities 1.06 1.09 1.11 1.05 1.00 1.11
Long TermDebt 1.05 1.00 1.07 1.02 0.94 1.16
Total Other Long TermLiab. 1.06 1.32 1.30 1.11 1.09 1.02
Source: The FAME sample
This result may be valid for the ratio of total debt to total liabilities provided that
total debt is more pro-cyclical than total liabilities. This seems reasonable since through
the bank lending channel all sorts ofloans may be influenced by a change in the monetary
policy stance. However, the same result for the ratio of short-term debt to total debt may
not be straightforward. It is more likely that the short-term loans react more quickly to a
change of monetary policy than long-term loans. The overall effect is expected to be pro-
cyclical if the short-term debts are reacting faster than long-term debt.
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5.4. Methodology
5.4.1. Basic Background for Testing the Hypothesis
This study seeks to determine whether firms with different characteristics respond to the
monetary policy stance heterogeneously. For example, small and financially weak firms
may have difficulties obtaining relatively low external premium funds during tight
periods. Therefore, they would tend to substitute more costly funds to finance risky
projects that increase the extent of moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Alternatively, a general increase in the demand for bank funds in tight periods may raise
the possibility of financial constraints for small and weak firms who have limited
collateral. In this context, differentiation in the reaction of the firms' liabilities
composition to the monetary stance across different finn groups can be evaluated as
evidence for a broad credit channel. In addition, one can derive some information about
the bank lending channel even though there are difficulties over observing the supply
side. In fact, the overall decline, for example, in the short-term bank finance to total
current liabilities ratio in tight periods across finn groups with different characteristics
may be taken as evidence for the bank lending channel.
Our approach here is to explain the mixture of liabilities that a firm draws upon
over the cycle with a combination of environmental (monetary policy determined)
conditions and firm specific characteristics. We usc three different measures of the
liabilities composition of firms. The first one is the ratio of short-term debt to current
liabilities (MIXI) by which we tend to find evidence for the bank lending channel in the
line with Kashyap et al (1993) as well as for the broad credit channel as Olincr and
Rudebush (1996) suggest. We use two additional variables, namely the ratio of total debt
to total liabilities (MIX2) and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt (MIX3) to test the
impact of monetary policy on the firms' liabilities composition considering liabilities
terms and types. Unlike MIXI and MIX2. testing the impact of monetary policy on MIX3
may not provide direct evidence for the bank lending channel but it gives an idea about
how firms' liabilities react to the policy and therefore it may provide evidence for the
broad credit channel.
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To capture the effects of external events, we divided the sample into two different
time periods corresponding to tight and benign monetary policy (policy regime periods).
The first period relates to the period when monetary policy in the UK was dedicated
towards maintaining the exchange rate within its target zone in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism during 1990-1992. This period coincided with a recession, tightening
monetary policy and a harsh environment for existing and new corporate borrowers
(Figure 5.1). Nevertheless, high interest rates in Germany after reunification and the
perceived weakness of sterling as a currency contributed to keep interest rates high during
this period. The second period, 1993-1999, when followed the recession, witnessed a
period of sustained economic growth, a fall in unemployment and inflation, and low
interest rates. The corporate sector experienced an improvement in net worth and
borrowing conditions were less constrained.
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The financial mixes are explained by variables that control for exogenous
conditions such as monetary policy stance, age, demand and other cyclical conditions and
for the financial position of firms such as the gearing ratio, tangible asset ratio, credit
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rating, and real tangible assets". Some of these variables are used to test the implications
of the moral hazard model presented in Chapter Three.
Shifting between types of finance with different terms and structure involves a cost
for finn groups that are subject to informational asymmetries. For example, firms with
poor collateral and reputation are less likely to get long-term bank loans and funds from
the market directly. Financially strong firms can easily borrow from the market directly
without incurring an external finance premium. On the contrary, our model suggests that
financially weak firms that are more subject to informational asymmetries might have to
pay an external finance premium for their borrowing transactions. This offers them
incentives to choose risky projects in order to maximize the private benefit of the
managers.
We categorise firms and run regressions by considering size, age, rating, and
indebtedness, to emphasise the importance of finn heterogeneity that reflects the extent of
financial imperfections. This allows us to compare small with large firms, young with old
firms, risky with secure firms, low-indebted with high-indebted firms, high capital return
with low capital return firms and to determine how the explanatory variables influence
the mix when monetary policy is tight compared to when it is benign.
We generate finn type dummies to identify the impact of monetary policy in our
empirical model by considering the lower and the upper tails of the distribution for the
respective firm characteristics. We do not include the firms in the middle of the
distribution for each firm type in order to focus more on the firms in the tails. For
example, in our empirical analysis, we test the impact of monetary policy on the various
financial mixes for the most risky versus the least risky firms, that is, we do not capture
the impact of monetary policy for the moderately risky firms. By this method, it is
thought that the credit channel of monetary policy is better identified for more financially
constrained versus less financially constrained firms. The firms that are financially
constrained, i.e. small, risky, young and high indebted firms, are more likely to be subject
to informational asymmetries than those that are financially unconstrained, i.e. large,
6 As we explained in Chapter Four, the FAME sample includes a lot of missing observations for the item of
intangible assets. We prefer to use real tangible assets in our econometric estimations by subtracting
intangible assets from total assets to avoid biases resulting from missing observations.
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secure, old and less indebted firms therefore firms in the former group are more sensitive
to tight credit conditions.
Firm type dummies are created based on two classification methods. First, firms are
allowed to switch across firm categories over time, that is, the criteria of splitting the
sample into groups are applied to the sample for every year. For example, a firm may
shift from the 'small' group to the 'large' group or vice versa over time. By this
methodology, it is intended to use the time dimension of the sample that allows us to gain
valuable insights. Second, we use pre-period figures of 1991 as thresholds for
categorising firm into groups to avoid the endogeneity bias concerning the change in
status of firms over time. That is, firms are not allowed to switch across firm categories as
the economic and financial conditions change. We only report the findings with the first
method even though they do not differ significantly across the splitting methods.
We generate size dummies based on the criteria given in Table 4.3 in Chapter Four
where firms should satisfy at least two criteria out of three (total asset, turnover and
employment criteria) to be classified into the small or the large group while firms in
between are classified as medium sized firms and we do not consider a dummy variable
for this group. Small firms meet at least two out of three following criteria; turnover
below £2.8 million, total assets below £1.4 million and number of employee below 50
and similarly, large firms meet at least two out of the three criteria; turnover above £ 11.2
million, total assets above £5.6 million and number of employees above 250.
The sample contains rich information about the credit ratings of firms. The credit
rating score measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following
the date of calculation. The credit ratings are scaled in the range from 0 to 100. For ease
of interpretation, that range may be considered as comprising five distinct bands, the
details of which are reported in the previous chapter. Clearly firms in bands one and two
are quite secure, while firms in band four are four times as likely to fail as the firms in
band three, and are therefore quite risky. Firms in band five are almost certain to fail
unless action is taken immediately. Firms whose rating score figures are at most 40, were
labelled risky while those having rating score over 60 were labelled secure. We use this
variable to generate dummies for risky and secure firms to compare the reaction of the
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mix to risk as monetary policy changes. The rating score is highly correlated with the
variables that reflect the financial healthiness of firms such as solvency and gearing; the
correlation coefficients are around 0.80 and -0.50, respectively over the whole period.
Therefore, in our empirical analysis we also use the rating score as an explanatory
variable that reflects the financial healthiness of firms.
We have the information about the year of incorporation for all firms. Firms are
classified according to their age in order to measure the importance of a track record for
the composition of firm external finance. The firms in the lowest quartile (lower 25
percent) of the age distribution are classified young while those are in the highest quartile
(upper 25 percent) are classified as old. We use the respective dummies in the regressions
to identify the credit channel. Again, we do not use a dummy for the firms in the middle
of the age distribution. We classify firms as highly-indebted or low-indebted if their
gearing ratio figures are in the highest or lowest quartile of the distribution, respectively.
The following subsection explains the methodology for estimating the responsiveness
(elasticities) of bank-based and market-based finance to explanatory variables controlling
for the monetary policy stance, the financial positions of firms and firm specific effects.
5.4.2. The Model
The empirical model is based on Kashyap et al. (1993) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996).
We also consider the implications of the moral hazard model studied in Chapter Three
where the composition of the firm's financial source is determined by monetary policy,
the probability of having good and bad projects, gearing, collateral, monitoring cost, and
project size as well as the distribution of firms in terms of investment opportunities.i
The model constructed by the Kashyap et al. (1993) is very much similar to the one
in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) even though Kashyap et al. (1993) focus more on the
firms' composition of finance. The model assumes a representative firm that can choose
between two sources of finance in raising funds for investment, i.e. banks loans, L, and
7 The model in Hoshi et al. (1993) is modified in Chapter Three so that the impact of a change in monetary
policy on the liability composition of the firms can be tested.
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commercial papers, B. The details of this model are discussed in Chapter Two. We
summarise the basic predictions of the model below.
One can observe the main implications of Kashyap et al. (1993) model by studying
the following derivatives:
dLldM = a*dIldM + Ida* / dM
dBldM = (J-a*}dIldM - Ida*/dM
da*ldM = F' d(rL - rB)ldM
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
where M. I, a*, ri and r» denote money supply, investment, the mix, lending rate and
paper rate, respectively. The impact of a change in the monetary stance on supply of loans
and bonds is a function of the mix. The impact on the mix is a function of the wedge
between lending and commercial paper rates given the assumption of imperfect
substitutability between loans and commercial paper both as bank assets and corporate
liabilities.
Equation (2.14) implies that when the loans and bonds as bank assets are perfectly
substitutable, then, the effect of money supply on bank loans depends only on the change
of investment as a result of the monetary shock. If the loans and bonds are not perfectly
substitutable, the weight of bank finance changes because of the non-zero loan and bond
rate spread. Equation (2.15) implies that monetary tightening will have opposite impacts
on bond finance; a reduction in money supply reduces investment and thus the demand
for all source of finance as well as bond finance, but the demand for bond finance may
increase as a result of substituting bond finance for loan finance. Therefore, the
proposition that monetary policy shocks affect the mix is valid if the bond and loans are
not perfect substitutes as given in equation (2.16).
From the investment demand equation, I = I,t{Y,k)
(2.17)
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The term on the right hand side disappears in the case of perfect substitution between
loans and bonds and thus a change in the investment is determined only by income and
the bond rate. The hypothesis that loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes as firms'
liabilities can be tested by adding the share of short-term bank loans in total short-term
finance (mix variable) as an independent variable into the investment equation in addition
to the interest rate variable. Excluding the interest rate as an explanatory variable would
not allow us to verify the existence of an independent lending channel of transmission. In
other words, without using the interest rate as an explanatory variable together with the
mix variable, it is unlikely that one could identify the impact of loans on investment
properly.
Kashyap et al. (1993) explain the mix by using its lags, lags of monetary policy
stance and GNP growth to control for cyclical factors other than monetary policy for the
aggregated data. In order for the bank lending channel to operate, the supply of bank
loans should decline relative to the supply of other debt (the mix declines), after a
monetary contraction. They find the evidence for the bank lending channel, where the
mix declines as a result of the monetary contraction.
Oliner and Rudebush (1996) criticise the empirical method used by Kashyap et al.
(1993) and use disaggregated firm level data instead to explain the mix in their analysis.
This enables them to identify the impact of the monetary policy stance on the mix for
large and small firms. They find the evidence that for large firms short-term debt expands
after a monetary contraction, while it declines for small firms, therefore they decompose
the sources of change in the mix as the 'shift' and the 'fixed' components. The shift
component represents a reallocation of short term credit from small firms to large firms
under the tight policy, while the fixed represents the change in the mix because of change
in the relative supply of various loan types keeping the share of the short-term debt for the
respective firm groups fixed. Using disaggregated data, Oliner and Rudebush (1996) find
evidence that the decline in the mix originates from the shift in the composition of the
debt across firm groups not from the decline in the supply of the short-term debt relative
to other loans. Therefore, the decline in the mix at the aggregate level should not be
interpreted as direct evidence for the bank lending channel. However, the decline in the
mix across firm groups can be considered as evidence for the bank lending channel if the
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debt shares across firm groups remain fixed. They also claim that the shift in the
composition of the various debt categories is considered as evidence for the broad credit
channel.
We combine the idea of Kashyap et al. (1993) with the predictions from Hoshi et al.
(1993) to test whether firm heterogeneity is important for explaining the behaviour of
liabilities of firms over the business cycles. We introduce the base rate into our empirical
model to measure the impact of monetary policy on the composition of external finance.
The theoretical model implies that the change in the composition of external finance
depends on the firm's collateral, debt, asset size, probability of good and bad projects
(riskiness), monitoring cost, interest rate, project size, ownership structure, and the
distribution of firms in terms of investment opportunities. We adopt this theoretical
framework to test the hypotheses associated with the credit channel of monetary
transmission. In this context, we specify our base line empirical model using the
following function.
MIX=[(MPS, MPRp, MPS*TYPE.b MPS*TYPE/MPRp. MPS*MPRp,
TYPEj, SIZE, SCORE, AGE, COL, GEAR, GDP, YEARD) (5.1)
where MIX, MPS, MPR, TYPE, SIZE, SCORE, AGE, COL, GEAR, GDP, and YEARD
denote three alternative mixes, monetary policy stance variable, the monetary regime
dummies, the firm type dummies, real assets, credit rating, the age of firms, the ratio of
tangible assets to total assets, gearing ratio, the GDP growth rate and year dummies,
respectively. MPS*TYPEj, A1PS*TYPE/MPRp, and MPS*MPRp arc interaction terms that
capture the impact of firm types and monetary regime periods. We provide detailed
explanations for these variables below.
As defined above we use three different measures of the financial mix (MIXI, MIX2
and MIX3) as dependent variables in our regressions. Two-time period dummies are
assigned to reflect two different monetary policy regimes, MPRp, namely tight monetary
policy period of 1990-1992, TP, loose monetary policy period of 1993-1999, LP,
respectively.
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TP= 1ift=1990-1992
= 0 otherwise
LP =1 ift=1993-1999
= 0 otherwise
We only provide the estimation results with the TP dummy interacted with the monetary
policy variable and firm type dummies to avoid redundancy as TP =1- LP.
MPS shows two alternative monetary policy stance variables, namely the
cumulative index of the Bank of England's base rate, BRATE and the apparent interest
rate i.e. the ratio of interest payment to total debt, ARA TE. The first variable is calculated
by adding the percentage changes in the base rate to the previous year value starting from
base year, 1990=100. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) proposed the Federal Funds rates as a
variable to reflect monetary stance along side the spread of the Federal Funds rate over
Treasury Bill rates and the careful reading of Fed minutes (the 'narrative' approach
leading to 'Romer dates', Romer and Romer, 1990) and this variable is widely used by
researchers in this area. One shortcoming of this variable is that it is firm-invariant i.e.
theree is a single rate for all firms having different characterises for a given year.
However, in this study by using different financial variables and firm-specific fixed
effects in a panel data framework, the extent of this shortcoming is likely to be eliminated
substantially.
Contrary to the cumulative base rate, the apparent interest rates, as a measure of
monetary stance instead vary across firms and time. This variable reflects the extent of
the external finance premium. Some firms are more likely to incur a high interest
payment relative to their total debt because they are supposed to be financially weak and
risky and not able to find cheaper external finance. Although this variable is not
controlled exogenously by the Bank of England (it is endogenous in the sense that it
reflects the financial conditions of firms as well as the interest rate), it does provide
evidence about the extent of the asymmetric information problem in the financial
transactions given firm heterogeneity. On the other hand, since apparent interest rates are
calculated based on the interest payments that are incurred for past debts they hardly
represent changes in the current interest rate. Therefore, ARA TE is less likely to reflect
monetary shocks compared to the BRA TEs.
8 Results for estimations with the apparent interest rates are given in the Appendix.
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There are quite a number of studies that classify firms as less financially
constrained firms and more financially constrained firms, which is consistent with the
methodology used by the financial constraint literature. This sort of taxonomy is crucial
for the hypothesis of credit channel of monetary transmission, as it helps to measure the
extent of variations in the reaction of firm groups to monetary policy, if any. In this study,
small, risky, young and highly indebted firms are supposed to have a higher sensitivity to
changes in monetary policy relative to large, secure, old and less indebted firms.
Firm type dummies (TYPE) consist of eight different binary variables reflecting
eight different firm characteristics i.e. small, large, risky, secure, young, old, highly
indebted, and less indebted. We could use only one dummy for each firm characteristic,
namely size, rating, age, and indebtedness (as in case of monetary regime dummy) to
carry out our regressions but instead we use two dummies for each firm type to capture
the reactions of firms in the tails of the distribution. For example, for the size we carry out
estimations by using interactions for both small and large firms as we do not intend to
measure the reactions of the middle sized firms. This method enables us to identify the
reaction of firms in the tails of firm distribution for a particular type of firms9•
TYPEj = 1 j = 1 ....8 and zero otherwise
MPS*TYPEj, MPS*TYPE/MPRp and MPS*MPRp are the interaction terms that are
vitally important for this study. They enable us to do inferences about the impact of
monetary policy on firm's financial behaviour considering different monetary policy
regimes and a great extent of firm heterogeneity. Interaction terms in the first group show
the extent to which the impact of monetary policy differs across firms with different
characteristics, while the second group is made up of interaction terms that consider both
monetary policy regime and firm characteristics interacted with the monetary stance
variable. The third group identifies the impact of monetary policy across the tight policy
regime period.
9 We intend to use the firm type dummy (TYPE) among the explanatory variables but since the software
d~op.pedit in some regressions (due to collin~arit~), and the estimated coefficients are not generally
significant therefore we do not report the estimation results where TYPE is used as an explanatory variable.
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This conventional method, the interactions terms approach, enables us to have a
more parsimonious model with a larger sample size and thus greater degrees of freedom.
Interaction of monetary policy stance with firm type, MPS*TYPE, or with both firm type
and sub-periods MPS*TYPE*MPRp do the same job as in the split sub-samples. In the
case of the interaction terms approach it is implicitly assumed that the impacts of control
variables on the dependent variable do not change across finn characteristics. For
robustness, we also carried out separate estimations by using the firm type dummies as
part of interaction terms for all explanatory variables.
SIZE is the variable that reflects the activity level of firms. We use two alternative
variables for this purpose, namely the logarithms of real tangible assets and real sales.
The estimation results for alternative SIZE variables do not differ significantly but we
only report the results for the real tangible assets (RASSET), which have relatively fewer
missing observations. SCORE is the credit rating score and as explained above it reflects
the credit risk. GEAR denotes the gearing ratio and reflects the indebtedness of firms.
COL is the ratio of tangible assets to total asset showing the collateral level of the firms.
We think that these firm specific variables, namely RASSET, SCORE, GEAR and COL are
more likely to be endogenous even though the correlation coefficients between error
terms and these variables are not significant.
AGE, GDP and YEARD show the age of firms, the growth rate of bTfOSS domestic
product that is invariant across firms to control for the business cycle, and the time (year)
dummies, respectively. Time dummies control firm invariant cyclical effects (as BRATE,
GDP, and TP do) therefore using these variables in the same regression leads the software
(Stata) to drop three time dummies automatically as a result of collinearity. We tend to
use BRATE, GDP and TP to capture the cyclical factors instead of time dummies to avoid
this problem as BRATE is the key variable for our analysis and it should be used as an
explanatory variable rather than time dummies. In fact, the estimation results do not differ
significantly if time dummies are also included as explanatory variables but in this case
some of dummies drop out from the regression due to collinearity 10. Therefore, we carry
out estimations and report the results without using time dummies to avoid complications
10 If we use the age of firm as an explanatory variable in the regression with time dummies, we also loose
one time dummy.
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originated from collinearity between some crucial explanatory variables_(GDP, AGE,
BRATE) and the time dummies 11.
We summarise the basic statistics of the variables employed for estimating the
empirical model in Table 5.2 and Table 5.312• We report the number of observations,
mean, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for each variable based on
firm groups according to size, age, risk, and indebtedness in Table 5.2 while we provide
the same statistics for sub-samples considering the monetary policy regime in Table 5.3.
The means of MIXI and MIX2 are larger for large firms while the mean for MIX3 is larger
for small firms. However, all versions of the mixes are larger for risky firms than secure
firms. As expected, MIXI and MIX2 are much higher for highly indebted firms as
compared to less indebted firms. Large, secure, old and less indebted firms have high
ratings relative to their counterparts, namely small, risky, young and highly indebted
firms. Risky firms have a high gearing ratio relative to other firms. Similarly, large,
secure, and old firms have high real asset size and high tangible asset ratio on average
relative to their counterparts. The apparent interest rate and gearing ratio have very high
standard deviations and their maximum values are very large relative to their mean even
though we trim variables both in the upper and lower tails of their distribution.
In Table 5.3, we calculate the figures for the whole sample and sub-periods that
reflect the monetary policy regimes. Means for MIXl, MlX2, MlX3, SCORE and GDP
growth rate are higher in the loose period than the tight period while the means for
BRATE, ARATE, and GEAR are higher in the tight period than in the loose period.
tt Detailed definitions of the variables used in the regression are provided also in the Appendix.
t2.To~eal with outliers we tri~ed sO.mevariables with extraordinarily large and small numbers. The
trJl~nung procedu~e for ~a~h vana~le IS. explained in the Appendix that provides detailed definitions for the
vanables. The basic statistics provided In Table 5.2 and 5.3 are calculated based on the trimmed figures.
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Table 5.2: Basic Statistics across Firm Characteristics
MIXI MIXl MIX3 AHA TE SCORE HASSET AGE GEAR COL
Small Firms
Ohs 24,420 24,420 22,006 24,420 24,367 24,419 24,420 24,420 24,005
Mean 28.21 34.89 69.97 8.89 58.40 6.89 23.70 141.55 0.29
Std. Dev. 25.68 26.56 34.52 17.99 21.49 0.77 18.85 265.93 0.21
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.33 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 12.80 124.00 2497.94 1.00
Lar!:.e Firms
Ohs 39,480 39,480 38,240 39,480 39,425 39,480 39,480 39,480 38,947
Mean 33.45 41.51 68.64 8.68 60.10 10.27 38.85 160.24 0.32
Std. Dev. 25.54 25.22 34.09 15.89 20.09 1.34 27.61 284.97 0.19
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 18.64 136.00 2494.57 1.00
Risk}!.Firms
Ohs 23,392 23,392 22,415 23,392 23,392 23,379 23,392 23,392 22,870
Mean 43.46 48.34 76.44 8.02 31.90 8.28 25.51 362.27 0.29
Std. Dev. 27.06 25.84 29.23 13.78 7.55 1.57 21.19 418.43 0.20
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 40.00 16.29 135.00 2499.19 1.00
Secure Firm s
Ohs 57,356 57,56 49,362 57,356 57,137 57,355 57,356 57,356 55,977
.Mean 21.91 29.74 66.32 7.85 78.72 8.60 34.94 47.71 0.33
Std. Dev. 23.52 26.15 37.21 17.55 11.24 1.64 25.17 114.22 0.20
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 61.00 1.55 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 18.64 135.00 2491.47 1.00
Youn!:. Firm s
Ohs 29,973 29,973 27,254 29,973 29,907 29,968 29,973 29,973 29,372
Mean 28.69 37.19 64.33 8.33 54.91 8.10 8.48 171.25 0.31
Std. Dev. 25.88 26.68 35.44 15.85 19.68 1.54 2.66 291.62 0.20
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 16.24 12.00 2499.19 1.00
Old Firms
Ohs 30,976 30,976 28,132 30,976 30,926 30,976 30,976 30,976 30,329
Mean 29.84 37.09 69.01 7.95 64.14 9.20 66.94 120.73 0.34
Std. Dev. 26.21 26.77 34.86 15.95 20.21 1.80 17.84 247.60 0.20
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.71 44.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 17.72 136.00 2491.47 1.00
Highlr. Indebted Firn is
Ohs 30,846 30,846 30,418 30,846 30,704 30,837 30,846 30,846 30,054
Mean 47.21 58.37 65.53 6.03 41.69 8.66 27.61 424.81 0.33
Std. Dev. 25.86 21.26 34.16 8.61 14.62 1.72 22.89 400.75 0.21
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.46 1.00 142.40 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 17.72 135.00 2499.19 1.00
Less Indebted Firms
Obs 30,876 30,876 22,392 30,876 30,824 30,876 30,876 30,876 30,168
Mean 9.20 10.78 76.95 10.71 77.60 8.16 34.21 7.06 0.28
Std. Dev. 16.34 16.72 35.15 25.41 16.81 1.39 24.23 4.98 0.18
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.25 0.00
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 18.64 132.00 17.41 1.00
140
Chapter Five Financial Structure, Firm Characteristicsand the Credit Channel ofMonetary Policy
Table 5.3: Basic Statistics across Periods
MIX1 MIX2 MIX3 ARATE SCORE RASSET COL GEAR BRATE GDP
Whole Period: 1990-1990
Obs 126,112 126,112 114,556 126,112 125,893 126,097 123,614 126,112 126,112 126,112
Mean 29.56 36.77 68.69 8.11 59.78 8.48 0.32 138.29 41.08 2.26
Std.D. 25.79 26.37 34.35 15.91 20.47 1.61 0.20 258.84 23.51 1.60
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.00 0.25 15.30 -1.38
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 18.64 1.00 2499.19 100.00 4.66
Tight Period: 1990-1992
Ohs 31,165 31,165 28,449 31,165 31,087 31,162 30,750 31,165 31,165 31,165
Mean 28.45 35.89 66.11 11.41 58.13 8.50 0.33 142.28 76.46 -0.19
Std. D. 25.58 25.95 37.44 20.32 20.68 1.64 0.19 266.02 15.86 0.90
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.00 0.25 59.80 -1.38
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 17.60 1.00 2498.72 100.00 0.79
Loose Period: 1993-1999
Obs 94,947 94,947 86,107 94,947 94,806 94,935 92,864 94,947 94,947 94,947
Mean 29.92 37.06 69.53 7.02 60.32 8.48 0.32 136.98 29.47 3.07
Std. D. 25.85 26.51 33.22 14.00 20.37 1.60 0.20 256.43 10.29 0.72
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.00 0.25 15.30 2.41
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 121.00 96.00 18.64 1.00 2499.19 46.40 4.66
5.4.3. Estimation Techniques
A panel data set includes information about individuals (firms, households or
industries) at different points in time. It is generally claimed that the studies employing
only the cross-section or time series cannot control for individual specific unobservable
effects. If the individual specific unobservable effects that are not specified in the
regression (the omitted variables), are correlated with the explanatory variables, the
estimates of coefficients will be biased since the individual specific unobservable effects
are considered as a part of the disturbance term. Consider a simple production function
model in which log-output is explained in terms of log capital, log labour and managerial
ability. Managerial ability is typically unobservable and affects the investment and
employment decisions of the firms. A regression using a cross-section sample causes the
factor elasticities (coefficients of explanatory variables) to be biased as managerial ability
is not observable and it may be correlated with the explanatory variables. However, it
would be possible to control for the managerial ability by introducing time invariant
individual effects in panel data models.
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We employ panel data methods to test our hypothesis where firms with different
characteristics react heterogeneously to monetary policy shocks and where finn specific
factors may be important for these heterogeneous reactions. Panel data methods allow us
to capture firm heterogeneity over time, which is important for analysing the credit
channel of monetary policy. Firm specific effects are omitted under the pooled ordinary
least square (OLS) estimation which leads to biased estimates if unobservable individual
specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables in the model.
A standard model of panel data is specified in the following form;
(5.2)
where i = 1,2,.... , N refers to a cross section unit (firms in this study), t = 1,2,..... ,Trefers
to time period. v« and Xii denote dependent variable and the vector of non-stochastic
explanatory variables for the firm i and year t, respectively. At represents firm-invariant
time-specific effects, a; is time invariant unobservable firm specific effects and Cil are the
disturbance terms that vary with time and across firms. Restrictive assumptions on the
nature of firm specific-effects lead to various panel data models. The nature of the data
and the specification of the model are important for the selection of an estimation method.
There are basically two main panel data models, namely fixed effects and random effects.
In the fixed effects model as specified above, each cross-section unit has its own
intercept, a; The fixed effects approach considers the finn specific time invariant fixed
parameters as regressors. The stochastic disturbance terms have an independent and
identical distribution with zero mean and constant variance and are independent from Xii.
In the cases where the firm specific effects are correlated with the vector of regressors,
the fixed effects models still provide consistent estimators. However, since there are too
many parameters in the fixed effects model there will be an efficiency loss in the
estimations. The fixed effects model is estimated by using a dummy variable for each
individual to capture the individual specific effects. Panel data sets usually have a large
number of individuals and small number of time periods. The dummy variable method
entails large number of dummy variables in the regression which is not very
parsimonious. There are many methods in the literature that transform the observations to
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remove these dummies from the regression to obtain a parsimonious model. The 'within
groups' and 'between groups' are widely used transformation techniques. The former
uses time variation within each cross section unit while the latter uses only variation
between the cross-section observations. Models with transformed variables provide
consistent OLS estimates.
Yit - Y i = (Xii - X;) P + (6 it - e;) (Within transformation) (5.3)
Y1- Y = (X i-X) P + (i; 1- i;) (Between transformation) (5.4)
On the other hand, in the random effects model A/ and a, are assumed to be random,
that is, time and individual specific effects are assumed to be a part of the disturbance
term, Vii = A/ + a, + CiI, where these terms are distributed identically and independently,
have zero means and constant variances. Therefore, the Xii are independent of ..1./, a, and
Cit for all i and t. If the sample is drawn from a large population, the random effects
model is the most suitable approach for estimation, because it is more likely that firm-
specific terms are distributed randomly across cross-sectional units, that is, there should
be no correlation between firm-specific terms and explanatory variables (the fixed effects
model is an appropriate specification if we want to do inference about specific set of
individuals). One can write the random effects models as follows:
(5.5)
where the individual disturbance, cq, is a component of Vii and is invariant over time and
assumed not to be correlated with the explanatory variables, E(Xi/, aJ=O, in order to have
consistent estimates in the random effects model. However, this condition, E(Xi/, aJ =0,
does not have to hold in the fixed effects model in order to have consistent estimates. The
estimates of the fixed and random effects models become identical as T become large.
Under the random effects specification, the Generalised Least Square estimates
are asymptotically efficient. On the other hand, the fixed effects estimates which are more
sensitive to the errors in variables are unbiased and consistent but not efficient. Unlike the
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fixed effects model, the estimates for random effects model will not be consistent if the
individual effects are correlated with the independent variables. We rejected the
hypothesis of no systematic difference between coefficients obtained from the random
effects and fixed effects models by using the Hausman test. This means that the random
effects estimates are efficient but not consistent; therefore we use the method that gives
consistent results which is the fixed effects model. Only results obtained from fixed
effects estimations are reported in the next section. We also provide the Hausman
statistics for the fixed effects estimations.
We also employ an approach to consider the possibility of endogenous explanatory
variables. The instrumental variable two stage least square (lV-2SLS) procedure is carried
out in order to remove biases originating from the endogenous explanatory variables. This
estimation procedure involves instrumental variables that are independent of the
disturbance term and lead to unbiased coefficients, that is, if any explanatory variable is
not independent of the disturbance term, the estimated coefficients are biased. Therefore,
we also use the fixed effect estimates of the IV-2SLS procedure, which are robust
compared to those of the fixed effects model.
The decision on candidates for possible endogenous variables is critical in this
analysis. We assume that firm specific variables, such as SCORE, RASSET, GEAR, and
COL, are all endogenous. Rating score is calculated based on the variables that either
reflect or affect the financial position of firms, including solvency, gearing, cash flow,
interest cover, monetary stance, therefore it is reasonable to consider this variable as
endogenous. Similarly, firm size, indebtedness, or collateral position of firms may be
endogenous to the model as liabilities positions of firms may be important for these
variables13.
The difference GMM procedure produces consistent and more efficient estimates
for models that have a dynamic structure (lags of dependent variables) and endogenous
variables. We prefer not to use this estimation procedure in this chapter as the underlying
13 In fact, the correlation coefficients between the lags and level residuals and endogenous variables are
negligible except for the correlation coefficient between the lag residual and SCORE that is 0.05 in the
fixed effect estimation. ' ,
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transformation (the first difference) in this procedure and using the lags of dependent
variable lead to loss of observations for the entire tight money period therefore we can
analyse the impact of monetary policy on the mixes during this period. In other words, we
can not identify the impact of monetary policy during the tight period which is vitally
important for this study when we employ the GMM procedure for estimations. Therefore,
instead we use the IV-2SLS procedure in order to capture the endogeneity in the model
and to avoid loss of observations. We provide 0 discussion for the GMM procedure and
employ it extensively in Chapter Six in order to analyse inventory investment and
employment growth.
5.5. Results
In this section, we report the estimation results of the fixed effects model that use the
cumulative base rate as the monetary policy stance. We report the findings of the fixed
effect model that explains different measures of the mix, i.e. MIXl, MIX2, and AfIX3 in
Tables 5.4-5.6, respectively. We use three interaction terms for these estimations to
identify the impact of monetary policy across firm types and the tight policy regime
period, conditional on the control variables. In addition, we report the fixed effect
estimates for the model where interaction terms across firm types and the tight period
dummy are used for all explanatory variables to test whether the impact of these variables
differ with respect to firm characteristics. The findings are reported in Table 5.7. For a
further test of robustness, we employ the IV-2SLS procedure by which it is intended to
control for endogeneity in the empirical model. The fixed effects estimations of the IV-
2SLS procedure, where interaction terms are used for the monetary stance variable, are
reported in Tables 5.8-5.10. Moreover, the fixed effects estimations where the apparent
interest rate is used as a monetary policy stance variable are reported in Tables A5.I-A5.3
in the Appendix.
The columns of each Table indicate the estimation results for each firm type
dummy used as a component of the interaction terms in the regressions. In column one,
we report the estimation results where we do not consider any interaction terms. For
estimations where we usc interaction terms, we separate out the responses of firms
according to size - small and large firms in columns 2-3, credit rating - risky and secure
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firms in columns 4-5, age - young and old firms in columns 6-7 and, gearing - highly and
less indebted firms in columns 8-9. For example, in column 2, which is denoted as
'TYPE-Small', we provide estimation results with interaction terms that include the small
firm dummy, while in column 3, which is denoted as 'TYPE-Large', we provide
estimation results where the large firm dummy is used as a component of interaction
terms.
5.5.1. Fixed Effects Model Results
5.5.1.1. Monetary Policy, Firm Characteristic and Financial Mix
We focus more on the findings for the MIXI and the MIX2 in this section'". These mixes
show the composition of short-term debt (basically the bank loans) and total debt versus
current and total liabilities, respectively; therefore they have implications for the credit
channel of monetary policy as explained earlier. Although the findings for the MIX3 may
not have a direct implication for the credit channel of monetary policy, nevertheless they
may have implications about whether the monetary policy is important for the debt
structure.
We estimate the empirical model including the interaction terms for the dummy
variables for firm types and the tight period of 1990-92. We focus more on the estimation
results where BRATE is used as the policy variable to explain the mixes even though it
has some weaknesses as a candidate representing monetary policy stance in the sense that
it is invariant across firms. Alternatively, AM TE can be used as a monetary stance
variable that varies across time but its weakness is that it is not a policy variable
controlled by the Bank of England and thus it may involve a potential endogeneity
problem. In fact, the findings with these alternative measures of monetary policy stance
variables are quite similar to those with BRATEI5. In addition to the alternative monetary
policy stance variables and their interaction terms with firm type and tight monetary
policy dummies, we also include real tangible asset size, credit score, age, gearing ratio,
14 M/Xl is the closest mix by definition to the mixes which were used by Kashyap et at. (1993) and Oliner
and Rudebush (1996) in their analyses.
IS The coefficients for the ARATE in percentage terms are larger than BRATE because of the scales of the
variables. The former is a ratio while the latter is a an index based on cumulative values.
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the ratio of tangible asset to total and GDP growth rate in the regressions for all mixes to
control for variables that reflect firm specific financial positions and demand conditions.
The coefficients for BRA TE and ARA TE for the regressions where interaction terms
are not included as regressors are negative and significantly different from zero for MIXl
and MIX2 as shown in the first columns of Tables 5.4-5.5, and of Tables A.S.1-A.S.2,
respectively. This result confirms that in general the MIXl and MIX2 decline as interest
rates increase. However, the coefficient for BRA TE is negative but not significant while
the coefficient for ARATE is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in the
regression for the MIX3 (Table A.S.3).
The magnitudes and signs of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms for
firm type and tight period dummies (BRATE*TYPE*TP) are particularly important for
this study. They convey information about how the mixes arc responsive to monetary
policy shocks across various firm types in the recessionary period versus the recovery
period. These coefficients tell us whether the credit channel of monetary transmission is
operating through the bank lending channel, the balance sheet channel, or both. The
coefficients of these interaction terms for firm groups that arc more likely to be
constrained are expected to be negative and large in absolute terms than those of less
constrained firm groups. In fact, the coefficients of the interaction terms (the second
variable in Table 5.4) for small, risky, young and highly indebted firms arc -0.036, -
0.016, -0.038, and -0.047, respectively and only insignificant for risky firms in the
regressions for MIXI. The respective coefficients are positive and signi ficant for large,
secure, old and less indebted firms, and they are 0.035, 0.018, 0.040, and 0.049,
respectively. We observe a similar pattern when ARATE is used as the monetary policy
stance variable; the coefficients for interaction terms of constrained firms are generally
negative and significant in all regressions for MIXl. These findings support the idea that
tight monetary conditions have been destructive for small, risky, young and highly
indebted firm groups in their access to short-term bank finance which is the most
important source of finance for collaterally poor, small, and young firms.
In the regressions for MIX2, the results are slightly different but have similar
implications. The coefficients of the interaction terms (BRATE*TYPE*TP) are negative
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for small, risky, young, highly indebted firms but significant only for risky (at the 10
percent significant level) and highly indebted firms. The respective coefficients for large,
secure, and, old, less indebted firms are positive and significant except the coefficient for
old firms (Table 5.5). For MIX3, the coefficients for small, risky, secure young and less
indebted firms are negative but insignificant for risky firms while those for large, old and
highly indebted firms are positive and significant. Contrary to the regressions for MIXI
and MIX2, the coefficients for secure and less indebted firms are negative and significant,
while those for their counterparts are positive but significant only for highly indebted
firms in the regression for MIX3. Although MIX3 also declines with tight policy for
secure, less indebted, small, young firms, it must have different implications for secure
and less indebted firms compared to small and young firms. Finns in the first group might
have flexibility to shift to long-term debt as short-term debt became relatively expensive
during the recession while the firms in the second group might have difficulties to have
access to short-term debt at the given long-term debt (Table 5.6).
The coefficients for the BRATE*TYPE are generally insignificant and are positive
for constrained firms. This result confirms the findings in Table 5.1 to some extent; as the
recovery set in after 1992, bank loans became more available to constrained firms thus
their MIXI increased. The coefficients for the BRATE*TP are negative and significant for
both MIXI and MIX2 but they are larger in absolute terms for the latter. These
coefficients are generally negative but only significant for large and old firms for MIX3.
Negative coefficients of BRATE*TP for MIXI and AlIX2 regressions reflect the restrictive
impact of the tight monetary policy for debt finance (mainly bank loans) versus non-debt
finance.
We can simply measure the overall impact of monetary policy on the composition
of firm liabilities during the tight policy by adding all the coefficients of the interaction
terms and of BRATE together for each regression. The summations of coefficients are all
negative and are larger in absolute term for small (-0.084), risky (-0.062), young (-0.086)
and highly indebted (-0.063) firm groups compared to those for their counterpart groups,
namely large (-0.044), secure (-0.060), old (-0.052), and less indebted (-0.049) firm
groups in the regression for MIXI. A similar pattern is observed in the regressions for
MIX2 but we observe a different pattern for the regression for MIX3 where the overall
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summations of coefficients are not negative for large, old and highly indebted firm
groups. Negative coefficients across all types can be considered as evidence for the bank
lending channel as suggested by Kashyap et al. (1993) in the regressions for debt versus
debt plus non-debt liabilities (MIXI and MIX2). These findings are supportive for the
theoretical framework forwarded by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), where the tight
monetary policy constrains the supply of loans. As Oliner and Rudebush (1996) highlight
for the US economy, we may also expect that potentially unconstrained firms might shift
to bank finance during the recession but the overall decline in the supply ofloans seem to
dominate such shift during the recession in the early 1990s.
These findings confirm that financially constrained firms have difficulties to get
short-term debt (mainly bank overdrafts) during the tight period. As they are more
dependent on bank sources they tend to reduce their real activities or access more
expensive finance. The restrictive mechanism may work either by a decline in the overall
supply of bank loans or by rationing bank loans for the firms that are more subject to
moral hazard and adverse selection problems because of lack of collateral assets. Small,
young, risky, and highly indebted firms are more likely to get bank loans with reasonable
rates during loose periods, while those firms that are financially strong (large, secure, old,
less indebted firms in our case) are more likely to have access to market finance in an
environment where the demand and the supply for funds increase. They can extract low
cost resources from the capital market directly by issuing bonds or equity rather than
getting bank loans during the loose period, while they are more likely to have access to
bank finance in tight periods. Lim (2003) splits the sample into periods based on the
financial crisis in 1997 for Korean firms and he concludes that large firms, to some
extent, shifted to capital market finance from intermediary finance after the crisis while
small profitable firms used intermediary loans more often. He suggests that improving
lending practices of banks, at least partially, contributed to this shift.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the monetary policy stance on the
firms' choice of finance across firm types and monetary regime periods - small, young,
risky and highly indebted firms are affected more severely than large, old, secure, and
less indebted firms during the tight policy regime period. Variations in the coefficients of
interaction terms for the monetary stance variable across firm groups are considered as
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evidence of the balance sheet channel (the broad credit channel). The broad credit channel
implies that financially constrained firms are more sensitive to a change in monetary
stance, and are less likely to have access to already squeezed bank loans and therefore
they are more likely to be subject to a 'credit crunch'. The findings are generally
supportive for the broad credit channel as the summed coefficients for firm groups that
are more likely to be financially constrained are larger in absolute terms than those for
their financially unconstrained counterparts. Similarly, the coefficients for
BRATE*TYPE*TP are negative for financially constrained firm groups while they are
positive for the unconstrained firm groups in the regressions forMIXI and MIX2. In short,
both coefficients of interaction terms alone, BRATE*TYPE*TP, and those for the summed
coefficients confirm the broad credit channel hypothesis. The evidence is mixed in the
regressions forMIX3. In fact, since the theoretical and empirical framework that we adopt
in this chapter is to analyse the composition of bank-sourced finance versus non-debt
liabilities rather than the composition of liabilities based on debt terms, the findings for
MIX3 regressions are not particularly important for our hypothesis. We document the
regression results forMIX3 in order to compare them with those forMIXl, andMIX2.
5.5.1.2. Response to Control Variables
In addition to the exogenous monetary stance variable, and interaction terms, we usc real
tangible asset size, rating score, age, collateral assets ratio, gearing ratio and the GOP
growth rate as explanatory variables to control for the financial conditions of firms and
for aggregate demand. In our original estimations, the interaction terms method assumes
that the coefficients of the control variables other than BRATE do not vary significantly
across regressions using various firm type dummies as components of interaction terms
(Tables 5.4-5.6). For robustness, we carry out some additional regressions to test how the
sensitivities ofMIXI to all explanatory variables differ across firm types and when we use
the tight regime dummy. We use interaction terms for all explanatory variables with the
tight period dummy and report the regression results in the first column of Table 5.7.
Estimations that consider these interaction terms with eight firm type dummies arc
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reported in the remaining columns of the same Table16• Therefore, DUMMY represents
the tight dummy in the first column and the firm type dummies in the remaining columns.
Real tangible asset size captures firm-specific activity level, and this is found to be
an important determinant of the mix. The coefficients of real assets are positively signed
and significant in the regressions for MIXI and MIX2 while they are negative in the
regressions of the MIX3 (Tables 5.4-5.6). We expect MIXI and MIX2 to increase with real
tangible assets because of improvements in bank credit conditions following a rise in the
general activity level after 1992. The sensitivity of the mix to this variable is relatively
high for the regressions of MIX2. Our findings support the theoretical model given in
Chapter Three because we observe predominantly positive signs, implying a greater share
of intermediary finance, in response to increasing real assets. Negative coefficients in the
regression of MIX] may imply that positive macro and micro conditions lead firms to
substitute long term debt as firm size increases. The coefficients of the interaction term
for RASSET across firm types are significant except for secure firms and are positive only
for interaction terms that include small, old and highly indebted group dummies (Table
5.7).
Rating scores, SCORE, may be interpreted as perceptions about the financial risk or
the healthiness of firms. Estimation results imply that it is also an important explanatory
variable for the different versions of the mix. The estimated coefficients are consistently
negative and significant in all cases, lying around -0.46 for MIXI, -0.32 for M/X2 and -
0.35 forMIX3. These figures may imply that as the credit risk of firm declines firms may
shift more easily from debt to non-debt finance and from short-term debt to long-term
debt finance (Tables 5.4-5.6). The coefficients of the interaction terms with firm types are
negative for financially unconstrained firms except the one for highly indebted firms. The
coefficient for the interaction terms for less indebted firms is positive and larger than the
coefficient of SCORE (Table 5.7). SCORE is highly correlated with financial variables
that reflect the financial positions of firms17. This variable is likely to be endogenous,
therefore, we carry out a robustness test that considers this problem in the next section.
16 We only use the firm type dummies in the interaction terms across variables to have a more parsimonious
wodel and to i?entify the sensitivity of MIXl to all re.gressors across firm groups.
The correlattons between SCORE and solvency ratio and between SCORE and gearing ratio are 0.80 and
-0.45 on average across years, respectively.
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The age of firms appears to be a significant explanatory variable for all versions of
the mix and the coefficients are positive in all regressions but they are larger for the
regressions of MIX3 (Tables 5.4-5.6). Summations of the respective interaction terms
with age indicate that small, risky, young and highly indebted firms are more sensitive to
age than their counterpart firm groups, namely large, secure, old and less indebted firms.
In other words, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are positive for the
former firm groups, while they are negative for the latter groups in the MIXI regression
(Table 5.7). When we consider the dummy for the monetary policy regime period in the
interaction terms the coefficients of AGE are larger for the tight monetary regime than the
loose one. That is, the age of the firms becomes a more important factor in for their
ability to access short-term bank finance when monetary policy is relatively tight. These
results provide a confirmation of the importance of a track record for certain types of
firms and this is a direct test of the relationship-banking proposition of Sharpe (1990),
Rajan (1992) and Boot (2000). Small and financially weak firms are less likely to be
subject to financial constraints if they have a long track record that enables them to
receive bank loans in tight periods
The gearing ratio also appears to be a significant factor in explaining the mix.
Implication of the Hoshi et al. (1993) model is that a rise in firm debt relative to assets
will lead to an increase in the demand for intermediary finance. Firms with high debt are
more likely to have a close relation with banks and thus to raise bank finance relative to
weak firms with low collateral and short track record. The positive and significant
coefficients for GEAR in almost all regressions may confirm this prediction. Summed
coefficients in the regressions with interaction terms in Table 5.7 are very large for less
indebted firms but very close to zero for highly indebted firms and the same coefficients
for other firm groups do not differ significantly. As we explained above, we classify firms
based on their gearing ratios to measure the impact of monetary policy on the
composition of external finance across low and highly indebted firms; the mix of firms in
the high-debt group is more sensitive to a change in the monetary policy stance than that
of the low-debt firms. High indebtedness is perceived as a weakness during tight periods
when high interest rates reduce the cash flow of firms. This creates a debt-servicing
burden on these firms.
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The share of tangible assets, a measure of the collateral position of the finn, is
likely to be important for accessing external finance. The model in Chapter Three implies
that the response of the mix to more collateral assets is negative for firms in the upper tail
of the distribution as they can easily access market finance when they have more
collateral. We may assume that secure, large, old, less indebted firms are close to the
upper tail of distribution, while small, risky, young and high indebted firms are more
likely to be close the lower tail of distribution. The model does not have implications for
the constrained firms that have difficulty getting bank finance (for the firms close to the
lower tail of distribution). Regression results for MIXI indicate that the coefficients of
COL are generally positive but only significant at the 10 percent level, while the
coefficients for highly and less indebted firms are negative but significant only for the
latter. These coefficients are very large, positive and significant in all regressions
explaining MIX2. On the contrary, these coefficients are very large, negative and
significant in all regressions explaining MIX3. They decline across the board as collateral
increases, indicating that there is a shift in the composition of total debt towards longer
maturity finance as collateral assets increase (Tables 5.4-5.6).
The findings for the regressions where we introduce the firm type interaction terms
for all variables confirm our theoretical predictions up to some extent. Summation of the
coefficients for COL and respective interaction terms are positive for small and risky
firms but they are negative for the other groups, namely large, secure, old, less indebted,
young and highly indebted firms. However, the coefficients for young and highly
indebted groups are very small in absolute value compared to those for large, secure, old
and less indebted ones. These findings imply that as collateral ratios increase small and
risky firms tend to get more bank finance while large, secure, old and less indebted firms
and up to some extent young and highly indebted firms tend to get cheap non-debt
finance (Table 5.7). On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction terms with the
tight period dummy in the first column of Table 5.7 is negative and significant implying
that during the recession high collateral level is more important for accessing alternative
sources of finance.
We also use the GDP growth rate to control for cyclical effects in aggregate
demand. The coefficients of this variable for the regressions explaining AfIX} and MIX2
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are negative and significant, while they are negative but insignificant in all regressions
except the regression without interaction terms for MIX3. In general, an increase in the
GDP growth rate leads firms to shift toward non-debt liabilities. This proposition seems
reasonable since firms have more flexibility to access alternative financial sources during
boom periods. In addition, during these times the extent of moral hazard and adverse
selection is reduced and this leads financial markets to work more efficiently. On the
other hand, the coefficients of the GDP growth rate differ across firm groups when we
use the interaction terms suggesting that the effects are not uniform. Summed coefficients
of the GDP growth rate for small, young and high indebted firms are larger than their
counterparts. It seems that relatively fragile firms are more sensitive to a change in
demand conditions.
The coefficients of BRA TE*DUMMY where firm type dummies are interacted with
all explanatory variables in Table 5.7, are significant except for the coefficients of risky
and secure firms. More importantly, these coefficients for small and young firms are
significantly negative while they are significantly positive for large, and old firms. These
findings are different from what we find in Table 5.4 where both the tight regime dummy
and firm type dummies are used as interaction terms in the regressions forMIX] in Table
5.4. We believe that this difference is because of the fact that we do not capture the
impact of the tight period independently in the regressions reported in Table 5.7. In other
words, the firm type dummies also capture the monetary regime period effects but the
period effects might dominate the firm type effects. As a result the coefficients of
BRATE*DUMMYare negative and significant for small, and young firms.
5.5.2. Robustness Tests: Estimations Considering Endogeneity Problem
We also carry out regressions by using instrumental variable two-stage least squares
approach to consider possible endogenous explanatory variables. Estimations with the IV-
2SLS are based on the fixed effects model as the Hausman specification test does not
rejects the systematic difference between coefficients obtained from the random effects
versus those from the fixed effects estimations, and therefore we report the estimation
results for the consistent model which is the fixed effects model. We assume that all
variables, except the firm invariant monetary policy stance variable (BRA rE) and the
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GDP growth rate, and firm-variant the age of firms, are endogenous. We had difficulty in
finding valid instruments for the endogenous variables, namely RASSET, GEAR, COL and
SCORE, and therefore we tend to use the first lags of these variables as instruments.
Estimation results are reported only for the regressions where BRA TE is used as the
monetary policy variable. We follow the same methodology adopted in the previous
section. Respective estimations for MIXl, MIX2 and MIX3 are given in Tables 5.8-5.10.
Main findings from the IV-2SLS estimations are in the same line with those of the fixed
effects model.
There are two important differences between estimations with the fixed effect and
those with IV-2SLS in MIXI model. First, the coefficient of BRA TE turns to be positive
and insignificant in the model where we do not use interaction terms at all (the first
column). Second, the coefficients for COL are negative and significant in all regressions.
However, the findings for MIX2 follow those of the fixed effects estimations.
We are mainly interested in the coefficients for the interaction terms rather than that
for BRATE as we might better identify the restrictive impact of a tight policy on mixes
across firm types. The findings from these interaction terms imply that as macro and
micro conditions improved after 1992, the constraining impact of monetary policy
weakened.
The coefficients of the interaction terms between the monetary stance variable, the
firm type and tight monetary regime period dummies (BRATE*TYPE*TP) arc again
negative and significant for small, young and highly indebted firm groups, while they arc
positive and significant for large, old and less indebted firms for the regression of MIXI.
Contrary to the fixed effects estimations in the previous section, the coefficient of the
interaction term for secure firms is positive but not significant and that for risky firms is
not negative. In spite of the change in some results when this estimation method is used,
findings generally confirm the fact that, under the tight monetary regime, financially
fragile firms like small, young and highly indebted have difficulties in accessing bank
finance. However, these groups of firms are more likely to use bank loans during the
loose monetary regime when large, secure, old and less indebted firms tend to prefer a
variety of cheaper forms of market finance. In fact, during the tight period, financially
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strong firms tend to use bank loans more intensively. When we add up the coefficients of
interaction terms and that of BRATE, we find out that they are all negative across finn
groups (Table 5.8).
Findings from the regressions for MIX2 with the IV-2SLS procedure generally
support those with the fixed effects regressions that do not use instruments. The
coefficient of BRATE is negative and significant in the regression where we do not use
interaction dummies. The coefficients for the interaction terms (BRATE*TYPE*TP) are
negative for small, young and highly indebted firms but not significant for the small finn
group. These coefficients are positive for large, risky, secure, old and less indebted firms
groups but not significant for risky firms. The coefficients for large and old firms are
significant at the 10 percent level (Table 5.9). For MIX3, the coefficients of the
interaction terms are very much similar to those of the fixed effects regressions discussed
in the previous section (Table 5.10).
We test the validity of the instruments by regressing each endogenous variable on
instrumental variables, which are the first lags of the endogenous variables, namely
SCOREu-l, RASSETi,I_I, GEARi,l_I, COLi,I_I, (BRATE*TYPE)i,t_Jand (BRA TE*TYPE*TP)i,t_1
and all exogenous variables (AGE, GDP, BRATE, BRATE*TP). Following Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999), we estimate these regressions by using the random effects method and
test whether the explanatory variables are jointly different from zero. The Wald statistics
have a1distribution and are very large for all regressions. For example, the Wald
statistics are 1 (16)= 230246.6 (p=O,OO)for SCORE, 1(16) = 613899.2 (p=O.OO)for
RASSET, 1(16)= 74500.8 (p=O.OO)for GEAR and 1 (16)= 46150.4 (p=O.OO)for CAL, in
the regressions where we use the small firm dummy as part of the interaction terms. In
fact, these statistics are also very large when we use other finn type dummies as a
component of the interaction terms. The test results imply that the explanatory variables
are jointly different from zero at less than one percent significant level, therefore, the
instruments that we use in our regressions are valid.
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5.6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the influence of a tightening of monetary conditions on
corporate credit in the United Kingdom by comparing the uptake of bank loans and other
external credit during tight and benign periods of monetary policy. The study
differentiates between firms according to their size, credit rating, indebtedness and age,
and can therefore determine whether monetary policy tightening influences firms' finance
choice according to their type.
Results show that smaller, more risky, highly indebted and younger firms are more
influenced by monetary tightening than larger, secure, less-indebted or older firms. This
confirms for the UK data the findings of major US studies - that there is a broad credit
channel effect (as found by Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996), a bank lending channel (first
discovered by Kashyap et al. 1993, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), accelerator effects
(predicted by Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), relationship banking when age proxies for the
development of such bank-firm relationships (Rajan, 1992 and Boot, 2000), and influence
from gearing (Hoshi et al., 1993).
The effect of the tightening of monetary policy is felt more severely by small firms
and by those that have adverse financial characteristics such as poor solvency, a short
track record, high gearing and low real assets than by the financially healthy, large
companies with good credit ratings. Relationship banking only favours larger, older and
more secure firms rather than those that are affected most by the tightening of monetary
conditions. Larger companies are less affected in their credit ratings by a changing
monetary climate. It may be concluded that Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) were right to
point out the importance of distinguishing between firm types, but for the UK, the effects
of making this distinction do not undermine the findings of Kashyap et al. (1993) as they
did for the US.
Potentially constrained firms such as small, risky, young and highly indebted firms
in this empirical study tended to increase their share of intermediary finance as source of
finance during the benign period while they have difficulties to access intermediary
finance during the tight monetary regime period. This is understandable in the sense that
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in the loose monetary policy environment the extent of moral hazard and adverse selection
problem between lenders and borrowers tend to lessen. On the contrary, large, secure, old
and less indebted firms have used relatively more intermediary finance during the tight
monetary period while they tended to reduce their share of intermediary finance in the
following period of 1993-1999 when monetary policy was loose. Financially less
constrained firms are able to find cheaper financial sources relative to intermediary loans
In short, we find plenty of evidence for the credit channel effects.
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Table 5.7. Fixed Effects Resultsfor the fl.flXI-Introducing Interaction Terms for
Firm Type and Policy Regime
DUMMY- DUMMY- DUMMY- DUMMY- DUMMY-
Tight (1) Small (2) Large (3) Risky (4) Secure (5)
BRATE -0.001 -0.010*** -0.031 *** -0.019*** -0.016***
(0.27) (2.87) (8.32) (5.83) (3.75)
BRATE*DUMMY -0.059*** -0.037*** 0.039*** 0.008 -0.005
(8.20) (5.19) (5.72) (0.83) (0.86)
RASSET 2.729*** 2.801*** 3.848*** 3.121*** 2.913***
08.53) (16.45) (21.98) (20.00) (15.44)
RASSET*DUMMY 0.442*** 0.409 -3.018*** -1.298*** 0.008
(7.93) (1.25) (9.61) (3.00) (0.03)
SCORE -0.467*** -0.499*** -0.456*** -0.463*** -0.461 ***
(111.89) (109.25) (98.78) (113.54) (83.44)
SCORE*DUMMY 0.002 0.120*** -0.038*** 0.028* -0.003
(0.42) (13.61) (4.38) (1.78) (0.32)
AGE 0.820*** 0.715*** 0.836*** 0.785*** 0.893***
(27.44) (27.20) (31.10) (32.63) (29.14)
AGE*DUMMY 0.027*** 0.351*** -0.137*** 0.238*** -0.179***
(6.05) (6.78) (2.75) (3.32) (3.94)
GEAR 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012***
(41.58) (32.60) (44.60) (40.16) (40.23)
GEAR*DUMMY -0.000 0.008*** -0.006*** -0.002*** 0.004***
(0.94) (13.14) (10.45) (3.39) (4.92)
COL 1.105* -1.492** 5.295*** 0.130 4.859***
(1.91) (2.27) (8.09) (0.22) (6.31 )
COL*DUMMY -0.398 8.322*** -16.372*** 9.309*** -8.164***
(0.74) (6.72) (13.11) (5.02) 0.29)
GDP -0.482*** -0.541*** -0.771*** -0.684*** -0.668***
(6.95) (10.66) (14.85) (14.73) (11.17)
GDP*DUMMY 0.037 -0.587*** 0.295*** 0.062 -0.017
(0.31) (5.83) (3.05) (0.44) (0.20)
Constant 7.122*** 8.240*** 8.419*** 6.300*** 7.028***
(5.26) (6.74) (6.88) (5.19) (5.75)
Hausman Spec. Test 1,735*** 1,814*** 1,496*** 1,532*** 1642***
R-sQuared 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
..Absolute value oft statistics m parentheses, *slgnificant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Numbers of firms and of observations are 15,491 and 123,422, respectively.
DUMMY represents dummy variables for tight period in column one and for firm types in the remaining
columns. These dummies are interacted with explanatory variables.
The Hausman specification test has X2distribution with k-I degrees of freedom where k denotes the number
of estimated coefficients in the regressions. The Hausman test results confirm that there is a systematic
difference between the coefficients obtained for the fixed effects and of random effects specifications.
Therefore, the results for the consistent specification that is the fixed effects are reported in this study.
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Table 5.7. Fixed Effects Results for the Ml'Xl-Introducing Interaction
Terms for Firm Type and Policy Regime (Cont.)
DUMMY- DUMMY- DUMMY-High DUMMY-Less
Young (6) Old (7) Indebted (8) Indebted (9)
BRATE -0.008** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.018***
(2.37) (7.74) (6.81) (5.21)
BRA TE*DUMMY -0.041 *** 0.036*** -0.012* 0.014*
(6.12) (5.44) (1.82) (1.66)
RASSET 2.857*** 2.803*** 1.958*** 3.043***
(19.30) (18.30) (11.72) (19.76)
RASSET*DUMMY -0.376*** 0.346* 1.057*** -4.082***
(3.74) (l.95) (3.31 ) (10.43)
SCORE -0.473*** -0.454*** -0.323*** -0.499***
(110.32) (l01.95) (69.86) (118.86)
SCORE*DUMMY 0.033*** -0.041*** -0.201 *** 0.517***
(4.32) (4.87) (20.89) (48.50)
AGE 0.759*** 0.843*** 0.757*** 0.918***
(30.20) (33.39) (30.57) (36.45)
AGE*DUMMY 0.255*** -0.028 0.253*** -0.419***
(4.94) (0.79) (4.57) (8.08)
GEAR 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.069*** 0.011***
(39.61) (43.71) (83.49) (41.85)
GEAR*DUMMY -0.000 -0.003*** -0.063*** 0.563***
(0.66) (5.38) (72.18) (78.70)
COL 1.602*** 2.854*** -0.208 0.392
(2.68) (4.61) (0.33) (0.65)
COL*DUMMY -1.886** -7.301*** -1.313 -3.872***
(2.18) (6.53) (1.02) (2.82)
GDP -0.663*** -0.719*** -0.638*** -0.664***
(13.16) (l4.18) (l3.35) (13.52)
GDP*DUMMY -0.168* 0.142 0.150 0.248**
(1.66)- (l.40) (1.39) (2.50)
Constant 9.224*** 6.622*** 4.719*** 5.240***
-(7.30) (5.32) (3.96) (4.37)
Hausman Spec. Test 1,592*** 1,749*** 2477*** 2970***
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.24
..Absolute value of t statistics m parentheses, *slgmficant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; .. * significant at 1%
Numbers of firms and of observations are 15,491 and 123,422, respectively.
DUMMY represents dummy variables for tight period in column one and for finn types in the remaining
columns.
These dummies are interacted with explanatory variables.
The Hausman specification test has X2 distribution with k-J degrees of freedom where k denotes the number
of estimated coefficients in the regressions. The Hausman test results confirm that there is a systematic
difference between the coefficients obtained for the fixed effects and of random effects specifications.
Therefore, the results for the consistent specification that is the fixed effects are reported in this study.
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CHAPTER SIX
Financial Constraints, Inventories, and Employment in the UK
Manufacturing Industry
6.1. Introduction
Under perfect financial markets, the Modigliani and Miller theorem (the MM theorem)
states that the market value of a firm is independent of its financial position 1. However, a
growing number of theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the financial
positions of firms are important for their investment, and employment decisions under
imperfect financial markets" Theoretical and empirical evidence show that monetary or
productivity shocks may affect investment, and the employment activities of firms or
households, by changing their financial positions. The extent of the changes in investment
and employment as a result of external shocks depends very much on how these activities
are financed. In other words, the availability, cost and types (internal versus external,
bank versus market finance) of financial sources are crucial in the formation of
investment and employment decisions. This issue has been studied using the financial
accelerator framework (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996
and 1998)
Real or monetary shocks lead to changes in the balance sheets of firms, banks and
households under imperfect financial markets. More specifically, the balance sheet
channel of the transmission mechanism implies that a contractionary monetary policy
shock reduces the asset prices and cash flow, and in tum, deteriorates firms' financial
positions by changing the value of their collateral assets and thus weakening their
borrowing ability. In this framework, a change in the monetary stance affects the net
I See Modigliani and Miller (1958)
2 We use financial constraints and imperfect capital markets interchangeably.
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worth of firms and their investment decisions. The literature largely focuses on models
that explain fixed investment and inventories in this context.
In the neo-classical investment model, investment has often been assumed as a
function of firms' investment opportunities (profitability) and not their financial position.
However, models incorporating asymmetric information assert that a firm's investment is
a function of its net worth in addition to investment opportunities. In this context, a shock
to the financial position or net worth of firms may affect their investment decision. The
empirical difficulty here is to identify and distinguish variables that reflect investment
opportunities from those that are associated with a firm's financial position. For instance,
cash flow may reflect both firm profitability and financial constraints, thus profitability
needs to be controlled by other variables as in the Q model of investment.
The seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) tests empirically the
impact of financial constraints on the investment of firms by using cash flow as an
explanatory variable. The empirical research following Fazzari et al. (1988) uses some
financial variables in addition to traditional variables like sales, Tobin's q, the user cost of
capital and lags of the dependent variable in the investment models. Estimations based on
this type of models confirm a high sensitivity of investment of financially constrained
firms to a change in their cash flow. This suggests that a contractionary monetary shock
can affect investment through a worsening of the net worth positions of particular firms.
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) comment on Fazzari et al. (1988) and conclude
that high sensitivity of investment to cash flow should not necessarily be considered as an
indicator of financing constraints. They claim that there is no strong theoretical reason to
expect a monotonic relationship between cash flow sensitivity of investment and financial
constraint. In this chapter, we will adopt a theoretical and empirical framework that was
originated from the debate between Kaplan and Zingales (1997,2000) and Fazzari et al.
(1988,2000).
Under informational problems, monetary policy shocks are supposed to affect firms'
real activity by changing the composition of internal versus external finance, which are
not perfectly substitutable. The external finance premium is expected to rise for firms with
poor collateral as a result of an increase in the interest rates. Therefore, these firms are less
likely to have access to external funds relative to well-capitalized firms. In addition, the
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supply of bank loans may go down as money supply is squeezed. This leads to a shift
especially in the composition bank finance versus market finance that reflects information
about uniqueness of the bank loans.
Using aggregate data, Kashyap et a1. (1993) use the mix (the ratio of short term
bank debt to commercial papers plus short term bank debt) as an explanatory variable to
explain investment and thus to test the bank lending channel. In this study, we use a proxy
for the mix, the ratio of short-term debt to current liabilities, alongside other variables to
explain inventory investment and employment growths by using firm level data. On the
other hand, following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari et a1. (1988), we also use
cash flow as an explanatory variable in inventory investment and employment growth
equations in order to capture the importance of the net worth of firms for various firm
types.
In Chapter Five, we use a panel of over fifteen thousand UK manufacturing firm
records for the period of 1990-1999. We find out that the reactions of firms (in terms of
their mixes) with different risks, sizes, ages, and gearing level to monetary policy shocks
differ significantly across time periods which refer to various monetary policy regimes.
Based on this evidence, we estimate a variety of specifications for inventories and
employment models that consider the mix as an explanatory variable in addition to other
variables, which include the cumulative base rate (a proxy of the user cost of capital),
sales, cash flow etc. across finn groups. This helps to some extent to resolve the
identification problem originating from cash flow that contains information not only on
the degree of financial constraints but also on investment opportunities. We use the GMAf
procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for the determinants of inventory
investment and employment growths for the UK manufacturing industry.
The evidence shows that cyclical behaviour of output in the modem industrialized
economies is influenced very much by fluctuations in inventories. It is generally argued that
inventories (rather than fixed investment or employment) are more sensitive to changes in
the monetary policy stance or other external shocks because they are expected to have a low
adjustment cost. Therefore, they explain a large proportion of output fluctuations. Analysing
the reaction of inventory investment to monetary policy shocks provides valuable
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information to policy makers for managing aggregate demand.' We also estimate an
empirical model of employment growth in the framework of capital market imperfections to
test the impact of financial variables and to compare findings to those of inventory
investment that has a lower adjustment cost. It is expected that employment growth is less
sensitive to the monetary stance variable and other financial variables compared to
inventory investment growth.
In section two, we summarize the theoretical and empirical literature related to the
impact of monetary policy on investment under capital market imperfections. We
concentrate more on the cash flow hypothesis, which recently has been discussed very
often around the debate originated from Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) and Kaplan and
Zingales (1997, 2000). In section three, we briefly discuss the traditional theories on
inventory investment. In addition, we summarize the empirical studies that use the
financial position of firms to explain inventory investment and the employment behaviour
of firms, Section four is devoted to the empirical model, methodology, and data. In section
five, we provide the empirical results obtained by the GMM estimations for inventory
investment and employment growth rates. Finally, in section six, we provide some
concluding remarks.
6.2. Background Literature: Financial Constraints and Investment
6.2.1. Investment Models
Well-known models of investment are the accelerator, the nco-classical, the Q model" and
those using the Euler equations. Recent versions of investment models have introduced
strictly convex adjustment cost into firms' optimisation problem to solve for the optimum
levels of the capital stock and investment. This innovation in the profit function suggests
the notion of a slow adjustment of investment. Most empirical studies in this field have
introduced financial imperfections into the standard investment theories using the Q
3 Using annual data in the empirical analysis may prevent us to fully observe the reaction of inventories to a
change in the monetary policy because of the high volatility of inventory investment. High frequency data,
for example quarterly data would be more useful for this purpose, however, they are not available in UK
firm level data.
4 Based on this model, investment is estimated econometrically by using a proxy of Tobin's q as an
explanatory variable
S Clark (1979) provides a detailed comparison of investment models.
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model and the Euler equation approach. The variables that reflect the financial positions
of the firms (cash flow, debt-equity ratio, coverage ratio, liquid assets ratio, dividend
payout ratio etc.) can be added to analyse the impact of financial imperfections.
The basic theoretical framework for the adjustment cost model of investment is
given below by modifying the traditional neo-classical model. Consider a firm, whose
objective is to maximise the expected present value of the discounted flow of future
dividends, Dt+i,
(6.1)
where p is the discount factor and is equal to 1/(1+r) where r denotes the market interest
rate and
where profit, n, is a function of the capital stock, Kt. costlessly adjustable factors such as
labour, Lt. investment, It. profitability shock, Vt and technology shock. T. The adjustment
cost, C(.), is a function of the capital stock, investment and the technology shock. Pt
denotes the price of output, F(.) is the production function, Wt is the vector of prices for
variable inputs, P: is the price vector for capital goods, (Bt+l-BJ denotes net borrowing,
and rBt is the interest payment. The adjustment cost is assumed to be strictly convex in the
level of investment. The capital stock is a quasi-fixed factor while labour is a variable
factor. The profit is maximised subject to the adjustment cost function and a capital
accumulation equation, Kt+l=It+(J-8)Kt• (where 8 denotes the rate of capital
depreciation).
Maximising (6.1) subject to the profit function, the capital accumulation constraint,
and the adjustment cost function gives us the optimum levels of the capital stock and
investment.6 The constraining assumptions on dividends and borrowing enrich the
6 For the derivation details, different presentations of the theoretical model and its solutions see Blundell
Bond, and Meghir (1996), Hubbard (1998) and Saltari (2001). '
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model's implications. We are not going into the derivation details of this model. Using
the first order condition, the standard Q and the Euler equation can be derived. Tobin's q
is derived as;
(6.3)
Fazzari et al. (1988) use this theoretical framework and assume a quadratic functional
form for the adjustment cost
(6.4)
Substituting equation (6.4) into (6.3), we obtain the traditional Q model. That is:
I 1
_, =a+-(qt -l)+v,
Kt a
(6.5)
where Vt is a combination of profitability and technology shocks and the error terrn,
Econometric estimation of the model given in equation (6.5) faces two obstacles.
First, the marginal qh the increase in the value of the finn due to unit increase in
investment, is not observable, thus testing this equation can only be possible by finding a
proper proxy for the marginal qt. Most studies in this area including Fazzari et al. (1988)
use the average Tobin's qh that is defined as the market value of equity plus the book
value of total debt minus inventories divided by the replacement value of capital stock.
Second, the model given in equation (6.5) does not capture financial imperfections, which
imply that internal finance is cheaper than external finance. Empirical studies like Fazzari
et al. (1988) add variables that reflect the net worth of firms in order to account for
market imperfections. Cash flow is a commonly used variable to capture the impact of
financial imperfections across finn groups. Cash flow (or other liquid assets) acts not only
as a proxy for net worth that reduces the premium on the external finance, but also gives
information about the extent of investment that can be financed by internal funds. Since
internal finance is less costly than external finance, an increase in internal funds or cash
flow would lead to a higher investment.
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It S, A A 5: CF t
-=a+ p,-+ t-'2R+t-'3Qt+u--+vt
Kt Kt Kt
(6.6)
where S denotes sales as the accelerator theory proposes, R is the user cost of capital
consistent with neo-classical investment theory, CF" denotes cash flow, often defined as
the sum of net income plus capital stock depreciation. The coefficients PI, PJ, and 0 are
positive. Firms with higher expected sales, higher market value relative to their
replacement cost and high net worth are going to invest more. However, the coefficient
for the user cost of capital that is a cost item, is expected to be negative.
The cash flow may also contain information about expected profitability. Unless
variables, which reflect expected profitability like Tobin's q, are used alongside cash flow
to explain investment, there will be an identification problem where cash flow conveys
information both on expected profitability and the extent of financial imperfections.
Therefore, empirical studies may fail to identify the impact of financial constraints on
investment. In the Q model, it is the marginal Tobin's q (the ratio of market value of
additional investment goods to their replacement cost) that reflects the expected
profitability of investment for additional investment. Empirical studies in this research
area generally use the average Tobin's q as a proxy for expected profitability because it is
easily observable contrary to the marginal Tobin's q. However, the average Tobin's q can
only replace the marginal Tobin's q if the market is perfectly competitive with a constant
return to scale technology (Hayashi, 1982). Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use an
alternative proxy for expected marginal profits to solve this empirical problem in the Q
model.
The Euler equation approach is formulated from the same maximisation problem
from which the Q model is derived but it avoids relying on measures of profitability or
investment opportunities that are based on firms' market value, namely Tobin's q. The
Euler equation is superior to the Q model. The Euler equation is derived directly from the
first order conditions of the model defined above and the investment opportunities are
directly based on the estimation of future dividends. These studies generally employ the
GMM panel data estimation procedure and the impact of monetary policy is tested in this
context by looking at the elasticity of the user cost of capital, or liquidity indicators (Bond
and Meghir, 1994; Guariglia and Schiantarelli, 1998).
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The impact of monetary policy on investment is generally analysed by dividing
samples into groups in terms of size, age, liquidity, rating, profitability, dividend etc.
Asymmetrical effects of a change in the monetary stance on various firm groups can be
interpreted as evidence for the credit channel. Heterogeneous reactions of firms to their
respective cash flow can be observed by classifying them as more constrained or less
constrained according to their internal sources, dividend payout ratio, affiliation,
indebtedness, bond ratings, access to bank or market finance, size, age etc. Recently,
auto-regressive distributed lag models have been employed to explain investments based
on the variables that reflect the user cost of capital, firm's liquidity or cash flow, lags of
dependent variables and sales. (Chirinko, Fazzari and Myer, 1999; vonKalckreuth, 2001;
Chatelain et al., 2001; Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). The empirical model in this
framework is generally specified in the following form:
(6.7)
where VC;" represent the user cost of capital, A;, 111and f) I.; denote time invariant
individual effects, time effects and an error term, respectively.
6.2.2. The Cash Flow-Investment Sensitivity
The analysis so far in this thesis implies that the firm characteristics associated with the
financial structures of firms determine their external finance premiums and thus their
investment patterns. A monetary policy shock is supposed to affect the extent of
informational problems associated with the financial transactions between lenders and
borrowers. This affects the net worth or collateral level of borrowers and the composition
of bank and market finance by changing the demand structure of borrowers as well as the
supply behaviour of banks and other lenders. This theoretical framework has been tested
empirically by using cash flow in the investment equation as a variable representing the
financial position of firms.
Fazzari et al. (1988) investigate the impact of financial constraints on corporate
investment. This study suggests that transaction costs, tax advantages, agency problems,
and costs of financial distress and asymmetric information are the main reasons for
differentiation between the cost of internal finance and external finance. Based on
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theoretical studies, like Myers and Majluf (1984), it assumes that investment decisions are
in accord with the hierarchy of finance where firms prefer the least costly finance, which
implies that they prefer internal finance to external finance. Availability of internal
finance allows firms to undertake investments without paying a premium on external
finance. The extent of this premium is negatively related with the internal cash flow, or
the net worth position.
Fazzari et al. (1988) classify firms according to their financial positions to
investigate the impact of cash flow on investment. The investment equation is estimated
by taking into account the role of internal finance when markets are imperfect and by
following theoretical models of investment, namely the Q model, the neo-classical, and
the sales accelerator model. Empirical estimations based on these theoretical models
confirm a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow. In other words, the impact of cash
flow on investments is strong, especially for financially constrained firms. This result
suggests that contractionary monetary shocks may affect firms' investment through a
worsening of their balance sheet positions, which are manifested in cash flow.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) comment on Fazzari et al. (1988) and conclude that the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow should not necessarily be considered as an indicator
of financing constraints. They claim that there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a
monotonic relationship between a cash flow sensitivity of investment and financing
constraints. They found that the investment of less financially constrained firms exhibits
significantly greater sensitivity to cash flow than the one of more financially constrained
firms.
A simplified single period model is constructed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
where the demand for investment (/) and capital are identical; by using this model they
uncover a theoretical foundation of the investment cash-flow sensitivity. Firms choose the
level of investment to maximize profit given the production function, F(l),where the first
derivative with respect to investment satisfies FlI»O and the second derivative satisfies
FJ/<O. Investment can be financed by internal funds Ut') and external funds (E), I = W+E.
The opportunity cost of internal fund is r. Since the capital depreciates in just one period,
the user cost of capital is 1+r, when investment is not higher than the amount of internal
funds. The cost of external funds depend on the amount of external funds as well as the
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wedge between internal and external funds that increases with the extent of informational,
and agency cost problems. The cost function, C(E, k) is assumed to be a convex function
of external finance and an exogenously determined external finance premium, k. The first
and the second derivatives of the cost function with respect to external finance are greater
than zero, CdE»O, and CEE>O.
The firm maximizes the following profit function:
Max[F(J)-C(E,k)- (1+r)I)J wherel=W+E (6.7)
The f.o.c is given by,
FJ(I) = 1+r+ Cdl- W, k) (6.8)
The external finance premium is zero if J ~ W and it is positive if J > W then the
solution for the marginal product of investment is:
FJ(I) = l+r, if 1 ~ Wand
FlJ) = 1+ r + CdE, k), if I> W, where CdE, k) > 0 (6.9)
The effect of internal finance on investment can be obtained by implicit differentiation of
equation (6.8)
_01__ CEE > 0
oW CEE -FI/
(6.10)
where the assumption of imperfect capital market holds. This derivative is equal to zero if
capital market is perfect since in that case CEE = O.
The sensitivity of investment to the exogenously determined external finance premium, is
given by:
01 - C Ek
-=--~-<O
ok CEE - Fl/ (6.11)
where the marginal cost of external finance is increasing in k, Cn > O. Therefore,
investment in imperfect markets is positively correlated with the internal finance but
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negatively correlated with the external finance premium that is assumed to be determined
by the extent of informational and incentive problems that individual firms encounter. It
is implicitly assumed that firms are financially constrained at various degrees depending
on their net worth and informational problems. The empirical research in this area
classifies firms according to the severity of their constraints in order to test their
investment sensitivities to cash flow. Before going into this literature, in Figure 6.1, we
show a graphical presentation of the model discussed above.'
Marginal
cost
S2B
(l+rT)+kB
(l+rT)+kA
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Figure 6.1: Investment, internal funds and asymmetric information
The figure shows supply and demand functions of investment. It is assumed that
any change in investment opportunity will shift the demand curve, D. The MM theorem
implies that the supply function, S, is horizontal at (l +r) that is, there is no difference
between internal and external finance in terms of cost. The intersection of the demand
curve and the horizontal supply function, So, determines Jorgenson's investment (desired
capital stock) level, la. The amount of investment would still be the same when firms
finance their investment projects entirely by using internal funds. However, since firms
may own limited amount of internal funds, they need external funds for their investment
7 Adopted from Hubbard (1998).
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projects. Contrary to the MM theorem, under capital market imperfections the external
finance is more costly. Lenders have less information than firms (borrowers) about the
projects' default risk, thus they tend to ask a high return from lending to capture the
default risk, i.e. the rate charged is higher than the risk free rate (the difference is external
finance premium).
Initially, firms are assumed to have an amount of average internal funds, WI and the
difference between investment and internal funds, 11-WI is financed by external funds. If
macroeconomic conditions and financial positions of firms are relatively supportive for
investment, the risk-free interest rate, r, and the external finance premium, kl, would be
relatively low. A contractionary monetary policy would change the macroeconomic
conditions, that is, the risk free interest rate increases. This also affects the financial
positions of firms by deteriorating the extent of informational asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers, and therefore the external finance premium increases and
eventually the supply function shifts. We show the supply function of relatively less
constrained firms by S2A and more constrained firms by S2B. Relatively more constrained
firms are going to end up with relatively less internal resources, WB and investment, le.
There are two reasons for the low investment in this case: firstly, internal funds for more
constrained firms decline more sharply than their internal funds for less constrained firms,
and secondly, the extent of informational asymmetries is more serious for constrained
firms.
This argument assumes that the steepness of the supply function depends on the
availability and cost of external finance - either bank finance or other forms of finances.
Evidence shows that firms with relatively good track records, large assets, high credit
ratings have relatively flatter supply functions and lower external finance premiums.
Similarly, firms that have close relationships with banks or other non-financial firms and
get access to bank loans, have a relatively flatter supply function than the firms that
cannot have access to bank finance because this lessens the extent of informational
asymmetries, and as a result the potential external finance premiums for these firms. If a
firm has access to market finance, however, it would pay a limited external finance
premium that is close to zero. Apparently this is less than the external finance premium
paid by a firm that does not have access to market finance but it has access to bank
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finance. There are alternative sources of finance for firms that can not have access to bank
finance, such as venture capital or trade credit but these funds are more costly.
The empirical literature considers both the cross-section and time series data and
splits firms into less constrained and more constrained based on the availability and cost
of external finance. Variables representing internal funds such as cash flow or the
coverage ratio are often used among the explanatory variables to test the indirect impact
of monetary policy on the investment behaviours of firms in this literature. The criteria
for splitting firms are supposed to reflect the extent of the potential external finance
premium.f This empirical literature predicts that the investment decisions of firms that are
financially constrained are more sensitive to changes in internal funds. Monetary policy is
one of the disturbances, which affects the level of internal funds of firms. Therefore, any
change in monetary policy is going to be more effective on the activity of firms whose
investment decisions are more responsive to internal funds.
In the theoretical model presented above, the slope of the supply function is given
by CEE and the slope of demand function by FI/. The larger the slope of the supply
function (more constrained firms) and the lower the slope of the demand function in
absolute terms the higher will be the investment sensitivity to a change in internal funds.
According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the proposition that the investment of more
constrained firms have high cash flow sensitivities relative to less constrained firms, may
be valid only if dlldWis monotonically decreasing in W(or increasing with respect to k).
That is;
a2 I == (Fm _ C EEE) C EE 2 F" 2 < 0
aw2 FIl2 CEE2 (CEE _F,,)3
(6.12)
This condition depends on the curvatures of the cost and the production functions;
the term in brackets is negative if the third derivative of the production function is
negative, given a quadratic cost function. If this condition does not hold, the cash flow
sensitivity of investment increases with firms' internal sources. By using the single period
8 For example Fazzari et al. (1988) use the dividend payout ratio to split firms as constrained or not Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) use size for the same reason. '
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model given above, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) conclude that the investment-cash flow
sensitivities do not necessarily increase with the degree of financial constraints. Figure
6.2 shows two different firm groups that have different levels of internal funds, WL, WHo
In the first panel, the slope of the supply function is constant, CEEE=O and the demand
function is convex, FlJ[>O. This implies that the investment of firms with lower internal
funds is less sensitive to a change in internal finance, i.e. the derivative in equation (6.12)
is positive. Similarly, in the second panel of the Figure 6.2, where the demand function
has a constant slope, Fm=O and the supply function is concave, CEEE < 0, the investment
of firms with high internal funds is also more sensitive to a change in internal funds.
Therefore, the hypothesis that the investment of financially constrained firms is more
sensitive to internal funds is not necessarily valid.
Fazzari et al. (2000) comment on Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and claim that
since the split criterion is not cash flow, there is no need to check the second derivative of
investment with respect to internal finance given in equation (6.12). A larger slope for the
supply function of more constrained firms (eEl) compared to that of unconstrained firms
(eEl) is a sufficient condition for the financially constrained firms' investment to be
more sensitive to cash flow than that of financially unconstrained firms. Figure 6.3 shows
that the investment of financially constrained firms is more sensitive to a change in
internal funds than those of unconstrained in those cases where both firm groups have the
same level of internal funds.
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Figure 6.2: Investment-cash flow sensitivity and the shape of production and cost
functions
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Kaplan and Zingales (2000), however, argue that the condition forwarded by
Fazzari et al. (2000) is not sufficient for reaching the conclusion that the investment of
financially constrained firms is more sensitive to a change in internal funds. That is, the
sensitivity of investment to internal finance with respect to an increase in the external
finance premium, k, may increase or decrease depending on the curvature of the cost and
production functions of the firms. The monotonicity condition proposed by Fazzari et al.
(1988, 2000) is valid only if the derivative in (6.13) is positive. That is, firms with higher
k have a higher slope of the external finance curve, CEEk>0, and F/l is the same across
firms otherwise the derivatives would be negative depending on the form of production
and cost functions.
a
2I _ CEEk
2
p/ -CEEkCEEFl/ +CEkCEEEFl/-CEkCEEFm s 0
akaW (CEE _pl/)3 ~
(6.13)
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Figure 6.3: Investment-cash flow sensitivity and the degree of 'financial imperfections
Cleary (1999) finds evidence supporting Kaplan and Zingalcs (1997) by splitting
us firms according to their creditworthiness that reflects financial constraints. His study
uses a larger sample and verifies the results reached by Kaplan and Zingalcs (1997). It is
found that the investment decisions of firms are very sensitive to the availability of
internal funds in general but less creditworthy firms are relatively less sensitive to internal
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funds. Similarly, Gomes (2001) claims that testing the extent of the financial imperfection
may be misleading when using cash flow. According to Gomes (2001), the studies that
find evidence supporting the hypothesis of investment monotonicity are subject to a
measurement error in Tobin's q and an identification problem concerning it. Gomes
(2001) finds that in case of liquidity constraints, investment is sensitive to cash flow if
one ignores Tobin's q. This paper also finds evidence that cash flow explains investment
significantly even in the absence of financial frictions. Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick
(1998) use a sample of six OECD countries and support the results forwarded by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) and others by splitting firms in terms of size. They find evidence that
the investment of small firms, which are known to have less access to external finance are
generally less sensitive to cash flow than the investment of large firms. They conclude
that the degree of sensitivity of a firm's investment to its cash flow cannot be considered
as measure of the extent of the firm's financial constraint.
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) provide evidence on the debate between Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari et al. (1988) and support the conclusions of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) by using a sample of overwhelmingly fragile firms. It
is found that the investment of those firms having negative cash flow is not sensitive to
cash flow. However, excluding such firms from the sample increases the investment
sensitivity of more constrained firms to cash flow. This result confirms Fazzari et al.
(1988) and the theoretical evidence forwarded by Povel and Raith (2002). Allayannis and
Mozumdar (2004) also claim that the investment sensitivity of firms to cash flow declines
in periods 1987-1996 relative to the period 1977-1986 for the US corporate sector
because of the decline in the extent of informational problems in recent years.
Povel and Raith (2002) construct a model in which the relationship between
investment and internal funds can be negative, positive, or undetermined depending on
the level of internal funds at given degrees of asymmetric information. Povel and Raith
(2002) point out that the degree of a firm's financial constraints depends both on the
extent of capital market imperfections (where external finance premium is determined
endogenously by the model), and the level of the firm's internal funds. They show that
these two measures of financial constraints have different implications for the firm's
investment. With more asymmetric information, a high k, investment becomes more
sensitive to changes in the internal finance. In their microeconomic model, they show that
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the optimal scalable investment is a U-shaped function of the firm's level of internal
funds: an increase in internal funds leads to an increase in investment if the level of
internal funds is sufficiently high but it leads to a decline in investment if its level is very
low. Financial indebtedness may lead to negative internal funds but the firm may still
have positive net worth that includes also the firm's marketable collateral. Therefore, a
rise in the level of internal funds is used for the repayment of debt rather than new
investment projects and a further decline in internal finance may encourage firms to
invest more with the expectation that the revenue from this investment will exceed the
cost.
The solid line in Figure 6.4 summarizes the basic findings of the model where the
financial contract used is debt.9 It is assumed that a higher investment incurs a larger cost
effect (borrowing cost) relative to the revenue from investment when the internal funds
are high. At sufficiently high level of internal funds, W> fV, a decline in the internal
funds is going to lead to a rise in the cost of initial level investment thus the firm avoids
this cost by reducing its investment level dlldW>O. However, at a sufficiently negative
internal funds level, W< W where financial fixed costs and debt payments are higher than
income, as internal funds decline, the revenue effect of an additional unit of investment
dominates the cost effect (lower marginal cost of investment relative to the marginal
revenue) thus investment is going to increase, d//dW<O. The sensitivity of investment to
internal funds will be less important if internal funds arc close to JV, that is, if the
investment function is nearly flat, dI / dW == O. In the Kaplan-Zingales's model, a firm's
cash flow-investment sensitivity depends on the shape of production and cost functions
while in this model, the sensitivity is independent from the shape of the production
function but it is associated with the nature of the debt relationship between firms and
investors that gives rise to the U-shaped investment function.
The model has also implications for the investment under vanous degree of
asymmetric information problem when introducing an uncertainty factor about the firm's
9 A firm that wishes to invest in a project may require funds from an outside investor if its internal funds are
insufficient. The return from the investment is stochastic, thus unobservable to the borrower and the lender.
To en~orce repayment,. the investor can be.threa~ened to liquidate the firm's assets. Therefore, the optimal
financial arrangement IS the debt contract In which the firm promises to repay a certain amount and the
default is followed by liquidation.
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future profit. The dotted line in Figure 6.4 shows the investment function of the firm with
a high degree of informational problems. As the informational problems becomes more
severe, the curve becomes steeper almost everywhere, i.e. investment become more
sensitive to a change in internal funds. Therefore, an increase in market imperfections
tends to strengthen the investment cash flow sensitivity, except at the level of internal
funds where the curve is nearly flat and thus the sensitivity is limited.
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Figure 6.4: Investment and cas" flow: a/lowing for negative internal funds
This study contributes to the debate on the cash flow hypothesis where it is argued
that firms with relatively limited internal funds invest less in order to avoid the high cost
incurred by borrowing external funds. The levels of internal funds and external finance
premium determines the degree of financial constraints. Therefore, it is argued that more
financially constrained firms are going to be more sensitive to variations in the available
internal funds. Investment of unconstrained or less constrained firms should depend on
their expected profits or investment opportunities. The criteria of splitting the sample are
central to this hypothesis. If samples are split into groups by using measures that reflect
the degree of asymmetric information, the firms with positive and moderate internal funds
level are going to have a high investment-cash flow sensitivity compared to the group of
firms that are subject to severe informational problems. On the contrary, if splitting
measures are based on the internal funds or net worth, since the investment curve is U-
shaped it is difficult to derive implications about the investment-cash flow sensitivity
across groups. The investment of a group of firms whose internal funds are in the range
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OfT ,0) is going to be less sensitive to a change in the internal funds than the other group
whose internal funds are positive, and the slope of their investment function therefore is
steeper.
The studies discussed above implicitly assume that there are no quantity restrictions
on external finance; external finance is available with varying external finance premiums
across firms and time. In real life, however, firms often face credit rationing: quantity
restrictions may be as important as the external finance premium for the corporate sector
activity. In fact, Greenwald, Siglitz and Weiss (1984) claim that the availability of
external finance rather than its cost is what really limits corporate investment. Almeida
and Campello (2002) develop a model in which the relationship between investment
demand and cash flow is considered when firms face credit rationing. This study predicts
that the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases with the financial constraints so long
as firms are not entirely unconstrained and when investment and external finance arc
endogenously related. As we have shown in Chapter Five, during a tight period of
monetary policy the reduction in the mix, especially for more financially constrained
firms, is more substantial. It is suspected that this variable conveys some information
about potential credit rationing.
6.3. Inventory Investment, Employment and Cash Flow
6.3.1. Inventory Investment and Cash Flow: Theory
The traditional theories on inventory investment hardly support the observed empirical
evidence and therefore new models of inventory investment have been adopted
accordingly to explain the observed facts. During the last decade, it has been noticed that
inventory investment has played a central role for business cycle fluctuations, especially
in recessions (Blinder and Maccini, 1991). Recent empirical literature incorporates
financial imperfections into inventory investment parallel to the case for fixed investment
(See Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994; Carpenter, Fazzari,
and Petersen, 1994 and 1998 for the US corporate sector and Guariglia and Schiantarelli,
1998; Guariglia, 1999 and 2000; Small, 2000 for the UK corporate sector). This area of
research on inventories goes beyond the standard theoretical model of inventory
behaviour in order to uncover a consistent relation between theory and data. We will
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summarize the theories on inventory investment and discuss recent theoretical work and
empirical evidence on the role of monetary policy within the framework of the financial
accelerator theory.
Macroeconomic and micro economic views on inventories have conflicting
implications. The former sees inventories as a destabilizing factor that causes cycles
while the latter considers inventories as stabilizing for productive activity. One of the
well-known theories on inventory investment is based on the production-smoothing
model. This model has provided the microeconomic foundations for further research on
the behaviour of inventories over the business cycle. The intuition behind this model is
that firms adjust inventories to minimize their costs as demand conditions change. This
model adopts the convex cost function as in the case of fixed investment models. Firms in
this model tend to reduce the fluctuations in their production to minimize costs.
Therefore, this model predicts lower volatility in production than in sales.
A firm is going to maximize the following long-term discounted values of profit.
cc
MaxEoLP'(p/S/-C/)
1=0
subject to
c, =YIY, +Y2y,2 +Y3N;
!IN = f, - S, and N ~ 0 (6.14)
where Eo, P" PI S" C" flo and N, denote the expectation conditional on information at
time zero, discount factor, commodity prices, sales, cost function, output and inventory
stock at time period t, respectively. The cost function satisfies the following conditions
YI, Y2>O and Y3 ~ O. The discount factor is equal to (111 +r) and it is between zero and one
where r is the constant interest rate. In this model, prices and sates are determined
exogenously. Therefore, the profit maximization problem defined above can be
reformulated as a cost minimization problem subject to the same constraints.
'"
MinEoLP'C,
,=0
(6.15)
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The model allows for a smaller variance for output relative to sales if the cost
function is sufficiently convex and the discount factor is not too small. As demand
conditions change, firms tend to adjust inventories to minimize costs and therefore they
exhibit production-smoothing behaviour. In other words, firms will have an incentive to
produce a surplus when sales are low and use this surplus to keep their output fluctuations
at a moderate level when sales are high. On the other hand, if sales are stochastic, the
response of firms to an unexpected increase in sales will be to reduce inventories and
increase production. If the firm must make its production decision before observing sales
shocks, then the increase in the sales is met completely by a decline in inventories. This
inventory behaviour of firms is generally referred to the buffer-stock motive.
The production-smoothing model makes two predictions: the vanance of sales
exceeds the variance of output and inventory investment and output move in opposite
directions. However, empirical findings for US industry level data do not confirm this
theory: output is found to be more variable than sales and output and inventory
investment move in the same direction (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Blanchard, 1983).
Although some other research suggests that these findings result from measurement errors
and data aggregations, new theoretical approaches appear to resolve this discrepancy
between theory and observed facts, as we shall explain.
Fitzgerald (1997) classifies the modified production-smoothing models that were
developed in response to the empirical findings into three groups: adding cost shocks,
adding target inventory level and adding non-convexities in technology. Adding time
varying cost shocks to the cost function given above, explains theoretically why
production could be more volatile than sales. Specifically, the new version of the cost
function after adding the cost shock parameter, If/t, can be written as:
(6.16)
Monetary policy shocks are included in this framework because they affect the cost
function of firms. In addition, since firms with different financial structure react
differently to these shocks, analysis with a disaggregated sample would be more
informative in this respect.
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Adding a target inventory level to the cost function leads to the following cost
function:
(6.17)
The target level of inventory investment that minimizes the cost function is assumed to be
proportional to sales, as,. Additional inventory investment increases holding costs but it
reduces the cost of stocking out or backlogging orders. An unexpected increase in the
sales for a given level of production can be met by a reduction in inventories. In the next
period, the firm can respond by increasing production to meet higher expected sales as
well as to restore inventories to the targeted level. In this case, output and inventories are
positively correlated and the volatility of production exceeds that of sales. These
theoretical implications are derived within a framework of a stockout avoidance motive of
inventory accumulation (Lovell, 1961; Kahn, 1987; Maccini and Zabel, 1996).
Most of empirical research in this field uses the inventory stock adjustment
equation derived by Lovell (1961). Following Lovell (1961), it is assumed that the actual
stock of inventories depends on the planned stock of inventories (lI) and unanticipated
changes in sales.
(6.18)
Et-ISi/ is the expected value of sales at the beginning of period t. The targeted stock of
inventories is modelled by using a standard stock adjustment equation.
(6.19)
N~represents the target stock for firm i at time t. Ni,I_1 is the actual stock of inventories at
the beginning of period t. A is the adjustment speed parameter of inventories. By
combining equation (6.18) and equation (6.l9), the inventory investment for finn i at
period t can be formulated as follows,
(6.20)
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Inventory investment depends on the difference between the targeted inventory
stock and the actual stock of inventories at the beginning of period and the unexpected
change in sales. The target level of inventories is modelled as a linear function of
expected sales
(6.21)
where a is constant and P is the accelerator effect. Finns' targeted level of inventory
increases with expected sales. Therefore, production adjusts to accumulate inventories
and to meet increased sales so that the firm avoids stockout. On the other hand, the
expected sales are modelled in the following form:
(6.22)
where 77gives information about the expectation of firms. If it is negative, firms over-
estimate sales when sales increase over time, and they underestimate sales when sales
decrease. Therefore, in that case the business cycles will be amplified by firm
expectations. Combining these equations into an inventory investment equation, we get
inventory investment in terms of observed variables:
(6.23)
This model has an empirically testable form and it can be extended by adding financial
variables, firm specific fixed effects, time effects and others. Later in this section, we will
extend our discussion by focusing on the empirical research that studies the inventory
investment within the framework of financial imperfections.
The third modification in the production smoothing model is to adopt non-
convexities in technology. This approach implies that as output increases the cost of
production declines, i.e. decreasing marginal cost. The parameter, n would be negative
in the cost function given in (6.14). Under this assumption, in some periods, firms tend to
increase output to lower their costs, while in some other periods, low output leads to a
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high marginal cost. Therefore, firms would minimize their costs by bunching production
rather than smoothing it. The evidence on decreasing marginal costs is mixed.
An alternative approach to the production smoothing models family is the (S,s)
model which focuses on the timing of deliveries rather than the timing of production. If
inventories fall to the level of s, the firm reacts by increasing them to the optimal level, S.
In the range of (S,s), the firm does not intend to change inventories. The model assumes
that the cost of acquiring goods is made up of a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost.
The marginal cost represents shipment costs, which are assumed to be a constant function
of ordering and ordering also requires a fixed cost. High fixed costs imply a large optimal
lot size, S-s, thus less frequent shipments. Even when sales are constant, the shipments
will change between zero and optimal lot size, thus the volatility of production will be
higher than that of sales. Even in the case of variable sales this result may hold.
Early studies including Blinder (1981) and Caplin (1985) provide evidence that
(S,s) models explain the fact that the production is more volatile compared to sales.
Caballero and Engel (1991) study the aggregate dynamics of (S,s) inventory behaviour in
details. Recently, Fisher and Hornstein (1997) provide a general-equilibrium framework
in which the aggregate implications of the (S,s) model. By using this framework, they
find evidence supporting the empirical observations over the business cycles. More
specifically, they claim that polices have little impact on the propagation and
amplification of productivity shocks but they contribute substantially to the amplification
of demand shocks.
6.3.2. Inventory Investment and Cash Flow: Empirical Research
Many empirical studies tend to combine the traditional inventory models and the
asymmetric information framework that is consistent with the investment cash flow
hypothesis. These studies have investigated the role of financial frictions for the inventory
decisions of firms. They emphasize that inventory decisions play an important role in
business cycle fluctuations. Firms respond to the variations in financial or
macroeconomic conditions by changing inventory investment to overcome the difficulties
in their cash management. Negative inventory investment provides the source of liquidity
in case of difficulties faced in borrowing from external credit markets because the
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adjustment cost of inventory investment (more specifically for work-in-process and raw
material inventories) is lower than that of the other investment and spending items. The
literature in this field supports that inventory investment of more constrained firms in the
credit market is more sensitive to adverse monetary shocks.
Since public information is less available on small, young and financially weak
firms, they are more likely to encounter greater informational asymmetries that lead to
severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Such firms rely heavily on bank debt
and rarely issue corporate bonds or commercial paper. Bank debt may be the only way of
recovering the losses in liquidity and internal finance as a result of adverse external
shocks. Evidence shows that the volume of short-term credits and of internal funds
decline during the recessions. Short-term external funds are not generally sufficient to
offset the reduction of internal funds and therefore the economic activities of firms
including inventory investment are expected to fall during these periods. We summarize a
number of empirical studies that incorporate financial constraints into inventory decisions
of firms.
Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) have been influential in establishing a link
between monetary policy and inventory investment and first to provide micro-level
evidence to support the bank-lending channel of monetary transmission. Their study uses
the Federal Funds rate, the prime rate-commercial paper rate spread and real M2 as
indicators of the monetary policy stance and gives a brief history of US monetary policy
during the recessions 1974-1975 and 1981-1982. Inventory investment is explained by
using the inventory-sales ratio, sales growth, the ratio of cash plus marketable securities
to total asset as an indicator of liquidity, a dummy variable that indicates the access of
firms to the bond market and industry dummies corresponding to two-digit SIC codes to
control for the non-financial determinants of inventories. An interaction term controls
how liquidity affects inventory investment differently for firms with bond rating and
firms without it.1OThe evidence shows that the inventory investment of firms without
access to the bond market is more liquidity constrained during tight monetary periods.
10 We use a similar specification in our estimations in this study.
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Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) analyse the response of small versus large
manufacturing firms to monetary policy. The aim is to find evidence on the importance of
the financial propagation mechanism for aggregate activity as a result of monetary
shocks. Monetary policy affects firms directly and indirectly. In the first stage, a rise in
interest rates weakens balance sheets by increasing short-term interest payment (reducing
cash flow) and lowering the value of collateral assets. This constrains the borrowers'
spending including inventory investment. The balance sheet of the firm will further
deteriorate after an initial drop of firms' spending. In other words, financial factors will
affect the real activities with a lag after a policy shift. Empirical evidence for the US
economy shows that the decline in the credit volume and economic activity occurs within
6-9 months following a tight monetary policy.
Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994) investigate the impact of changes in internal
finance or net worth on the firm's inventory investment behaviour given imperfections in
capital markets. Their study employs quarterly panel data and the estimations include
both fixed firm effects and industry time dummies, to control for non-financial shocks to
technology or costs. The evidence shows that the variations in inventory investment can
explain a significant proportion of the change in output during recessions. In fact, the
fluctuation in internal finance is one of the main reasons for changes in inventory
investment. Capital market imperfections may limit firms' access to external finance and
lead to fluctuations in all type of investments including inventories. Inventories are
considered as a buffer stock to smooth production. Firms can rearrange their inventories
easily because of their lower adjustment cost relative to other investment forms, such as
fixed investment or research and development. Financial firms will seek to equate the
marginal returns on different investment.
The inventory investment literature has also different implications for disaggregated
inventory investment, namely finished goods inventories, raw material inventories and
work in progress. Carpenter et al. (1994) observe that raw materials and work-in-process
inventories are much more volatile relative to finished goods inventories. A firm can
readily disinvest a portion of its raw materials stock by consuming the inventory without
making new orders, to mitigate the impact of financial constraints.
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Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998) find new evidence supporting the
importance of financing constraints for inventory investment. Financial variables like
coverage ratio, cash stock and cash flow as measures of financing constraints, were
extensively used in previous research. This study uses these variables and compares the
statistical results for inventory investment equation by means of an identical high-
frequency (quarterly) firm panel sample. The main finding of this study is that the results
with cash flow are more successful in explaining inventories compared to those with cash
stock, and coverage ratio across firm size, inventory cycles and manufacturing sectors in
the US.
Small (2000) uses a panel of UK manufacturing firms to test whether the effect of
cash flow on inventory investment reflect the presence of financially constrained firms. A
number of criteria are employed to determine the financial condition of firms including
the dividend payout ratio used by Bond and Meghir (1994). A panel of 527 firms for the
period of 1977-1994 is used to carry out the estimation based on the GMM procedure
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The main finding is that there is no unique
criterion for identifying financially constrained firms using financial information from
company accounts. This study emphasizes that cash flow also affects the inventory
investments of unconstrained firms based on different criteria such as firm size or
coverage ratio. Small (2000) concludes that cash flow affects inventory investments of
both constrained and unconstrained firms. This may be due to the exclusion of the key
variables that reflect expectation about future demand. However, this does not explain
why cash flow has a larger impact on the inventory investments of financially constrained
firms than on unconstrained firms. Different criteria did not reduce the impact of cash
flow on the inventory investments of financially unconstrained firms.
Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1998) use a linear quadratic model to test the role of
firm heterogeneity and financial constraints on inventory investment in the UK
manufacturing industries by using panel data techniques for the period 1980-1991. By
adding new components into the cost function defined above, the Euler equation is
derived to explain the inventory investment empirically. The evidence does not support
the production-smoothing theory even when firms are partitioned into groups reflecting
the degree of financial constraints.
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Guariglia (2000) extends the linear quadratic model to create a direct theoretical
link between inventory investment and capital market imperfections and to allow the
testing of the effects of financial constraints on inventory investment. This study also
estimates the Euler equation derived from the model and provides empirical evidence that
financial factors have strong effects on the inventory investment of financially
constrained firms by using a panel of UK manufacturing firm for the period 1980-91.
Inventories are more sensitive to monetary shocks while they are less sensitive to real
interest rates. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that in a world of imperfect
capital markets, interest rates generally affect inventory investments indirectly through
the credit channel. Tight monetary policy causes the financial performance of firms to
deteriorate by decreasing cash flow (by increasing interest expense and reducing
consumer expenditures), and collateralisable net worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In
the case of imperfect capital markets, the premium on external funds increases as a result
of a worsening of the internal fund stock and the increasing demand for external funds. A
contractionary monetary policy affects the borrowing performance of firms, which have
relatively weak balance sheet positions (more constrained) due to an increase in the
interest rates in the credit market. Therefore, they reduce investments and general
economic activities following an immediate reduction in the raw material inventory
investments (Carpenter et al. 1994).
Guariglia (1999) uses Lovell's target adjustment model to test the inventories
behaviour in UK manufacturing firms for the period 1968-1991. This paper employs
different categories of inventories (total, raw material and work-in-process) and different
criteria of splitting firms into more and less constrained by using coverage ratio, leverage
ratio and the ratio of short-term debt to sales in order to test the impact of coverage ratio
and cash flow on different categories of inventories. Cycle dummies are also used to
capture the impact of tight monetary periods. The evidence supports the proposition that
inventory investment of financially weak firms is more sensitive to financial variables,
and the degree of sensitivity increases during recession or tight monetary policy periods.
6.3.3. Employment and Financial Constraints
The empirical literature that studies the role of financial constraints for economic activity
is mainly concentrated on the area of fixed investment and inventory accumulation. A
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limited number of studies pay attention to the impact of financial constraints on the
employment behaviour of corporate firms. It is generally believed that the cost of
adjustment for employment is higher than that of inventory or fixed investment over the
business cycles. Hiring, training and firing employees involves substantial cost for firms
and the existence of such costs especially for skilled employees make firms dampen
fluctuations in the employment compared to cyclical fluctuations in their output or
investment. This behaviour pattern is commonly referred to as labour hoarding.
However, during the recessionary periods, financially more constrained, small or highly
indebted firms are more likely to engage in less labour hoarding behaviour, that is, they
are more likely to adjust the employment in response to temporary shocks in order to
conserve their working capital. Credit restrictions or an increase in borrowing costs
reduce employment and all kinds of investment. Firms in financial difficulties reduce the
number of employees in order to avoid bankruptcy.
One of the earlier empirical studies, which tests the impact of financial constraints
on employment, is Cantor (1990) that employs US data. It is shown that highly indebted
firms experience greater volatility in their investment and employment. Nickell and
Wadhwani (1991) test the determinants of employment using UK industry firm level data.
Among other variables, it is found that financial variables like the debt-equity ratio, and
market capitalization explain a significant part of employment fluctuations. Sharp (1994)
finds evidence that the employment growth of highly indebted and small firms, ceteris
paribus, is more sensitive to demand and financial conditions over the business cycles.
Recently, Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) use UK firm level data and find that the inverse
coverage rate, i.e. the ratio of interest payments to cash flow, has a large negative impact
on employment after controlling for wages and supply and demand conditions.
We adopt the empirical framework provided by Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) to test
the determinants of employment growth by considering firms with various financial
characteristics. Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) suggest an empirical framework that controls
for financial variables reflecting net worth of firms in addition to demand and labour cost
factors in order to explain employment. We present this framework below.
Consider a firm, i,with a production function;
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Yi=AF(Ni,KJ (6.24)
where Y, N, K and A show output, employment, capital, and efficiency, respectively.
Profit maximization in an imperfect competitive environment implies the following first
order condition for employment (ignoring financial variables);
AjF N(Ni,KJ =wa+1)IPiKi (6.25)
where FN, Wi, I, Pi and s; indicate the derivative of the production function with respect to
employment, wages that are determined prior to employment, payroll tax rate, output
price and one minus the inverse demand elasticity that is expected to be influenced by
current and future expected demand and the competitive position of the finn. The
following expression is obtained if one takes the logarithm of the expression in (6.25);
(6.26)
where aj and At reflects firm specific, and time effects, respectively. These terms capture
efficiency, productivity shocks and other unobservable effects. n, k, and ware logarithms
of employment, capital and real wages, and d captures demand-competition effects
associated with K. One may incorporate the lags of employment through the standard
quadratic adjustment cost model!'. The following specification is obtained after adding
financial variables controlling for financing constraints in the employment equation.
(6.27)
where nU-I, fit and Cit represent lag employment, variables that reflects firms' financial
positions and an idiosyncratic disturbance term. We use a version of this empirical
framework for our econometric estimations in this chapter.
11 For details of derivations, see Nickell and Nicolitas (1999).
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6.4. Methodology, Empirical Model, and Data
6.4.1. Financial Constraints and Criteria for Splitting Data
The empirical literature that investigates the link between real activity of firms and their
financial positions categorises firms as more constrained or less constrained. This
taxonomy, also employed in Chapter Five, allows us to observe the reactions of firm
groups in the tails of the distribution to external shocks. This eases the identification of
the credit channel as we focus on more diversified groups. In fact, firms between the
lower and the upper tails are expected to exhibit mixed characteristics therefore it may be
difficult to identify the credit channel using them. As explained above, by splitting firms
into groups it is intended to create relatively homogeneous firm categories that are subject
to more or less the same degree of informational and incentive problems and have similar
financial structure in terms of net worth. By this method, we capture the impact of
asymmetric information and agency problems and avoid the problems associated with
aggregation. We already provide information on widely used grouping criteria in the
literature in Chapter Five, thus in the subsequent paragraphs we only discuss some
additional grouping criteria that we employ in this chapter. The criteria used in this study
are based on size, credit rating, age, indebtedness and dividend payout ratio.
It is likely that some firms switch between the more constrained and the less
constrained status over time depending upon shifts in investment opportunities and
availability of internal and external financing'<. Therefore, as in Chapter Five, firms are
allowed to switch across firm type over time. This procedure may potentially lead to an
endogeneity problem originated from correlation between grouping criteria and variables
used in the regressions. This endogeneity problem is likely to be controlled by using firm
type interaction terms as instrumental variables in the econometric estimations.
Alternatively, we classify firms based on the information of in the beginning of the
period; we take the average value of the variables that are used as splitting criteria for the
year 1991. In fact, estimation results obtained from both classification methods do not
differ significantly but we report only results for the former classification.
12 F~zz~ri et.al (1988) ado~~a priory groupings while Kasplan and Zingales (1997) examine firms in greater
details IIIterms of categonsmg them as constrained or unconstrained and they reach opposite results about
the cash flow investment sensitivity.
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Size is more often employed as a criterion for splitting firms into the less
constrained and the more constrained groups. The rational behind this criterion is that
small firms are generally poor in terms of collateral, younger, less known, thus are to be
subject to capital market imperfections induced by information asymmetries (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1994, Carpenter et al., 1994 and 1995). The size may be related with age, that
is, smaller firms are less likely to have good track records that help lenders to distinguish
between good from bad ones. In addition, lack of collateral assets increases the risk of
bankruptcy among smaller firms because they hardly have access to external finance
during the tight periods. Therefore, their activities including inventory, fixed investment,
and employment are expected to be more sensitive to the availability of external finance
especially during tight periods. On the other hand, smaller firms are more concentrated in
terms of share ownership, and this mitigates the agency problem between managers and
outside investors
The dividend is a widely used criterion by the investment-cash flow literature to
differentiate between constrained and unconstrained firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen,
1988; Whited, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994, and others). It is generally believed that
matured firms have higher dividend payout ratios payout ratio (the ratio of dividend
payment to total assets in our case), while financially constrained firms tend to have
lower dividend payout ratios because they are highly dependent on internal sources for
additional investment and for repaying their debt. However, some firms may pay high
dividend and possibly borrow at the same time for signalling purposes. In this chapter,
firms are categorised according to their dividend payout ratios. Those firms that are in the
upper quartile of the dividend payout ratios distribution are named the high dividend firm
group, while those in the lowest quartile of the distribution are grouped under the low
dividend firm group.
Firms may be split also according to their association with business groups and
banks. Firms that have a close link with large financial institutions, or large mature firms
having access to external finance, are less likely to be subject to financial constraints. The
link between firms and financial institutions may be manifested in terms of ownership as
tested by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) for the Japanese industries, or in terms
of a long track record that is related to the banking relationship or trade credit. Our data
allow us to split firms according to whether they have a large number of subsidiaries or
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not and whether they are a part of holding companies or not. If the firm has large number
of subsidiaries and connected holdings, it is expected that such firms are less financially
constrained because they can receive and extend trade credit to other subsidiaries of the
group. We do not provide estimation results based on this taxonomy here as we have
enough splitting criteria.
Contrary to the static panel data framework employed in the previous chapter in
which we identified tight and loose regime periods in our sample, the dynamic panel
model that we use in this chapter leads to loss of all observations for the tight period.
Therefore, we are not able to test our hypothesis for the two polar monetary policy
regimes, namely the tight period, 1990-1992 and the loose period, 1993-1999. In fact, we
are going to analyse mainly the loose period as we effectively use the data for the 1994-
1999 period in our dynamic model estimations. We capture the impact of monetary policy
shocks by including the cumulative base rate among explanatory variables. The impact of
the monetary policy stance on financial and real activity is expected to be muted in the
loose period compared to the tight period and therefore empirical findings may potentially
be less supportive for the credit channel that works more often when firms are subject to
serious financial constraints.
6.4.2. Estimations Techniques
6.4.2.1. Introductory Remarks
Selecting an appropriate econometric methodology to estimate an empirical model
depends very much upon the nature of the sample as well as the theory behind the
hypothesis to be tested. Our sample is an unbalanced panels, it contains missing
observations over time. The unbalanced panel data consist of a set of individuals (firms in
this study) with various number oftime periods. Constructing a balanced sample from the
existing unbalanced sample would lead to a substantial loss of information, therefore we
tend to use an unbalanced sample in our econometric estimations. In fact, it is generally
claimed that the use of the unbalanced panel may abbreviate the potential biases stemmed
from self-selection. The econometric estimation methods of unbalanced samples are
similar to those of balanced samples provided that there is sufficient number of
continuing time periods. An essential assumption here is that the observations in the
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initial cross-section are distributed independently and that subsequent additions and
deletions of new panels are random (see Hsiao, 1986).
For long time periods, and a small number of individuals, it would be possible to
use simultaneous equations modelling while for short time periods, with a large number
of firms, and unbalanced panels, the panel data methods are the most suitable estimation
procedures. The panel data methods allow us to analyze dynamic relationships (in
autoregressive form) in a single equation by using the cross-section and the time
dimensions of the data. In other words, these methods are especially useful in the sense
that the importance of firm heterogeneity over the business cycles can be combined into
the analysis and the aggregation biases can be removed by using micro data (Nickell,
1981).
Most economic behaviours exhibit a dynamic pattern as in the case of investment.
Decisions about current investment are more likely to affect investment in the future
periods. This type of behaviour can easily be estimated in the framework of dynamic
panel models. The static panel data models produce biased and inconsistent estimates for
short time periods because of dynamic factors (lagged dependent variables) and the
existence of endogenous or predetermined explanatory variables. In other words, the
correlation between the lagged dependent variables and the disturbance terms leads to
inconsistent estimates in the fixed effects or random effects models (Nickell, 1981). On
the contrary, the dynamic panel framework considers endogenous or predetermined
regressors in addition to strictly exogenous explanatory variables in the estimation. The
diagnostic complications originated from endogenous or predetermined regressors are
considered in this framework and therefore more efficient and consistent estimates are
obtained. The dynamic panel method captures the feedback from current or past shocks to
current values of variables by using suitable instruments for the endogenous variables.
A dynamic panel data model can be presented in the following form:
P
Yil = LakYi,t-k +XitPI +Wi,P2 +A, +l1i +Vit; t=q+l, ... ,T;;
k=l
i=I, ...,N, (6.28)
where 17i, AI and Vii are individual specific effects, time specific effects, and disturbance
terms, respectively. y« is the dependent variable and the first term in the right hand side
200
ChapterSix Financial Constraints, Inventories and Employment in tire UKManufacturing
shows p lags of the dependent variables. Xit are strictly exogenous explanatory variables
while Wit are endogenous or predetermined explanatory variables other than the lags of the
dependent variable. These variables can be in the form of levels and lags. q is the
maximum lag length in the model. The number of time periods available for the ith
individual (Ti) is assumed to be small relative to the number of individuals (N).
The model is identified according to restrictions on the serial correlation properties
of the disturbance terms and on the properties of explanatory variables. If some
explanatory variables are endogenous or predetermined, shocks to the serially correlated
autoregressive disturbance terms impose some restrictions on the regression coefficients,
a, p. To avoid this problem only serially uncorrelated or moving average disturbances are
allowed. The disturbance terms are assumed to be distributed independently across
individuals with zero mean but some forms of heteroscedasticity across individuals and
time are allowed. The explanatory variables which are made up of strictly exogenous,
endogenous, or predetermined variables do not have to be correlated with the individual
effects but the lagged dependent variables are expected to be correlated with them. The
Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure, which is a widely
used estimation method, produces consistent and more efficient estimates for the dynamic
panels and is described below.
6.4.2.2. The Arellano-Bond GMM Procedure
The ordinary least square (OLS) procedure considers the individual effects as omitted
variables that are part of the disturbance term and therefore the OLS estimates of the
model in (6.28) are not consistent as the lags of dependent variable are correlated with the
disturbance term (17i + Vit)' This correlation does not disappear as the number of
observations increases across time and individuals. The Within Groups estimates remove
this inconsistency by eliminating the individual specific effects through a transformation
that use deviations of the variables from their individual means over time in the
regressions. The OLS estimation of the transformed model (the model with mean deviated
variables) then produces asymptotically consistent coefficients if the number of time
period is large enough. However, if the time period is short, the transformed lagged
dependent variable (lagged dependent variable minus its individual mean over time) is
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likely to be correlated with the transformed disturbance terms as the means in the
transformed variables capture the feedback':'.
By using the first difference transformation, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest
using two or more lags of the dependent variable as instruments that are both correlated
with the differenced lag dependent variable, L1Yi,t-], and orthogonal to the difference
disturbance term, L1Vit, to eliminate this endogoneity. A two-step least square procedure
produces consistent estimates for this model but it does not produce asymptotically
efficient estimates as this procedure does not consider all possible instruments for the
endogenous explanatory variables. On the contrary, the GMM developed by Hansen
(1982) provides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates. We can rewrite (6.28)
for each individual i across time.
(6.29)
where X; shows all explanatory variables including lags of the dependent variable and
time effects, 8 represents the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and t, is unit
vector. Yi, X;, and Cj are Ti-P vectors of respective variables. This implies that there are T;-
q equations for each individual. The first difference transformation of this model is shown
belowl4•
(6.30)
where y;, X; and c; are the vectors of first differences of the respective variablcs'".
The most crucial stage in the GMM procedure is to construct the instrumental
variable matrix, Z;, which is made up of suitable lags of the dependent variable,
endogenous (or predetermined) variables and the first difference of exogenous
13 Bond (2002) highlights that the OLS estimate of the lagged dependent is upward biased while the within
group estimation is downward biased. The consistent and the most efficient estimate is therefore likely to
fall between these two estimates.
14 Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest a number of methods for removing individual effects. The most
common methods are first differencing and orthogonal deviations that express each observation as the
deviation from the average of future observations in the sample for the same individual, and weighting each
deviation to standardise the variance.
IS YiI*=YiI-Yi,I-I, Xu*=Xu-XU-I and, Gu*=GU-E:;,I-J
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variables16• The following moment conditions are exploited for selecting suitable
. t 17mstrumen s .
£[Z;c;] = 0 for i= 1,2, ... ,N (6.31)
Instruments are independent from c; by which the endogeneity problem is handled.
Assume that we use two lags of the dependent variable, in addition to other endogenous
(or predetermined) and exogenous variables as explanatory variables in the model (6.28)
for the balanced sample case. The instrumental variable matrix is shown as follows;
o 0 0 0 0 0 o
o
o 0
o 0
o
oo 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 Yil • YiT-2 \1)1
The Z matrix has T;-3 rows implying that the number of time periods for each individual
should be higher than the corresponding maximum lag in the model; the number of time
periods should be at least four in this particular case. The variables in the first row arc the
instruments for the equation explaining Y;4 while those in the last raw are the instruments
for Y;T. The number of columns depends on the number of explanatory variables, the
characteristics of these variables, for example, whether they are endogenous or exogenous
and the number of lagged dependent variable used as explanatory variablcs'". The matrix
for this particular case may include two and earlier lags of the dependent variables, two
and earlier lags of endogenous explanatory variables, the first difference of all exogenous
variables as instruments under the assumption that the moment conditions in (6.31) are
satisfied 19.
The difference GMM procedure provides efficient estimates for a well specified
model by using suitably lagged dependent variable and endogenous variables as
16 A variable, X, is predetermined if E(XilViJ= 0 for s ~ t and E(xil vu) *" 0 otherwise, and E(Xilll1) *" o.
17 Instrument selection process is not only a statistical process but also requires some economic intuition.
18 If the sample is unbalanced then the missing observations are handled by dropping the rows for which
there are no data and by replacing the column with zero where the missing observation would be required.
19 Bond (2002) suggests that too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases especially in small
samples. A restricted set of instruments that is obtained by deleting columns for the least informative
instruments, general~yvery early lags of ins~ments, produce more coherent estimates for long time series.
For the models that include endogenous vanables, over-fitting problem leads to biased estimates.
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instruments. The asymptotically efficient GMM estimates minimize the following term,
namely the Sargan statistic;
(6.32)
where WN is the weight matrix. Various linear GMM estimators are calculated based on
how the weight matrix is constructed, i.e. the one-step and the two-step estimates. A
general form of estimated coefficients is
(6.33)
If the number of columns of Z equals that of X* the weight matrix becomes irrelevant
thus,
The Within Groups estimation results are obtained when the number of columns in Z
equals that of X* and the variables are transformed by using deviations from individual
means. The one-step GMM procedure estimates the coefficients by using some known
matrix for H/ilO, while the two-step GA1M procedure uses estimates of the transformed
error term, e;, to construct the weight matrix, Hl;. lin and lh can be expressed as follow;
2 -1 0 0 0
-1 2 -1 0 0 and Ih;=E(e;e;')Hu=
0 0 0 -1 2
(6.34)
If the disturbance terms are heteroscedastic, a two-step estimator is more efficient
however as Arellano Bond (1991) suggest the standard errors for the two-step estimators
can be poor guide for hypothesis testing for typical sample sizes as the standard errors are
downward biased. In this case, inferences based on the one-step estimates is more useful
20 HII becomes an identity matrix if the transformation is based on the orthogonal deviations.
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while heteroscedasticity-consistent two-step estimates are potentially more suitable for
deciding on the specification of the model.
As we explained above the first-difference transformation suggested by Anderson
and Hsiao (1981) produces consistent estimators with instrumental variable estimations
while the methodology suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) produces consistent as
well as more efficient estimators by using all available moment conditions in the first
difference transformation. Arellano and Bover (1995) employ additional instrumental
variables for the level equations to provide further efficiency gains for the estimates. The
levels of the explanatory variables may be correlated with individual effects while their
suitably lagged first differences are not correlated with them. In this case, lagged first
differences of explanatory variables and the dependent variable that are uncorrelated with
the individual effects can be used as instruments for the level equations.
Blundell and Bond (1998) combine moment conditions relating to the equations in
the first difference with moment conditions relating to the equations in levels to obtain
more efficient GMM estimators. This extended GM},! approach is called the system
GMM. In this model, earlier lags of first difference of variables are not used as
instruments in the level equations as they are correlated with the lagged level instruments
in the difference equation. More specifically, if the simple AR(J) model is mean-
stationary, then first differences, L1Yi/, will be uncorrelated with 1]i , and this implies that
L1Yi.t-1 can be used as instruments in the level equations. Again, in the system of equations,
the one-step estimators are more useful for inferences compared to the two-step
estimators but for the model specification the latter is preferred".
The specification of econometric model can be verified mainly on the basis of two
tests, i.e. the test of serial autocorrelation and the Sargan tests of overidentifying
restrictions. The assumption of no serial correlation in error term, e; is essential for the
consistency of estimates in the model using the lags of the dependent variable as
instruments. Two statistics can be computed to test for the first and second order
correlation and are denoted by m, and m». respectively. We may expect a negative first
21 STATA 7.0,performs only the difference GMM while DPD for Ox under PCGive performs both the
system and difference procedures. We use PCGive in estimating our models,
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order serial correlation (m]) and no evidence of second order serial correlation (m2) in the
first difference error terms for serially uncorrelated error terms, That is, f1e; is negatively
correlated with f1e;.t-1 and it is uncorrelated with f1e:.t-2 . Therefore, in case of sufficiently
small value of the m2 statistic, the hypothesis of having serial correlation is rejected.
The GMM model uses a larger number of instrumental variables than the IV-2SLS
procedure does. The Sargan statistic given in (6.32) is widely used to test for the validity
of overidentifing restrictions in the GMM procedure. It is asymptotically distributed as
chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as overidentifying restrictions, under the null
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The statistic takes different values based on
the weights assigned in the one-step or the two-step estimates. The Sargan statistic
calculated from the two-step procedure, using H2i in constructing weight matrix, is
suggested for selecting instruments and specifying the model (Arallano and Bond, 1991)
as it is heteroscedasticity-consistent under the two-step GMAI procedure.
The system GMM provides additional instrumental variables thus it leads to more
efficient estimates. The instruments for the difference equations are likely to be weak
when the variables in the regression have near unit root properties. Weak instruments may
be subject to biases in the finite samples. If the variables arc more likely to be non-
stationary, the system GAfM procedure produces the most efficient estimates. Bond
(2002) shows that the system GMM gives smaller finite sample bias and greater precision
than the difference GMM when persistent series are modelled in an autoregressive form.
Therefore, time series properties of individual series should be considered in dynamic
panel data modcls'".
6.4.3. The Empirical Models
In this section, we study empirical models for both inventory investment and employment
growth. The empirical models used here are based on the theoretical framework derived
above according to which finn activities depend very much on the financial position of
firms under the assumption of imperfect capital markets. We use two different categories
22 We also test our models by using the system GMM procedure. Findings from this procedure are similar
to those with the difference GMM, therefore we only report the results of the latter procedure.
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of variables that represent financial conditions of the firms. In the first place, we
potentially use variables aimed at capturing the net worth of firms such as cash flow (net
income plus capital stock depreciation). This variable is expected to capture information
on both the degree of firms' financial constraint and their profitability. In addition, we use
the financial mix as an explanatory variable, as suggested by Kashyap et al. (1993),
alongside cash flow as well as other variables representing demand and supply conditions
to identify the model. Having access to bank finance is particularly important for those
firms that have limited internal funds and limited access to cheap market funds because of
their poor collateral structure. By using US aggregate data, Kashyap et al. (1993) find that
the mix explains inventories well, as firms get access to bank finance they will be less
constrained and thus, ceteris paribus, they will be able to continue investing.
6.4.3.1. Inventory Investment Model
We adopt the linear quadratic framework discussed above for specifying the inventory
investment model. The stock avoidance motive has been often introduced in this setup by
the empirical literature in the framework of the target adjustment model proposed by
Lovell (1961). More specifically, firms decide about the amount of inventories that
minimizes their holding costs and the risk of stocking out or backlogging orders. This
implies that firms tend to associate the amount of inventories with sales to obtain
optimum inventory target. A deviation from the targeted inventory-sales ratio affects the
cost and thus the inventory behaviour of firms. The stock avoidance motive is captured by
using this ratio as an explanatory variable in the inventory model. We usc sales growth
instead of sales level in the regressions to reflect the expected sales as in Kashyap et al.
(1994). We also use a lag of the inventory-sales ratio to capture long run dynamics in the
target adjustment model.
We also introduce variables that reflect the cost and the financial positions of firms
to obtain a testable version of inventory the investment model given in (6.23). This
empirical literature considers cost shocks stemmed from changes in monetary policy or in
the costs of labour, raw materials and capital (Carpenter et al., 1994). It is expected that
firm specific and time effects capture these unobservable factors to some extent. We also
use the cumulative base rate to capture the monetary policy shocks that have direct and
indirect impact on inventory investment through its impact on the cash positions of firms.
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The variables that represent the cash positions of firms are often used to explain
inventory investment in the empirical literature discussed above. For example, Kashyap et
al. (1994) uses a liquidity indicator by dividing cash and marketable securities to total
assets while Guariglia (1999) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use the interest coverage
ratio. Following Kashyap et al. (1993), we use the mix as a financial variable to capture
the uniqueness of bank finance. We use binary variables for size, dividend, risk, age,
indebtedness criteria interacted with these financial variables as explanatory variables.
Using interaction terms allows us to identify the reaction of inventories to the different
firms groups' financial conditions, and to use a larger sample size. In short, we adopt a
specification that considers cost shocks, and the financial positions of firms across firm
types in the framework of the target adjustment model described above23,
2 2
GINVit = k~1akGIN~,'_k + J:ljGSj,t-J + fJ3MD(, + fJ4(MIX11 *TYPE/,)+ fJ5CF I,t-I +
fJ6(CF;,I-1 *TYPE/')+fJ7TYPE/, +fJsBRATE,+fJ9RINVS;,I-, +11.,+T/; +v;t
(6.35)
where j denotes various firm groups, that is TYPE! consists of twelve different binary
variables (j = 1 .... 12) reflecting twelve different firm characteristics i.e. small/large,
risky/secure, young/old, highly indebted/low indebted, low dividendlhigh dividend,
respectively'".
TYPE! = 1 j = 1 ....12 and TYPE! = 0 otherwise
We use two lags of the dependent variables to consider the dynamic nature of
inventories. Sales growth, the mix, cash flow, the ratio of inventory investment to sales
and interaction terms are treated as endogenous (or predetermined) variables, while only
the cumulative base rate is treated as an exogenous variable. The mix is assumed to be
predetermined in the sense that an innovation to the disturbance terms and thus
inventories is expected to affect the mix. Inventories and short-term debt are determined
simultaneously as it is likely that inventories are financed by short-term debt.
23 W,e obtain, this ,specification f~om a general distributed lag model, dropping insignificant regressors to
obtain a parsimonious econometric model.
24 We intend to,us~ the firm type dummy among the explanatory variables but the estimated coefficients are
not generally significant therefore we do not report the estimation results where TYPE is used as an
explanatory variable
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GINVu denotes the change in the logarithm of real inventory investment. Fixed
investment clearly has a dynamic nature because it may take more than one period to
complete the project thus investment in the previous period affects the investment in the
present or future periods. This fact is valid also for inventory investment over the
business cycle but the change in inventory investment is considered to be more volatile
and frequent because of low adjustment costs. Therefore, it is more likely that we loose
some information by using less frequent data, namely annual data.
RINVSU-l is the ratio of inventory investment to sales. As the target adjustment
model proposed by Lovell (1961) implies, firms may have an implicit target for the
inventory-sales ratio in their mind25• If the inventory-sales ratio increases in the present
period (if inventories divert from the targeted level) firms would adjust their inventories
to attain the targeted level in the next period. Therefore, the expected sign for RINVS is
negative; an increase in this ratio is a diversion from the inventory target thus inventories
come down to keep this ratio at the targeted level in the next period.
We use the change in the logarithm of real sales and its lag, GSj/, among the
explanatory variables for inventory investment growth. This variable represents the
expected sales and captures demand conditions according to the accelerator model
framework. Therefore, inventories increase with expected sales that is consistent with the
target adjustment model.
We use the cumulative base rate, BRATE" to capture the impact of the monetary
policy stance on inventory investment. This variable is considered as a cost shock that
affects inventory decisions. At the high level of interest rates, firms tend to reduce their
inventory investment to minimize their cost therefore we expect a negative coefficient for
this variable.
The logarithm of real cash flow, CFU-1, and the ratio of short-term debt to current
liabilities, MIXiI• are the variables that capture the financial conditions that affect the
inventory investment through imperfect capital markets. Cash flow is used in the
25 The same ratio is also used by Kashyap et al. (1994) to explain inventory investment for the US
manufacturing industry.
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estimations to represent the net worth of firms. The mix is not only a complementary
variable to cash flow that captures the financial position of firms, but also it provides
information on the uniqueness of bank finance. The findings here should be evaluated
together with the evidence found in the previous chapter according to which financially
constrained firms are less likely to get bank loans during the tight period. That is, the
inventory investment of financially constrained firms is expected to be more sensitive to
the mix in the period of the tight policy. However, during the loose period of 1993-1999,
firms that are treated as financially constrained are more likely to have access to bank
loans compared to the tight period, therefore the sensitivity of inventories to the mix is
hardly identified across firm types whether they are constrained or not.
We follow a similar methodology to that we applied in the previous chapter where
we use the interaction terms to measure the reaction of various firm groups to the
monetary policy stance across monetary policy regime periods. We estimate the model
for each firm type reflecting polar tails of firm distributions according to various criteria
explained above. Contrary to the model employed in the previous chapter; we are not able
to identify the reaction of inventory investment across monetary policy regime periods
because the estimation method leads to missing observations belonging to the tight
monetary policy period, 1990-1992. However, we can still identify the reaction of
inventory investment across firm groups. This time the interaction tcnns enable us to test
only the reaction of inventories to a change in the financial position and net worth of
firms across firm characteristics. Therefore, the interaction terms, FPV*TYPE, have two
components: variables that reflect the financial positions of firms, FPV (MIX;t, and eFI.t_l)
and finn characteristics dummies.
6.4.3.2. Employment Model
We also follow the same empirical methodology for modelling employment, i.e.
using financial variables and their interaction terms with firm type dummies among
explanatory variables to estimate employment growth. We adopt a similar empirical
framework as in Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) for employment shown in (6.27). The main
differences between our econometric specification and that of Nickell and Nicolitas
(1999) are that we use the change in the logarithms of basic variables instead of their
levels and various lags of some of the explanatory variables in the econometric
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estimations. This specification allows us to compare the econometric findings from the
employment model with those from the inventory investment model as the dependent
variables in both models are in the form of change in log levels (growth rates). We
estimate the following employment model across various firm types by using interaction
terms for the mix and cash flow as in the case of the inventory model.
(6.36)
11
!36(CF;,1-'*TYPln+!37TYP.z; +!3gBRATI;:'+(\GRT4 + }.o(3jG»;',1-J +~ +111+VII
where GEM Pit, GRTAit and GWjt show the change in the logarithm of employment, real
tangible assets and real wages, respectively.
Again, GSit captures the expected demand for the firm's product and its coefficient
IS expected to be positive. M/Xit and CFi,t-J, and their interaction terms capture the
importance of bank finance and net worth position of firms for various firm types. The
coefficients for M/Xit and CFj,t-J are expected to be positive while those for the interaction
terms vary across firm types. BRA TEt captures the exogenous monetary shocks.
Employment growth is expected to decline with BRA TEt as restrictive monetary policy
increases the cost of external borrowing substantially through the interest rate and the
credit channels. We also expect that employment declines with real wage growth (GWi,)
but increases with capital growth (GRTAu). As in the case of the inventory investment
model, we treat all explanatory variables except BRATEt as endogenous or predetermined
variables'",
6.4.4. Data and Descriptive Analysis
In this study, we use the FAME data set that covers detailed information about the UK
manufacturing companies for the period of 1990-1999. The sample used in this analysis is
already discussed in detail in the previous two chapters. We are not going to repeat the
information given in these chapters, instead a basic descriptive analysis is carried out in
this section. We cannot differentiate between types of inventories such as raw material,
26 As in the cas~ of the invento~ investment model, we use TYPE as a separate explanatory variable for
each firm type 10 the econometnc estimations. Since its estimated coefficients are not significant we do not
use this variable among explanatory variables.
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work-in-progress and final goods; therefore, we use overall inventories in our analysis. In
this section, some details of data are reported in three tables. In Table 6.1, we provide the
output-sales variance ratios for firms groups over time for a preliminary analysis of the
production smoothing theory. In addition, we compare the output and sale variances
acrossfirms and we calculate average figures for firm groups for the two monetary policy
regimes in Table 6.2. The variance ratios in Table 6.1 are calculated based on the time
periods while those reported in Table 6.2 are based on the cross-section units. Lastly, we
provide summary information for variables used in the regression across firm groups in
Table 6.3.
As we discussed in the literature section, the production smoothing theory entails
lower variance for output, because firms adjust inventories to minimize the cost of
production. Lower output variance relative to sales variance is a direct implication of cost
minimization behaviour. However, preliminary evidence does not verify this theoretical
prediction. We report two output-sale variance ratios based on the number of years used
in the calculations in Table 6.1. Firstly, the output and sales variances for each firm are
calculated separately by using a balanced sample of 1991-1999 (nine years observations)
and firm group variances are obtained from averaging these variances. We also calculate
variances for individual firms that have at least five years observations by using the same
method. The output-sales variance ratios for risky, young and highly indebted firms are
upward biased in the balanced sample. The output-sales variance ratios for all groups
except for low indebted firms are larger than one. This finding clearly does not support
the production smoothing theory. Specifically, the output-sales variance ratios for large,
high dividend, risky, young and highly indebted firms are larger than their counterparts,
namely small, low dividend, secure, old, low indebted"; These findings are against the
production smoothing theory and suggest that firm characteristics reflecting the extent of
informational problems and financial variables may be important in modelling inventory
investment. We consider these characteristics in our econometric estimations in the next
section.
On the other hand, we calculate the variance ratios across firms and find out that
these ratios are significantly bigger than the one for all finn groups. In addition, these
27 We have relatively short time periods for the calculation of the variances but we think that this
information still can be useful.
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ratios are much higher for financially more constrained firms, namely small, low
dividend, risky, young, highly indebted than those for less constrained firms, namely
large, high dividend, secure, old, and low indebted. Moreover, these ratios are higher
during the tight period compared to the loose period for all firm groups. These findings
imply that relatively more constrained firms have much more variability in their output
than their sales, that is, they react less uniformly to cost shocks, and this is more
significant during the recessionary period (Table 6.2).
Table 6.1: Output-Sales Variance Ratios across Firm Groups
Balanced Data (1991-1999) More than Five Years
No. of Firms J Ratio No. of Firms I Ratio
Whole 6,180 1.07 10,700 1.07
Small 1,322 1.05 3,043 1.08
Large 2,546 1.07 3,645 1.07
Risky 594 1.44 1,438 1.33
Secure 2,652 1.03 4,397 1.04
Young 661 1.14 1,608 1.09
Old 1,987 1.03 2,908 1.04
Highly Indebted 1,180 1.29 2,444 1.26
Low Indebted 1,022 0.90 1,999 0.76
Low Dividend • 1,145 1.16 2,009 1.18
High Dividend 2,111 1.23 3,972 1.22
Table 6.2: Output-Sales Variance Ratios across Firm Groups and Monetary Policy Regime
Whole Period Tight Period Loose Period
(1990-1999) 11990-1992) (1993-1999j_
_IjgIH(J~~!l.!5e_
Whole Sample 1.232 1.260 1.221 1.032
Small 1.275 1.392 1.225 1.136
Large 1.232 1.259 1.220 1.032
Risky 1.363 1.455 1.334 1.091
Secure 1.208 1.239 1.200 1.033
Young 1.379 1.448 1.349 1.074
Old 1.221 1.244 1.211 1.028
Highly Indebted 1.256 1.258 1.256 1.001
Low Indebted 1.169 1.201 1.166 1.030
Low Dividend 1.232 1.272 1.213 1.048
Higli Dividend 1.232 1.234 1.231 1.003
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Basic statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests for both the inventory
and the employment growth equations are summarized in Table 6.3 across firm type
groups. We removed outliers for variables that have a large gap between their maximum
and minimum values to obtain a representative sample for the population. The statistics
that are provided in Table 6.3 are based on trimmed results. We provide more detailed
explanations on the trimming for each variable used in our empirical estimations in the
Appendix.
Table 6.3: Basic Statistics for Variables Used in the Regressions across Firm Groups
GINV GEMP GS CF MIX GW GRTA RINVS
Whole Samele
Obs 76,920 76,920 76,920 67,760 76,920 76,720 76,920 76,920
Mean 0.016 0.011 0.031 6.538 32.88 0.059 0.048 0.130
Std.Dev. 0.326 0.160 0.208 1.790 25.11 0.206 0.200 0.096
Min -1.539 -0.736 -0.870 -3.219 0.00 -0.559 -0.743 0.000
Max 1.584 0.806 1.071 15.246 100.00 1.367 1.028 1.714
Small Firms
Obs 13,936 13,936 13,936 12,110 13,936 13,852 13,936 13,936
Mean 0.027 o.ois 0.031 4.739 32.47 0.059 0.061 0.119
Std.Dev. 0.364 0.174 0.224 1.057 25.59 0.227 0.215 0.106
Min -1.522 -0.736 -0.866 -2.634 0.00
-0.559 -0.736 0.000
Max 1.582 0.799 1.065 8.970 100.00 1.367 1.023 1.480
Larg,e Firms
Obs 33,242 33,242 33,242 29,509 33,242 33,202 33,242 33,242
Mean 0.010 0.007 0.033 7.904 33.65 0.058 0.044 0.134
Std.Dev. 0.300 0.157 0.195 1.535 25.37 0.194 0.193 0.089
Min -1.539 -0.736 -0.867 -0.048 0.00 -0.559 -0.742 0.000
Max 1.584 0.806 1.069 15.246 100.00 1.367 1.027 1.032
Risky, Firms
Obs 13,090 13,090 13,090 9,302 13,090 13,045 13,090 13,090
Mean 0.012 0.007 0.033 5.704 46.75 0.057 0.041 0.136
Std.Dev. 0.370 0.184 0.241 1.720 26.75 0.229 0.238 0.106
Min -1.527 -0.728 -0.870 -2.634 0.00
-0.557
-0.743 0.000
Max 1.570 0.803 1.069 13.475 100.00 1.360 1.027 1.480
Secure Firms
Obs 31,751 31,751 31,751 30,149 31,751 31,670 31,751 31,751
Mean 0.014 0.008 0.026 6.916 24.31 0.054 0.048 0.131
Std.Dev. 0.299 0.145 0.189 1.784 22.60 0.191 0.174 0.095
Min -1.539 -0.736
-0.862 -0.867 0.00
-0.559
-0.738 0.000
Max 1.582 0.806 1.071 15.246 100.00 1.367 1.023 1.714
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Table 6.3: Basic Statistics for Variables Used in the Regressions across Firm Groups
(Continued)
GINV GEMP GS MIX CF GW GRTA RINVS
Young,Firms
Ohs 16,505 16,505 16,505 14,281 16,505 16,444 16,505 16,505
Mean 0.043 0.035 0.059 6.237 34.28 0.089 0.071 0.123
Std.Dev. 0.367 0.182 0.229 1.681 25.87 0.232 0.223 0.095
Min -1.527 -0.727 -0.867 -1.487 0.00 -0.559 -0.743 0.000
Max 1.570 0.806 1.067 14.561 100.00 1.367 1.027 1.714
Old Firms
Ohs 21,630 21,630 21,630 19,231 21,630 21,583 21,630 21,630
Mean -0.006 -0.012 0.010 7.113 30.58 0.034 0.026 0.140
Std.Dev. 0.285 0.144 0.183 1.954 24.81 0.179 0.179 0.097
Min -1.519 -0.736 -0.866 -2.634 0.00 -0.559 -0.739 0.000
Max 1.584 0.795 1.069 15.246 100.00 1.367 1.027 1.019
Jlig,hlr.Indebted Firms
Ohs 21,445 21,445 21,445 17,124 21,445 21,373 21,445 21,445
Mean 0.013 0.009 0.035 6.412 45.75 0.059 0.048 0.131
Std.Dev. 0.357 0.177 0.228 1.853 26.62 0.219 0.231 0.102
Min -1.537 -0.727 -0.870 -1.974 0.00 -0.559 -0.743 0.000
Max 1.584 0.802 1.071 14.705 100.00 1.363 1.027 1.480
Low Indebted Firms
Ohs 15,391 15,391 15,391 14,504 15,391 15,343 15,391 15,391
Mean 0.010 0.005 0.021 6.453 14.58 0.051 0.045 0.130
Std.Dev. 0.300 0.138 0.185 1.578 17.41 0.188 0.161 0.096
Min -1.488 -0.736 -0.862 -3.219 0.00 -0.554 -0.738 0.000
Max 1.569 0.806 1.056 14.482 100.00 1.354 1.009 1.413
Low Dividend Firms
Ohs 13,305 13,305 13,305 11,357 13,305 13,280 13,305 13,305
Mean 0.022 0.011 0.029 5.700 33.58 0.055 0.048 0.139
Std.Dev. 0.321 0.158 0.206 1.346 24.37 0.201 0.192 0.108
Min -1.529 -0.727 -0.866 -2.634 0.00 -0.556 -0.742 0.000
Max 1.578 0.799 1.067 12.862 100.00 1.367 1.022 1.714
/lig,h Dividend Ratio Firms
Ohs 30,806 30,806 30,806 26,450 30,806 30,697 30,806 30,806
Mean 0.012 0.008 0.034 6.663 37.47 0.058 0.047 0.125
Std.Dev. 0.345 0.167 0.220 1.818 26.82 0.211 0.219 0.096
Min -1.539 -0.736 -0.870 -1.974 0.00
-0.559 -0.743 0.000
Max 1.584 0.806 1.071 t 5.246 100.00 1.360 1.027 1.413
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6.5. Estimation Results
In this section, we report the difference GMM estimates for the inventory investment and
the employment growth models discussed above. We use the binary variables
representing firm characteristics interacted with the financial variables like the mix and
cash flow to capture the reaction of firm groups to the changes in financial conditions.
Table 6.4 summarises the estimation results for the inventory investment growth equation
while Table 6.5 shows the same estimations for the employment growth equation. The
estimation results for firm groups are shown horizontally in each table. As in Chapter
Five, we differentiate the responses of inventory investment and employment growth of
various types of firms by using firm type dummies as part of interaction terms. The
findings for the inventory investment and employment models that do not use the
interaction terms are reported in the first column of each table while those for the models
that consider interaction terms for size, credit rating, age, indebtedness and the dividend-
payout ratio are reported in the remaining columns. As we did in Chapter Five, we
estimate the model for firm groups that represent polar tails of firm distribution. For
example, since medium sized firms are not considered in small and large firms dummies,
we estimate the model for small and large firms separately instead of using either small or
large firm dummies in a single estimation.
6.5.1. Inventory Investment Growth Estimation Resulti8
We employ the difference GMM procedure for estimating our model. We use two lags of
the inventory investment growth to capture the dynamics of inventory behaviour and to
avoid serial correlation in the econometric specification. We treat the lags of dependent
variables, the mix, cash flow, sales growth, the inventory-sales ratio and interactions
terms as endogenous (or predetermined) variables'", This means that these arc not strictly
exogenous i.e. any shock that affects the error terms or inventory investment today may
change the future values of these variables. Therefore, we tend to usc two and three lags
28 We use DPD for Ox to esti~at~ the models with the difference GMM (see Doomik, Arellano, and Bond;
2001 for the program and estimation details).
29 Tr~~ting variables as endogenous or predetermined increases the size of the instrument matrix. According
to Kiviet .(1995), la~gen~mber of endogenous or predetermined variables leads the GMM estimators to be
less efficient especially 10 small samples.
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of these variables and the lagged dependent variable as instruments to obtain consistent
estimatcs'". That is, we use following linear moment restrictions
E[(&it -Ej,t-t)Zi,t-j] for j= 2,3, t=1991, ..... ,1999 (6.37)
where Zi,t-j is an instrumental variables matrix that consists of two and three lags of
endogenous (or predetermined) variables; namely GINVu-2, GINVu-J, GSU-2, GSi,t-J,
MIX;,t-2, MIXu-J, (MIX*TYPE)i,t-2, (MIX*TYPE)i,t-J, CPj 1-2, CPj,I-J, (CP*TYPE)i,t-2,
(CP*TYPE)i,t-J, RINVSi,t-2 and RINVSu-J. The instrument set also includes the first
differences of BRATE" GDP" AGEit, and year dummies. The first differences of
exogenous variables are used as instruments to capture some macro and micro aspects
that affect the inventory behaviours of firms. That is, the GDPt growth rate and BRA TE,
reflect the macroeconomic environment. The validity of the instruments depends on the
lack of serial correlation in the error terms'".
The estimated coefficients from both the one-step and two-step GMM procedures
are consistent. However, standard errors from the two-step procedure are generally biased
downward for small samples. Therefore Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the
one-step estimates for the inferences (hypothesis testing) but using the two-step procedure
for the specification of the model. We report the estimated coefficients, t-statistics and
serial correlation statistics, mi, and mi obtained from the one-step procedure while we
report the Sargan statistic obtained from the two-step procedure as only the Sargan test
based on the two-step GMM estimator is heteroscedasticity-consistent. Wc do not reject
the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation of error terms for all regressions, i.e. m:
is close to zero, and therefore the model is well specified and produces consistent
estimates. However, the Sargan test from the two-step procedure rejects the null
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid in all regressions. Following Nickell
30 We estimate the model using alternative lags for instruments including three and four lags; two and
earlier la~s; three and earlier lags,.T~e estimations results and test statistics do not differ significantly across
lag selection. The Sargan test statistics are significant for all estimations with different lag selections.
31 The disturbance terms are serially uncorrelated if their differences, &,,- Cit./' display first order serial
negative correlation but no the second order serial correlation, i.e. E( &,,- C,.I'/)( &,.1'/ - Ci,t.2Y<O and E( CII-
&i.l.tJ( &i.I-2 - &i.t.JJ =0.
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and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito (2002) who report significant Sargan test statistics in
their papers, we also report these statistics in our analysis32•
Following Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), we check the effectiveness of our
instruments whether they are good predictors of the endogenous variables in the inventory
investment model. We regress, in tum, the first difference of endogenous (or
predetermined) variables on all instrumental variables including the first differences of
exogenous variables; using the GLS random effects method. Wald statistics testing the
joint significance of the instrumental variables for each endogenous or predetermined
variable imply that our instruments significantly explain the first differences of all
endogenous or predetermined variables ". The findings are reported in Table A.6.1 in the
Appendix.
The coefficients of the lags of inventory investment growth are generally significant
and negatively signed in all regressions'". GINVu-I has a larger coefficients than that of
GINVi,t-2 in absolute terms. This suggests that like many other economic variables,
inventory investment exhibits a dynamic pattern and the link between past values of
GINViI and its current level is less important for the earlier lags.
We include the cumulative base rate, BRATEt. among the exploratory variables to
capture the user cost of capital, which is the basis of the neoclassical investment theory."
This variable also measures the direct impact of monetary policy (the money or interest
rate channel). An increase in the interest rate by the Bank of England is going to increase
the cost of investment and thus firms will tend to postpone their investment projects. In
the framework of the inventory investment model derived above, the increase in the base
rate may be considered as a change in the stochastic component of the cost function; it is
going to be costly to increase inventories at high interest rates. This theoretical implication
is verified by the estimation results where BRATE, has a negative and significant
coefficient for the estimation that does not use interaction terms even though it is not large
32 Blundell et al. (2000) question the usefulness of this Sargan test in the context of model specification and
conclude that the Sargan test tends to over-reject the hypothesis in the case of hctcroscedasticity.
33 The Wald test has X2distribution with 14 degrees of freedom for the model that does not have interaction
term and 18 for the models that use interaction terms.
34 We mean significant at the five prevent level otherwise we are going to provide the significance level.
35 The Jorgenson's neo-classical model of investment is a linear function of output and the user cost of
capital under the assumption of perfect competition and a Cobb-Douglas production function.
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in absolute value, -0.003. Contrary to our result, previous studies that estimated inventory
investment do not find empirical evidence supporting this theoretical prediction (Blinder
and Maccini, 1991).
When we add the interaction terms for the mix and cash flow as explanatory
variables, the coefficient for BRATEt becomes smaller in absolute term and insignificant
in some regressions. The coefficient for BRATEt is significant for the regressions that use
dummies for small and low dividend ratio firms as components of interaction terms but
significant only at the 10 percent level for large, young, and high dividend ratio firms.
This result implies that firm specific characteristics capture some of the impact of the
cumulative base rate therefore this may prove the existence of some other channels other
than the interest rate channel by which monetary policy affects the real activity of firms.
Kashyap et al. (1993) suggest using the mix as an explanatory variable to explain
investment alongside the interest rate. This study claims that if the interest rate is not
included among the explanatory variables of investment, the lending channel of monetary
transmission would not be verified independently (p 89). By using time series techniques
for aggregate data, Kashyap et al. (1993) estimate that the mix explains inventory
investment significantly; a higher share of bank loans leads firms to invest more in
inventories. Our estimations show that the coefficients of the mix are positive in all
regressions except for the one that uses a large firm dummy as a component of the
interaction terms. However, these coefficients are not significant only for large, highly
indebted, and high dividend ratio firms. The coefficients of the interaction terms for the
mix are significantly different from zero for large, risky, secure, young, highly indebted,
less indebted and high dividend ratio firms. The sums of the coefficients of the mix and
those of its interaction terms measure the overall impact of the mix on the inventory
investment growth conditioning on firm characteristics. These sums are larger for small,
secure, highly indebted, old and high dividend firms compared to those of the counterpart
groups but negative only for large firms. Negativecoefficient for largefirms and positive
coefficient for smallfirms clearly support the hypothesis that financially constrained firms
in~_luding~.~<l!!_.f.!~§are bank dependent. However, larger coefficients for secure, highly
indebted, old and high dividend firms, which are categorized as less financially
constrained, compared to financially constrained counterparts do not support this
hypothesis.
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These results still imply that having access to bank finance is special: it reduces the
extent of informational problems and thus the negative impact of external shocks on
firms' activity. In other words, as explained in the previous chapter, bank finance can
overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems because of the monitoring
technology of banks. Banks can match their liabilities structure to the term to maturity of
loans and gather information on the financial background of companies. In this context, a
contractionary monetary policy, which reduces the bank loan supply, affects the level of
economic activity by changing the cost and availability of bank finance and thus the mix.
In fact, our estimations show that even during benign period the mix appears an important
explanatory variable for inventory investment growth.
We also use one lag of cash flow, CFi,t-J, to capture the impact of net worth on
inventory activity. The coefficients of CFi,I-J are positive and all significant across firm
groups except for the estimation that uses low dividend firms as component of interaction
terms. The sums of coefficients of CFi,t-J and CF i.t-I *TYPEjl are larger for small, young,
secure, less indebted, and high dividend firms compared to those of their counterparts,
namely large, old, risky, highly indebted and low dividend firms. These results support the
cash flow hypothesis forwarded by Fazzari et al. (1988), i.e. investment activity of
financially constrained firms is more sensitive to internal funds or net worth, when we
categorize firms according to size and age but they do not support this hypothesis for other
splitting criteria'". Apparently, these findings do not capture the restrictive impact of the
tight policy on inventory investment because of the estimation period used where micro
and macro conditions have been supportive for getting external finance.
We use the level and one lag of sales growth rate, GSiI• to capture the impact of the
change in expected sales. The coefficients of sales growth and its lag are positive and
significant for all regressions but those of the lag are smaller in absolute values. The
coefficients of sales growth for small, risky, young, highly indebted, low dividend firms
are higher than their counterparts; inventory growth of more constrained firm groups are
more sensitive to sales growth expectations. We also use one lag of the ratio of inventory
to sales, RlNVSt-J following Kashyap et al. (1994) to capture the adjustment of inventories
36 We ~hould be a~are that the c~sh flow,sensitivity of investments is expected to be higher especially for
financially constrained firms dunng the tight periods as tested by Guariglia (1999),
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to their long term target. Negative and significant coefficients are generally found for this
variable. An increase of inventory-sales ratio in the previous period leads to a reduction in
current inventory investment, which is consistent with the inventory target approach.
6.5.2. Employment Growth Estimation Results
As we explained above in our employment growth equation, we add two new variables to
capture employment dynamics, namely the change in the real wage (and its lag) and of
the real tangible assets that represent the capital stock of firms but we drop the RlNVSit
which is directly related to the inventory target adjustment dynamics. We treat the lags of
employment growth, the mix, cash flow, sales growth, real tangible assets growth, real
wage growth, and the interactions terms as endogenous (or predetermined) variables. We
use three and four lags of level endogenous variables as instrumental variables in the
difference GMM procedure to obtain consistent estimations. If we use two and three lags
instead of three and four lags as in the case of the inventory investment equation, the
Sargan test rejects the hypothesis of the validity of instruments therefore we tend to use
three and four lags by which the Sargan test does not reject this hypothesis for all
regressions. We also use the first differences of the cumulative base rate, age, the GDP
growth rate and rating score as instrumental variables. Formally, our instrumental
variables for the employment growth equation are GEA1Pu-3, GEMP;,'-4, GSi,I-3, GSU-3,
MIX;,1-3, MIX;,1-3, (MIX* TYPE) i,,-3, (AfIX* TYPE) i,1-4, CFU-3, CF;,1-4, (CF* TYPE) U-3,
(CF*TYPE)u-4, GRTAu-3, GRTAu-4, GWU-3, GWU-4, the first differences of BRA TE"
GDP" AGEiI, and SCORE;" and year dummies. In the employment growth model, both the
hypotheses of no second order autocorrelation and of the validity of instrumental variable
based on the Sargan statistic were not rejected. Therefore, our employment growth model
is specified with the valid instruments. The estimation results with the one-step GMM
across finn characteristics are reported in Table 6.537•
Although the coefficients of the monetary stance variable, BRA TE" are all negative
for all estimations, they are smaller in absolute terms in the employment model compared
to those in the inventory investment model and do not differ across estimations
significantly. These coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level only for estimations
37 As in the case of inventory growth model, the Sargan statistics are from the two-step GMM procedure.
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where risky, young, and old firm dummies are used as component of interaction terms
and for the estimation without interaction terms. These results imply that inventory
investment growth is more sensitive to interest rates than employment growth. Contrary
to the inventory investment growth model, adding interaction terms that capture financial
variables and firm characteristics to the model does not change the value of the
coefficients of BRATEt significantly.
The estimated coefficients for the mix are positive and generally significant but
smaller in the employment growth model. We sum up the coefficients of the mix and its
interaction terms across firm characteristics; we find out that the summed coefficient for
large firms is negative while that for small firms is positive and very large. This result
confirms our findings from the inventory investment growth model discussed above
implying that having access to bank finance is more important for small firms than large
firms for their inventory and employment behaviours. The coefficients of the interaction
terms for other firm groups are generally insignificant therefore we analyse only the
coefficients of the mix across various regressions. The coefficients of the mix for young,
risky, less indebted firms and low dividend ratio firms are larger than those of their
counterparts. Overall, the findings for the mix and the cumulative base rate imply that the
employment growth is less sensitive to monetary policy stance and the composition of
external finance compared to inventory growth. This is not totally surprising since after
all inventories are held to shelter firms from costly adjustment to production and
employment.
One lag of the cash flow, CFi,t-J, explains the employment growth significantly as in
the case of inventory growth. The coefficients for this variable are positive and significant
in all estimations and they are larger for constrained firm groups, namely small, low
dividend, risky and young firms compared to their counterparts with the exception of high
indebted firms when we do not consider the coefficients of interaction terms, Persistently
positive coefficients for CFi,t-1 across various regressions imply that the net worth
position of firms is important for employment decisions; this result supports the findings
of Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) where the ratio of interest payments to cash flow has
negative impact on employment after controlling for current and expected wages and
demand.
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We sum up the coefficients of significant interaction terms and CFu-1 and find out
that the coefficients for small, secure, and young firm group are larger than those for their
counterparts. When we consider the interaction terms for the cash flow across firm types
we do not find strong evidence supporting the cash flow hypothesis. In other words, the
interaction terms for financially constrained firms are not generally larger than those of
unconstrained firms. One possible reason for this is the period of our analysis, that is,
firms are less likely to be subject to financial constraints during the 1993-1999 period.
Another possible reason may be related to our taxonomy that may not reflect the degree
of financing constraints properly.
Nickell and Nicolitas (1999) use capital and wage among the explanatory variables
in their employment model. We also use the change in the log of real tangible assets to
reflect the change in the capital stock, GRTAit and the change in the log of real wage,
GWjt, and its lag, GW;.t-l, in our estimations. The coefficients for GRTAu arc positive
across estimations as expected but not significant. The coefficient for GWit are positive
and significant while those for GW;.t-I are negative and significant in all estimations. The
sum of coefficients for GW;t and GWU-I are negative for all estimations; we may
conclude that employment growth declines with the overall real wage growth.
The coefficients for the first lag of employment growth are negative and generally
significant across regressions but those for the second lag are rarely significant. These
coefficients for the lags of employment growth are generally smaller in absolute term
than those for the lags of inventory investment growth. The coefficients for sales growth,
GSi/, are positive and significant but those for its lag are negative but insignificant. These
variables are considered to reflect industrial demand conditions. Although we do not
report the coefficients for the year dummies here, they are generally significant.
6.6. Conclusion
Recently the literature has emphasized the fact that monetary policy shocks transmit
asymmetrically to the financial and real activity of the corporate sector, In this context,
studies employing micro data are very helpful for understanding this transmission in
depth. Such efforts produce valuable information for the policy makers. In this study, we
use a very large sample that enables us to split firms according to their size, rating, age,
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dividend payout ratio and indebtedness. This sort of analysis reduces the potential
problems encountered with aggregation. In addition, the channels of credit, namely the
bank lending and the balance sheet channels are well identified by this methodology.
Incorporating the role of financial variables following the development of the
literature on asymmetric information, incentive and agency problems has extended the
traditional theories of investment. The financial structure of firms and thus the shocks that
affect this structure may play an important role on their real activity. Many studies use the
cash flows that reflect the financial position of firms to explain inventory and fixed
investment. In this context, there is no agreement on the impact of cash flow on the
investment activity of firms across finn groups having different degrees of informational
problems. Apparently, firms with various default risks react differently to external shocks
including monetary policy shocks. Including cash flow among the explanatory variables
for investment may not be sufficient to capture the financial structure of firms because it
may also reflect investment opportunities. We add the financial mix as an explanatory
variable in order to obtain a well-identified model as proposed by Kashyap et al. (1993).
We use the interaction term approach in our econometric model to explain
inventory investment and employment growth. Econometric evidence shows that both the
financial mix and cash flow explain inventory investment and employment quite well
after controlling for firm characteristics, cost and demand conditions. The mix captures
the importance of bank finance and the bank-lending channel, while cash flow captures
information for the net worth position of firms and the balance sheet channel. Estimation
results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms for the mix and cash flow differ
across firm types. More specifically, we find out that bank finance is less important for
large firms among other firm groups both for investment and employment growth
equations. However, we do not find strong evidence that supports the argument that
inventory and employment activity of firms that are classified in groups representing
financially constrained firms, namely small, risky, young, highly indebted and low
dividend ratio groups are more sensitive to the mix and cash flow compared to their
counterpart groups. In fact, we think that since our sample period coincides with positive
macro and micro conditions for firms with financial difficulties, the financial constraining
hypothesis is not supported strongly by the empirical findings.
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The empirical evidence also shows that the cumulative base rate reflecting the
monetary policy stance has a restrictive impact on both inventory investment and
employment but this impact is stronger for inventory investment. In addition, the
sensitivity of inventory investment to the cumulative base rate changes significantly after
using the interaction terms that control for firm characteristics and financial variables. In
short, we may claim that the financial positions of firms are important for both inventory
investment and employment growth. It seems that the interest rate channel is stronger for
inventories while we observe some evidence of the credit channel for both inventories
and employment.
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Table 6.4: Inventory Investment Growth: Controlling for Firm Types and Financial Variables
Without
Inter. Terms TYPE=Small TYPE=Large TYPE=Risky TYPE=Secure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GINV1,I_J -0.204 *** -0.200 *** -0.209*** -0.192 *** -0.186***
-(12.90) -(11.90) -(12.00) -(11.70) -(11.30)
GINV,,1_2 -0.031 *** -0.024** -0.031 *** -0.022 ** -0.024 **
-(3.03) -(2.19) -(2.73) -(2.02) -(2.21)
as, 1.112 *** 1.125 *** 0.999 *** 0.994 *** 0.867***
(14.70) (14.60) (11.80) (13.20) (10.60)
GS"I_J 0.092 *** 0.070*** 0.062 *** 0.078*** 0.076***
(5.24) (3.61) (3.13) (4.18) (4.05)
MIXit 0.357*** 0.345 *** -0.067 0.082 *** 0.282 ***
(7.27) (6.66) -(0.63) (1.33) (5.73)
MIXil*TYPEit 0.000 0.009 *** 0.004 *** -0.004 ***
-(0.10) (4.31) (6.59) -(6.35)
CF"I_I 0.027 *** 0.036*** 0.061 *** 0.028*** 0.033***
(3.07) (3.96) (5.05) (3.02) (3.56)
CFi,t_I*TYPEit -0.007 -0.054 *** -0.003 * 0.005 ***
-(0.96) -(3.39) -(1.67) (3.50)
BRA TE, -0.003 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 * 0.000 0.000
-(3.06) -(2.02) -(1.94) -(0.40) -(0.35)
RINVSi,,_I -2.791 *** -2.625 *** -2.388 *** -2.220 *** -2.023 ***
-(12.20) -(11.00) -(9.39) -(9.45) -(8.38)
CONS 0.014 0.016 0.017 * 0.026 *** 0.030***
( 1.47) (1.55) (1.67) (2.57) (3.05)
Sargan Test 208.70 [0.00] 187.80 [0.00] 150.90 [0.00] 151.30 [0.00] 166.50 [0.00]
ml -33.52 [0.00] -28.89 [0.00] -24.94 [0.00] -29.33 [0.00] -29.94 [0.00]
m2 -0.76 [0.45] 0.06 [0.951 0.52 [0.601 -0.14 [0.891 0.28 [0.781
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; .. * significant at 1%, Heteroscedasticity consistent robust t-statistics in
parenthesis. All equations include time dummies. There are 8,609 firms and 33,264 observations.
Difference GMM Results: Dependent variable: inventory growth, GINVII. Explanatory variables: two lags of tile
dependent variable; GINVi.I.J. GINV;.I_l, sales growth and its lag; GSj" GSU'I' ratio of bank loans to total current
liabilities; MIXi,l' lag of real cash flow, CFi,I_1tinteraction terms for the mix and cash flow across firm types;
MIX it *TYPEit iv CF iI-I *TYPEil, cumulative base rate; BRATE" the ratio of inventories to sales; RINVSi 1.1; constant
term and year dummies, '
All variables except BRATE, are treated as endogenous or predetermined variables. We use two and three lags of
these variables, namely GINV;.I.l, GINVi".J, GSi,'.l, GSi,I.J,MIXi.I•1, MIX;".J, (MIX*TYPElt".2, (MIX*TYI'Eh'.J, CFU_1'
CFi,,_J, (CF*TYPE)i,'.l, (CF*TYPE)i,'.J, RINVSi".z and RINVSi".J, and the first differences of BRATE" GDP" and AGE"
as instrumental variables. In the first column we do not use interaction terms as explanatory variables therefore we do
not include their lags the in instrument set.
Estimations are based on the firm type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for MIX,.I.
and CFi,'.J . For example, in the second column, we use the interaction terms for the financial variables that are based
on the small firm dummy as explanatory variables. The corresponding estimations for various firm types are reported
in the following columns.
Estimations results are from the one-step GMM procedure except the Sargan test which is obtained from the two-step
procedure. Second order autocorrelation tests, mZ, do not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error
terms for all regressions, while the Sargan tests reject the hypothesis of the validity of over-identifying restrictions,
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Table 6.4: Inventory Investment Growth: Controlling for Firm Types and Financial Variables
(Continued)
TYPE= TYPE= TYPE=lligl. TYPE=Less TYPE=Low T}'PE=I1igh
Young Old Indebted Indebted Dividend Dividend
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
GIN~,'_I -0.196*** -0.194*** -0.190*** -0.183 *** -0.184*** -0.199 ***
-(11.7) -(11.5) -(11.5) -(10.7) -(10.3) -(11.8)
GINVI,I_2 -0.024** -0.022** -0.025 ** -0.022 ** -0.012 -0.024 **
-(2.16) -(2.00) -(2.28) -(1.98) -(1.09) -(2.17)
GS;, 1.090*** 1.083 *** 0.953 *** 0.898 *** 1.250 *** 1.077 ***
(14.20) (14.00) (11.50) (9.84) (13.60) (13.40)
GS;,I_I 0.070*** 0.071 *** 0.071 *** 0.068·** 0.055··· 0.067···
(3.64) (3.70) (3.80) (3.63) (2.75) (3.50)
MIX;, 0.418 *** 0.383·** 0.110 0.241 *** 0.207 *** 0.131
(8.03) (4.41) (1.40) (4.25) (3.10) (1.53)
MIX It*TYPEIt -0.251 *** -0.087 0.003 *** -0.010*** 0.040 0.274*"
-(2.84) -(0.31) (3.89) -(4.04) (0.26) (2.82)
CFI,I_I 0.032 *** 0.038*** 0.033 *.* 0.035 *** 0.012 0.037 ***
(3.40) (4.05) (3.72) (3.82) (1.32) (4.06)
CF 1,1-1*TYPEII 0.007 -0.033* -0.008 *• • 0.005 ** -0.030·· -0.002
(1.36) -(1.67) -(4.03) (2.54) -(2.21 ) -(1.22)
BRA TE, -0.002 * -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 ... -0.002 •
-(1.88) -(1.61) -(1.17) -(1.09) -(2.97) -(1.84)
RINVS1,1_1 -2.558 **. -2.608*** -2.235 *** -2.264 ... -2.946··· -2.500·"
-(10.8) -(10.5) -(9.3) -(9.3) -(11.2) -(10.4)
CONS 0.017 • 0.022** 0.023 ** 0.024** 0.001 0.Ql5
(1.69) (2.15) (2.33) (2.40) (0.08) (1.51)
Sargan Test 178.10 [0.00] 182.40 [0.00] 174.50 [0.00] 164.40 [0.00] 163.40 [0.00) 168.30 [0.00]
ml -28.39 [0.00] -29.30[0.00 ] -29.36 [0.00] -31.15 [0.00) -25.27 [0.00] -28.77 [0.00]
m2 0.18 [0.86] 0.08 [0.94] 0.21 [0.83] 0.35 [0.721 -0.28 [0.781 0.14 [0.891
• significant at 10%; • • significant at 5%; • • • significant at 1%, Hetcrosccdasticity consistent robust t-statistics in
parenthesis. All equations include time dummies. There are 8,609 firms and 33,264observations.
Difference GMM Results: Dependent variable: inventory growth, GINV;I' Explanatory variables: two lags of the
dependent variable; GINV1.,_I, GINVi,,_z, sales growth and its lag; GSih GS;,I_I, ratio of bank loans to total current
liabilities; MIXi,l' lag of real cash flow, CFI.t_/, interaction terms for the mix and cash flow across firm types;
MIX It*TYPEIt ;1' CF; I_I·TYPE;" cumulative base rate; BRATE" the ratio of inventories to sales; RINVS,.,.I; constant
tenn and year dummies.
All variables except BRATE, are treated as endogenous or predetermined variables. We use two and three lags of
these variables, namely GINV1,,_z. GINVI.t_3, GSi,,_1, GSi,I_J, MIX~I_l' MIX;,I_J, (MIX·TYI'E)I.I_1. (MIX·TYI'Eh,.J, CFU'1'
CFI.I_J, (CF*TYPE)i.t_l, (CF*TYPE)i,I_J, RINVSi.t_l and RINVSj,I_J. and the first differences of BRATE,. (;/)1',. and AG/~I'
as instrumental variables. In the first column we do not use interaction terms as explanatory variables therefore we do
not include their lags in the instrument set.
Estimations are based on the finn type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for MIX",
and CFi,I_1' For example, in the second column. we use the interaction terms for the financial variables that are based
on the small firm dummy as explanatory variables. The corresponding estimations for various firm types are reported
in the following columns.
Estimations results are from the one-step GMM procedure except the Sargan test which is obtained from the two-step
procedure. Second order autocorrelation tests, mz, do not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error
terms for all regressions, while the Sargan tests reject the hypothesis of the validity of over-identifying restrictions.
227
ChapterSix Financial Constraints, Inventories and Employment in the UKManufacturing
Table 6.5: Employment Growth: Controlling for Firm Types and Financial Variables
Without
Inter. Terms TYPE=Smali TYPE=Large TYPE=Risky TYPE=Secure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GEMPi,,-1 -0.060 ** -0.118 ** -0.100 ** -0.047 -0.077 *
-(2.31) -(2.41) -(2.13) -(1.04) -(1.71)
GEMP,.,_l 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.26) (0.61) (0.36) (0.02) (0.11 )
GSu 0.296 *** 0.204 *** 0.232 *** 0.293 *** 0.254 ***
(4.74) (3.14) (3.96) (4.65) (3.97)
GSi,,-1 -0.020 -0.077 -0.036 -0.005 -0.004
-(0.41) -(1.46) -(0.69) -(0.11 ) -(0.09)
MIX;, 0.092 *** 0.041 0.158 *** 0.085 *** 0.088 *
(3.47) (1.17) (2.98) (2.79) (1.86)
MIXu*TYPE;, 0.467 *** -0.166 * 0.107 0.025
(2.56) -(1.83) (0.63) (0.30)
CFi,,-1 0.040 *** 0.067 ** 0.056 * 0.043 *** 0.030 **
(2.58) (2.42) (1.78) (2.81) (2.03)
CF 1.'-1*TYPEu 0.059 ** -0.037 * -0.035 0.043 ***
(2.04) -(1.77) -(1.22) (2.57)
BRATE, -0.001 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 * -0.001
-(1.78) -(1.31) -(1.40) -(1.79) -(1.52)
GRTA11 0.050 0.095 0.084 0.037 0.046
(0.93) (1.62) (1.59) (0.72) (0.88)
GWu 0.175 ** 0.270 *** 0.221 *** 0.198 *** 0.238 ***
(2.43) (3.59) (3.61) (2.74) (2.84)
GW,.1_I -0.305 *** -0.444 *** -0.400 *** -0.308 *** -0.346 ***
-(4.68) -(6.88) -(7.32) -(4.68) -(4.64)
Constant 0.017 *** 0.011 0.018 * 0.015 ** 0.013 *
(2.59) (1.45) (2.73) (2.28) (1.91 )
Sargan Test 69.59 [0.24] 66.45 [0.63] 72.86 [0.16] 89.92 [0.26] 96.10 [0.14]
ml -9.18 [0.00] -10.23 [0.00] -9.45 [O.OO} -9.62 [O.OO} -10.31 [O.OO}
m2 0.25 [0.80] -0.08 [0.94] -0.05 [0.96] 0.34 [0.741 0.11 [0.91]
* significant at 10%; .. significant at 5%; .** significant at 1%, Heteroscedasticity consistent robust t-statistics in
parenthesis. All equations include time dummies. There are 8,594 firms and 32,987 observations.
Difference GMM Results: Dependent variable: employment growth, GEMPII. Explanatory variables: two lags of
dependent variable; OEMPi.t_I. GEMPI.,_l. sales growth and its lag; GS;" OSI,I'/' ratio of bank loans to total current
liabilities; MIX;.I' the lag of real cash flow, CFI.I.1; interaction terms for the mix and cash flow across firm types;
MIX it *TYPE,III• CF 11.1*TYPEIt, cumulative base rate; BRA TE" the tangible asset growth; ORTA;I; wage growth and
its lag, GWI/, OWi.t./. constant term and year dummies.
All variables except BRATE, are treated as endogenous or predetermined variables. We usc three and four lags of
these variables, namely GEMPu.3• GEMPu.4• OSI.I.J.GSI.,.4.MIXI,I.J. MIXI".4. (MIX*TYPE)I,I.J. (MLPTYPE);.1.4. CFI.I.].
CFj,I.4. (CPTYPE)I,I.J. (CF*TYPE);,1_4.GRTAI.I.J• GRTAu.4, GW,.I.J• OWI,I.4,and the first differences of BRATE" GDP,
and AOE" as instrumental variables. In the first column we do not use interaction terms as explanatory variables
therefore we do not include their lags in the instrument set.
Estimations are based on the firm type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for MIX
and CFj.,.1. For example, in the second column, we use the interaction terms for the financial variables that are based
on the small firm dummy as explanatory variables. The corresponding estimations for various firm types are reported
in the following columns.
Estimations results are from the one-~tep OMM procedure e.xcept the Sargan.test which is obtained from the two-step
procedure. Second order autocorrelation tests, m), do not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error
terms for all regressions. Contrary to the inventory investment model, the Sargan tests do not reject the hypothesis of
the validity of over-identifying restrictions in the employment model.
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Table 6.5: Employment Growth: Controlling for Firm Types and Financial Variables (Cont.)
TYPE= TYPE= TYPE=High TYPE=Less TYPE=Low TYPE=lligh
Young Old Indebted Indebted Dividend Dividend
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
GEMP1.t-l -0.061 * -0.067** -0.063 -0.078 * -0.055 -0.074 *
-(1.84) -(2.19) -(1.39) -(1.65) -(1.22) -( 1.68)
GEMPl,t_J 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.07) (0.16) (0.05) (0.46) (0.14) (0.26)
GSu 0.281 *** 0.279*** 0.276 *** 0.267*** 0.253 *** 0.254 ***
(4.4 7) (4.68) (4.48) (4.33) (3.84) (3.98)
GS1• t-I -0.013 -0.008 0.005 -0.019 -0.020 -0.009
-(0.25) -(0.16) (0.11) -(0.40) -(0.40) -(0.19)
MIXIt 0.159*** 0.069** 0.098 *** 0.139 *** 0.164 *** 0.068**
(2.59) (2.26) (3.45) (3.12) (3.26) (2.44)
MIX1,*TYPEII -0.138 0.136 -0.022 -0.157 -0.232 0.197
-( 1.27) ( 1.00) -(0.41) -(1.33) -(0.77) (1.05)
CF1.I_I 0.072 *** 0.040*** 0.037** 0.046*** 0.062 *** 0.034 ***
(3.59) (2.72) (2.53) (2.64) (2.96) (2.57)
CF l, 1-1*TYPEIt -0.063 *** -0.044* 0.002 -0.010 -0.054 ** 0.017
-(3.30) -(1.70) (0.67) -(0.81) -(2.48) (0.51)
BRA TE, -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-(1.66) -(1.76) -(1.57) -(1.29) -(1.42) -(1.49)
GRTA1I 0.052 0.046 0.046 0.049 0.049 0.063
(1.00) (0.88) (0.87) (0.93) (0.99) ( 1.19)
GWu 0.200** 0.l99*** 0.204*** 0.214 *** 0.206** 0.181 **
(2.53) (2.89) (2.86) (2.98) (2.53) (2.37)
GW1•I_I -0.327 *** -0.324 *** -0.322 *** -0.343 *** -0.329*** -0.320***
-(4.67) -(5.28) -(5.09) -(5.61) -(4.67) -(4.87)
CONS 0.014 ** 0.016*** 0.016 ** 0.018 *** 0.016** 0.018 ***
(2.11 ) (2.58) (2.46) (2.72) (2.28) (2.69)
Sargan Test 83.64 [0.43] 86.16 [0.36] 83.85 [0.42] 93.86 [0.18] 83.09 [0.45] 95.86 [0.141
mI -9.99 [0.00] -9.50 [0.00] -9.75 [0.00] -9.53 [0.00] -9.82 [0.00] -9.54 [0.00]
m2 0.65 rO.521 0.34 rO.74] 0.35 [0.721 0.02 [0.981 0.11 rO.91l -0.23 rO.82]
* significant at 10%; .. significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Heteroscedasticity consistent robust t-statistics in
parenthesis. All equations include time dummies. There are 8,594 firms and 32.987 observations.
Difference GMM Results: Dependent variable: employment growth, CEMP;,. Explanatory variables: two lags of
dependent variable; GEMPi.,.l.GEMPi".I. sales growth and its lag; CS;" CS;".I. ratio of bank loans to total current
liabilities; MIX;", the lag of real cash flow, CFi,'.1 ; interaction terms for the mix and cash flow across firm types;
MIXII*TYPEuit• CF it./*TYPEu, cumulative base rate; BRATE" the tangible asset growth; CRTAi,; wage growth and
its lag, C~" GWi"./. constant term and year dummies.
All variables except BRA TE, are treated as endogenous or predetermined variables. We usc three and four lags of
these variables. namely GEMPi,t_3. GEMPi,t.4. GS;,'_3. GS;,,_4. MIXu_J• MIX;,,_4. (MIX*TYPE);,'.3. (MIX*TYPE)i,'.4. CFU·3•
CF i".4. (CF*TYPE)i".J. (CF*TYPE)i,'.4. GRTA;,,_J. GRTAi,t.4, GWI,t.J. GWi".4. and the first differences of BRATE,. GDP,
and AGEit as instrumental variables. In the first column we do not use interaction terms as explanatory variables
therefore we do not include their lags in the instrument set.
Estimations are based on ~hefirm type dummies that are employed as component of the interaction terms for MIX;",
and eFi,,_1 . For example, In the second column, we use the interaction terms for the financial variables that are based
on the small firm dummy as explanatory variables. The corresponding estimations for various firm types are reported
in the following columns.
Estimations results are from the one-~tep GMM procedure except the Sargan test which is obtained from the two-step
procedure, Second order autocorrelation tests, mI, do not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error
terms for all regressions. Contrary to the inventory investment model. the Sargan tests do not reject the hypothesis of
the validity of over-identifying restrictions in the employment model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Selectivity Bias and the FAME Sample
7.1. Introduction
When undertaking empirical analysis, standard estimation methods generally employ a
random sample assumption concerning samples. Parameters, which are estimated by
using such samples, are expected to be unbiased, efficient, consistent, and sufficient after
removing some diagnostic problems. For example, in a regression analysis, the estimated
parameters are expected to be good representatives of population parameters where the
standard regression assumptions hold. However, because of sample behaviour and the
way some economic data sets are collected, available panel data samples are less likely to
be balanced and complete.
Many economic surveys are carried out based on 'selection rules' that lead to non-
random samples. Such sampling is generally called truncated, censored, or incomplete.
One classical example of incomplete sampling is related with the female labour supply,
where hours worked are observed only for women who decide to participate in the labour
force (Gronau, 1974 and Heckman, 1976). Powell (1994) gives a further review of
literature for the cross-sectional data. For panel data, in addition to unobserved
heterogeneity, the sample selectivity problem should be considered in order to produce
consistent and efficient estimators. Since the seminal contributions of Heckman (1976,
1979), it is known that inferences based on either balanced sub-panels or unbalanced
panels without correcting for selectivity bias may be subject to bias if the non-response is
endogenously determined.
Another typical example of incomplete samples relates to measuring the impact of
worker eligibility on family wealth. Wealth is assumed to be dependent on income,
education, age and a binary variable that indicates whether people belong to a pension
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plan or not. The sample covers people whose net wealth is under a threshold. In this
example, the sample is truncated based on a response variable i.e. wealth.
It is generally claimed that sampling based on a response variable is much more
serious in terms of inferences made from the sample than sampling based on an
exogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2002). Alternatively, however, suppose that
we want to estimate a model of desired labour supply. One can only observe working
hours for those employed, with zero working hours assumed for non-working people. In
this case desired working hours for non-working people are censored from below at zero.
In short, for a typical truncated sample we observe only a restricted part of the population,
thus in a regression analysis with a truncated sample, we do not observe both dependent
and explanatory variables for part of the population. However, in a censored sample we
may observe explanatory variables, but we can observe the dependent variable only
partially.
Truncated or censored samples lead to incorrect inferences about the population if
standard methods of random samples are employed to estimate the parameters of interest.
Many existing panels suffer from missing observations, not only due to selectivity bias,
which can lead to truncated or censored samples, but also due to the non-response of
agents or attrition (Verbeek and Nijman, 1996). Non-response occurs, for example, when
the individuals refuse to participate in surveys or answer particular questions. Therefore,
incomplete samples whether censored, truncated, or affected by non-response or attrition
require sophisticated methods that consider selectivity bias and other problems in the data
collection process. Before adopting alternative techniques for non-random samples it is
crucial to understand the selection rules and make decisions on whether these rules are
ignorable (in terms of the properties of estimators concerned). There are also cases where
the estimated parameters are not affected by the estimation method even though the
samples concerned are not random.
A variety of models have been adopted in the literature based on selection
mechanisms and data collection problems. Wooldridge (2002) provides a survey of these
models. We will introduce some basic models and literature on measurement and
correction of selection bias in the next section. The discussion will highlight possible
methods that are likely to be used to test for selectivity bias concerned with the FAME
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sample. In the third section we carry out some estimations based on simple methods
discussed in the previous section in order to test the hypothesis of selection bias for the
FAME sample. In the final section the findings will be summarised.
7.2. Theoretical Background
As outlined above, truncated regression estimates a model of a dependent variable on
independent variables from a restricted part of a population. Truncation is a characteristic
of a distribution from which the sample data are drawn. Assuming the following linear
conditional expectation model;
Yi=xJ3 +u, where E(y/xJ =xJ3 (7.1)
The standard regression analysis is not valid here to estimate pifthe data are drawn based
on a selection rule. Unlike in the case where the selection is based only on Xi, the selection
based on Yi causes problems for standard OLS analyses. Assume that Yi is truncated based
on the following selection rule,
(7.2)
where a, and a2 are constant numbers. If Yi and Xi are drawn randomly and Yi falls in the
interval (ai, az), then both Yi and Xi are observed, otherwise Yi or Xi is not observed. The
density function of'y, is formulated conditional on Si and Xi.
[(y/si= l,xJ =[(y)/{F(az/xi. f3)-F(a/xi. f3)] (7.3)
If the population conditional distribution is assumed to be normal (x;f3, cl), and the
parameters are estimated by the 'maximum likelihood method', then this model is called
truncated Tobit or truncated normal regression. If the selection mechanism is defined in
terms of a regression equation, this model may be called type II Tobit, that is,
(7.4)
(7.5)
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wherey I is observed only when Y2= J, uland V2are independent of X and z with zero mean
(exogeneity of x and z). V2has a standard normal distribution and E(U/V2)= Y1V2and z is a
set of explanatory variables possibly including some of XI. If these assumptions hold we
get the following equation.
(7.6)
If the hypothesis of Y= 0 is not rejected, that is UI and V2 are not correlated, then
E(y/xI) = XIPI. In other words, there is no selectivity bias with the sample and PI can be
consistently estimated by OLS by using the selected sample. What would be the case if
the hypothesis of Y= 0 is rejected?
(7.7)
where E(V/X,Y2) = h(z,ylJ· If we observe h(z,ylJ, the coefficients, PI and YI, can be
estimated from equation (7.7) directly. That is, because the selected sample has the
dependent variable (y2=J), we need only find out the following term:
(7.8)
where ).,(X02) is called the inverse Mills ratio and is equal to </J(zoJJ Id) (Z02 ); the
numerator is the density function and the denominator is the distribution function.
Heckman (1974, 1976) used this method to overcome inconsistent estimations in case of
selectivity bias that can be considered as an omitted variable problem in the selected
sample.
(7.9)
In the case where 02 is not known, the additional regressor cannot be estimated directly.
Nevertheless, 02 can be estimated consistently by using the first stage probit of the
selected equation. This method allows us to test the selectivity bias if the selection rule is
known. Once Yil = XilPl +Yl).,(zOi2) is estimated by using OLS, we can test for selectivity
bias under null hypothesis of no selection bias, Ho: YI=O.
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A similar methodology can be adopted for a standard censored Tobit model given
below:
(7.10)
(7.11)
where (x, y.z) is observed in the population and Yl is observed only if Y2 >0. ui and V2 are
assumed to be independent of z with zero mean, V2 has a standard normal distribution and
E(uJiv2)= y,V2. These assumptions are similar to the truncated model given above. The
only difference is that the variance of V2 is unknown, since Y2 is censored (as opposed to
using a binary variable).
An example given by Wooldridge (2002), below, shows how the selection rule or
mechanism does not constrain the dependent variable but the explanatory variables 1. The
structural equation of interest is
log(wage)= z,8, + ability + v where E(vlz}, ability, IQ)=O
and assume that IQ is a proxy for ability, that is,
ability = (}JlQ + e, where E(elz"IQ)=O
log(wage)= Z}o, + BJlQ + U where u = v + e and E(ulz}, IQ)=O
Assume that the sample excludes people whose IQ is below a fixed value. Let s be a
binary selection indicator representing a random draw from the population and s= 1 if we
use the draw in estimation and s=O if we do not because data for at least some elements of
variables in concern are unobserved due to survey design, non-response, or incidental
truncation. In this example the selection indicator is a deterministic function of an
exogenous variable, IQ, then E(u/z},s;JQ) = O. Therefore, OLS estimation of the wage
equation will be consistent. However, if the probability of missing data is higher at lower
I I~ the F~ME data set~selection is not directly related to dependent variable of our empirical model
estimated IIIChapter Five, but the dependent variables, the mix, inventory investment and employment
growth are conditional on firm size.
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IQs (because of people's reluctance to give permission to obtain IQ scores), then the
conditional expected value of u, E(U/ZI,S;IQ), is not equal to the unconditional expected
value, E(u). The reasons for missing data may be systematically related to disturbance
term and in this case leads to inconsistent OLS estimators. In short, even though IQ is
exogenous in the population equation, the endogenous selection rule makes it
endogenous. Therefore, we need to adopt a correction mechanism for the selectivity bias
to have consistent estimations. One way to do that is to introduce a variable, V, which
controls for selection mechanisms. This variable should be independent of the
explanatory variables but not necessarily independent of the disturbance term, u.
log(wage)= ZIOI + BdQ + PV + E
In this example, it is assumed that the selection indicator, s, is a function of zi, IQ and V,
therefore E(dzl, IQ, V. s)=O. Including V in the regression of the selected sub-sample
eliminates the selection bias and allows us to consistently estimate 01 and 01• Since V is
independent from Z} and IQ, we would not have to include it to obtain consistent
estimates if we had a random sample. If the hypothesis, P=O, is not rejected then the
sample selectivity problem can be ignorable. Including V would result in asymptotically
more efficient estimators when the conditional variance of the dependent variable is
homoscedastic.
If missing observations in a panel data set are non-random applied estimators may
be inconsistent as in the case of truncated and censored samples. Therefore, the problems
of non-response and attrition in panel data should be considered in detail in addition to
understanding the selection rules to make decisions on whether these rules arc ignorable
or not in terms properties of the estimators concerned (Verbeck and Nijman, 1996). Finns
may not report the information under concern regularly through the sample period
depending on various reasons or because of selection rules or firms may not be
categorised in the sample. For example, in addition to the selection mechanism
underneath the FAME data set, finn entry or exit rates, flexibility in data collection rules,
and other reasons of poor reporting determine the extent of missing observations. In fact,
panel data sets on firms' balance sheets and profit loss accounts arc more likely to be
unbalanced rather than balanced.
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Understanding the selection rule and correcting, if any, the selectivity bias involves
some computational difficulties. Therefore, the best strategy is to adopt some preliminary
and computationally easy techniques to establish whether selectivity bias is present or not
and ignorable or not. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Wooldridge (1995) proposed some
methods for testing and correcting for sample selection bias in panel data models. We
summarise what these papers suggest and then discuss the possible techniques that we can
use in our empirical models estimated in Chapters Five and Six in relation to the FAME
data set.
Even if the selection mechanism or response process is known, the estimation of a
full model, which includes a response equation, may be quite difficult because of missing
observations. A Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) may be one solution, which estimates the
model only under the null hypothesis; however, there are some difficulties with the LM
test. By this method it may not be straightforward to calculate the LM test statistics
because the value of this statistic is very much dependent upon the specification of the
selection mechanism and distributional assumptions. Instead, it may be more practical to
have some simple test to check for the presence of selectivity bias without having to
estimate the full model, or to specify a response or selection equation (Baltagi 2002).
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) proposed some simple tests for cases where
observations for endogenous variables are missing for some individuals in some periods.
They produced fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators for two models.
Firstly, coefficients are estimated from an unbalanced panel sample where the dependent
variable is not observed for some periods. Secondly, a sub-balanced panel sample where
the dependent variable is observed across all time and individuals is extracted from an
unbalanced sample. Based on these estimators, they construct quasi-Hausman tests of
selectivity bias given as;
f\ f\ f\
~D = N P'D'(DV D')- D P (7.12)
f\
where P is 4k dimensional vector with FE, and RE estimates of coefficients in balanced
and unbalanced samples. N is the number of observations, D denotes the matrix of
1\
restrictions, and V is the variance covariance matrix given in Verbeck and Nijman (1992).
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Verbeek and Nijman (1992) also proposed some tests based on variable addition;
the LM test and two-step estimation and testing procedure in the spirit of Heckman (1976,
1979). In addition, they have shown that the FE estimators are more robust for selectivity
bias than the RE estimator. Nijman and Verbeek (1992) use similar techniques to test
selectivity bias in a life cycle consumption function. For the random effects model,
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) suggest to include three simple variables in the regression to
check for the presence of selection bias. First, there is a variable that shows the number of
waves for the jth individual in the panel, T;, second there is a binary variable taking the
T
value one if and only if the ith individual is observed over entire the sample, n stl = 1,
rEI
and third, there is a variable that indicates whether the individual was present in the last
period, Si,t-l. Such tests have the advantage of computational simplicity and need only
observation, Xit, when Sit= 1.
Wooldridge (1995) relaxes some assumptions of this approach and uses FE
allowing correlation between unobserved component and observable explanatory
variables to test and correct for selectivity bias. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) consider a
RE model under the assumption of normality and independence of the idiosyncratic error
in both the selection and regression equations and time invariant unobserved effects in
both equations are assumed to be normally distributed.
Wooldridge (1995) derives some simple variable addition tests of selection bias as
well as estimation techniques correcting for selection bias in linear fixed effects model.
He produced some additional variables for the selection bias based on whether the
selection mechanism is observed (or partially observed) or not. For the observed
selectivity bias, the Tobit model is used, while for the unobserved, the probit model is
used, to produce additional repressors. For the former model Tobit residuals and for the
latter model inverse Mill's ratio are added to the empirical model. This framework allows
for arbitrary serial correlation and unconditional heteroskedasticity for disturbances in the
model. Wooldridge (1995) points out that the random effects estimates suggested by
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) maintain a null hypothesis of no correlation between
unobserved effect and regressors. Therefore, random effects estimates could be rejected
even in the absence of selection bias if the unobserved effect and regressors are correlated
or if the selection is based on the unobserved effect.
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In this chapter we employ the technique proposed by Wooldridge (1995) where
only the selection indicator is observed not the selection rule itself. This procedure is
shown below. Suppose the following model with an implicit selectivity mechanism:
(7.13)
E(uiI/aj,Xj, Vj)=PVi/ implying a selectivity bias and s, is a binary variable taking the value
one if variables are not missing and zero otherwise. Then,
(7.14)
In our case where only selection indicator IS observed as given above, y« IS not
conditioned on o,but on Sj.
E(y,/aj,Xj,sJ=aj + Xitf3 +pE(vj/aj,xj,sJ (7.15)
If Vii were independent across t and (aj,xJ then E(v,/aj,xj,sJ = E(vj/xj,SjJ. However, this
assumption is not valid when the structural selection equation contains unobserved
effects.
E(Vj/Xj,Si/=I) = E(v,/xj, Vii> - XjJ) (7.16)
Assuming the variance Vit of is unity, then we have
E(Vj/Zj,siI=l) = E(vj/zj, Vii> - XjJ) = J..(xj8) (7.17)
A(Xjc5) is the inverse Mill ratio. An estimator for the inverse Mill ratio is added to the
model to test the selectivity bias. More specifically, the steps are given below based on
the assumption that E(uj/aj,xj,sJ=O, where t = 1,2, ....., T.
(i) For each t, estimate the equation
P(Sii = llxJ = l/J(xj8)
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Using standard probit and for Sit = 1 compute estimator for the inverse Mill ratio.
A(ii) Estimate Yit= a, + XitP + P),,(x/8) +eit by using fixed effects model
A(iii) Test the Ho: p = 0 using t statistic for p
As mentioned before, the FAME sample does involve a selection rule in which the
data set is truncated in the sense that only firms that satisfy size criteria report some
variables. More specifically, individual companies, which meet criteria for small and
medium-sized status, have some advantages of not preparing detailed accounts relative to
large companies. For small-sized companies, to file a profit and loss account or details on
turnover and the number of employees are not obligatory, they have to file only abridged
balance sheet information that obviously includes some items of assets and liabilities. On
the other hand, medium-sized companies do not have to disclose turnover details.
Currently, companies should satisfy two out the three criteria, namely turnover, balance
sheet (total assets) and number of employees to be classified in terms of size. Based on
this mechanism, the sample is expected to represent relatively the upper tail of the
population in terms of firm size distribution and this may limit the extent to which the
sample represents the population.
However, although missing observations are overwhelmingly connected with the
selection rule, there are other reasons for missing observations. For example, there are a
number of missing observations (supposed to be reported) in turnover even though firms
are classified as large firms based on employment and balance sheet criteria while some
small firms have reported almost complete information even though they are not obliged
to report. The sample includes a large number of missing observations especially during
the first couple of years of the sample period. This implies that the efficiency in the data
collecting process has improved over time.
In addition, some variables have been reported more often relative to others across
years and firms. For example, investment or intangible assets are poorly reported relative
to tangible assets, turnover or rating variables. Therefore, variables that are used in the
model should be selected by considering this fact in the sense that alternative variables
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can be used instead of poorly reported variables or potentially missing variables. For
example, the item of intangible assets involves quite a number of missing observations as
a component of total assets, thus using total assets as a variable in the empirical model
may lead to bias. Because every missing observation for intangible assets is assumed to
be zero in the FAME sample even though we realise that some of these missing
observations are different from zero, and some of them are missing as indicated in the
data set by cross-checking with Datastream and One Source data sets. This implies a
potential problem with the FAME sample in which it is difficult to decide whether the
missing observations are zero or truly missing. It would be worthwhile using an
alternative variable for those firms having a large number of missing observations. In this
respect, it is extremely difficult to employ a regular truncated or censored selectivity
framework for our sample. We rather use the methodology proposed by Verbeek and
Nijman (1992) to test for the selectivity bias.
7.3. Test Results
We will adopt the techniques produced by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Wooldridge
(1995) to test whether the selectivity problem is ignorable or not for the FAME sample.
We use four alternative artificial variables to test the selectivity problem in addition to the
quasi-Hausman selectivity test. If the coefficients of additional variables are significantly
different from zero, the sample involves a selectivity bias. We test this hypothesis for the
empirical models given in Chapters Five and Six, namely the mix and inventory
investment. Assume that we have the following model,
yu=aj+ Xit!3+ Cit,
We added four alternative variables to this model to test the hypothesis of r=O,
yu=aj+Xu!3+ yZ + Cit
Selectivity bias occurs when the conditional expectation of the error terms, E(a +culsj), is
not equal to zero. If the conditional expectation of the error term based on the selection
rule were known one could add regressors, Z, leading to a zero conditional expectation of
the error term. Then standard two step regression procedures would lead to consistent
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estimates. However, E(a +&it1sJ is not identifiable if the selection rule is not known. One
may use some artificial variables, Z. that are likely to determine the probability of
selection (i.e. affecting the distribution of selection score, Si) or variables that are a
function of Si.
Table 7.1 and 7.2 show the estimation results of the model by adding the variables
defined above for two alternative monetary policy stance variables, namely the apparent
interest rate and cumulative base rate, respectively. We only report the results of the
model where the dependent variable is MIXI, the ratio of short-term loans to current
liabilities for three periods, namely whole sample covering 1991-1999, and two sub-
periods in terms of monetary stance, i.e. tight and loose periods. Model I shows the
random effects results without adding artificial variables for all periods to compare with
the other four models in which each includes an artificial variable. Four different
variables are generated (indicated by SVAR) to test for selectivity problems. All models
are estimated by using fixed effects estimators.
Three artificial variables used in Model2, Model 3 and Model4 were adopted from
Verbeek and Nijman (1992). The first one that was used in Model 2 is a binary variable
taking the value one if and only if the ith individual is observed over the entire period
T(balanced sample), 11s/i = 1. The second artificial variable that was used in Model 3 is a
r
binary variable taking the value of one if the individual was present in the last period Si,l-I.
The third one is the number of waves the ith individual participates in the panel, Ti. The
fourth artificial variable in Model 5 was calculated based on Wooldridge (1995) where the
selection mechanism is not observed but a binary variable indicating whether variables in
the model are observed or not is used to calculate the inverse Mill ratio by using probit
model', In contrast to Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 where estimations arc carried out by
random effects procedure; the fixed effects procedure is used in Model 5.
In all estimations, all alternative artificial variables (except for Model 5 in the loose
period) are significantly different from zero. This implies that our sample in general
involves a selectivity bias. Alternatively, in fact, this result is confirmed by using the
2Wooldridge (1995) uses a Tobit model to test selectivity problem if the selection variable is partially
observed.
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statistic proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) (quasi-Hausman test of selectivity
bias)'. On the other hand, the results for the inventory and employment models are mixed
across sub-samples based on firm characteristics. The coefficients of the artificial
variables for the random effects models are not generally significant while the
coefficients of the artificial variable in the fixed effects model proposed by Wooldridge
(1995) are generally significant.
At this stage, it is important to decide whether the selectivity bias is ignorable or
not. A change in the coefficients of the other variables after adding an artificial variable in
the models may give us an idea about the seriousness of the selectivity problem. By
adding the artificial variables the estimations become more consistent (Wooldridge,
2002). Looking at the results in Table 7.l, when the artificial variables are added into the
model, the coefficients of the monetary stance variable, and the apparent interest rate,
ARATE does not change significantly, and these results are consistent with the hypothesis
given in Chapter Five in which the mix is more sensitive to monetary policy during the
tight period than the loose period. More specifically, the coefficients of ARA TE are
negative in all periods but they are relatively larger in absolute value in the period of
1991-19924• Similarly, coefficients of rating, SCORE, total real fixed assets, RASSET,
solvency ratio, SOLV and gearing ratio GEAR, do not change significantly across
different models. However, they generally change across sub-periods reflecting monetary
policy stance as expected. However, the coefficients of AGE and the ratio of tangible
assets to total assets excluding intangible assets representing the collateral position of
firms, COL, change across models as well as periods significantly. The difference
between the fixed effects estimation, Model 5, and the random effects estimates arc
significant especially for these variables.
In Table 7.2 where the cumulative base rate, BRATE (only varied across time) is
used as a measure of monetary stance, adding artificial variables to the model leads to a
significant change in the coefficients of the base rate in the loose period and thus the
whole sample, especially for the models estimated by fixed effects. In fact, the
coefficients for the base rate are generally robust across random effects estimations as in
3 In fact, we calculate these statistics by using Mathematica where it is possible to calculate Pseudo inverse
(generalised inverse) of a matrix.
4 We did not include the year 1990 in estimations because we observe a large number of missing
observations for this specific year.
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the case of ARATE observed in Table 7.1. The coefficients of the rating, and asset size,
solvency and gearing ratio are quite robust across alternative measures of monetary stance
and selectivity bias. However, the coefficients of the variable reflecting collateral
differentiate generally across all models, while the coefficients of age differentiate
between fixed effects and random effects estimations:
We carry out the same tests for the inventory and employment models in Chapter
Six even though these models are in dynamic in structure, and where fixed effects or
random effect estimates lead to inconsistent estimators. We estimate these models by
splitting the sample according to the criteria used in the same chapter. The evidence is
mixed; for some sub samples the coefficients of the artificial variables are significantly
different from zero while for some others they are not significantly different from zero
especially the fixed effects estimates. However, since we adopt dynamic panel estimators
in Chapter Six not fixed or random effects, these conclusions may not be important.
7.4. Conclusion
Although the techniques that we employed for testing selectivity bias in this chapter have
some weaknesses, the findings we discussed so far imply that the FAME sample, to some
extent, contains selectivity bias. But importantly, the estimation results with the fixed
effects model imply that the selectivity problem is not serious while the random effects
results generally imply the opposite. The quasi-Hausman test proposed by Verbeck and
Nijman (1992) support the selectivity bias. One may claim that the selection problem in
the FAME sample is ignorable in terms of the implications of the hypothesis given in the
empirical models but it does not reject completely the existence of selectivity bias. In
other words, the coefficients of the key variables are robust after adding the artificial
variables.
The fixed effects model results imply that the selectivity bias is ignorable in the
model explaining the mix for the period of 1993-1999 when the data is reported more
regularly. In addition, it is observed that for the inventory and employment models,
splitting the sample estimations leads to insignificant coefficients for the artificial
variables mostly in the fixed effects estimation. Further correction techniques are studied
in the literature. These techniques may also be adopted to improve the consistency and
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efficiency of the estimated coefficients in our models but our sample allows us limited
applications because we do not observe the selection rule properly.
Table 7.1: Estimation Results for Testing Selection Bias ill tile Mix Model
ORS ARATE RASSET SCORE AGE SOLV COL GEAR SVAR R1
Whole Period (1991-99 ~
Modell 117,868 -0.002 3.523 -0.598 0.049 0.183 0.734 0.004 - 0.190
-3.62 43.24 -120.06 7.74 32.00 1.58 33.17
Model2 117,868 -0.002 3.332 -0.597 0.041 0.183 0.500 0.004 3.573 0.199
-3.60 40.40 -lt9.83 6.61 32.12 1.08 33.72 11.74
Model3 112,149 -0.002 3.129 -0.592 0.041 0.178 0.091 0.004 5.625 0.208
-3.71 38.09 -116.21 6.71 30.55 0.19 34.49 32.93
Model4 117,868 -0.002 2.815 -0.590 0.048 0.216 -0.026 0.004 -0.001 0.269
-3.95 36.53 -123.83 8.18 39.56 -0.06 34.65 -105.77
ModelS 117,859 -0.002 2.729 -0.609 0.541 0.179 1.576 0.003 17.188 0.086
-3.56 12.20 -116.33 25.91 28.02 2.74 26.57 7.07
Tight Period (1991-92~
Modell 23,345 -0.012 2.841 -0.713 0.011 0.302 2.219 0.005
- 0.230
-3.42 23.89 -62.18 1.38 23.81 2.55 21.75
Model2 23,345 -0.012 2.421 -0.710 0.004 0.313 1.407 0.006 6.496 0.248
-3.41 20.16 -62.31 0.43 24.85 1.63 23.13 17.35
Model3 18,995 -0.011 2.442 -0.694 0.012 0.284 0.682 0.006 5.044 0.232
-3.22 18.97 -54.51 1.34 20.30 0.71 19.59 11.77
Mode14 23,345 -0.013 2.278 -0.687 0.015 0.333 1.539 0.005 -0.001 0.295
-3.74 19.93 -62.10 1.88 27.26 1.85 22.58 -42.37
ModelS 23,343 -0.009 5.530 -0.756 1.552 0.407 -0.512 0.004 -38.805 0.022
-2.44 4.28 -44.75 7.73 16.30 -0.22 10.92 -2.46
Loose Period (1993-99 ~
Modell 94,523 -0.002 3.489 -0.586 0.043 0.172 0.498 0.004
- 0.183
-3.30 39.48 -105.06 6.47 27.03 0.96 28.85
Model2 94,523 -0.002 3.276 -0.585 0.035 0.173 0.268 0.004 3.582 0.192
-3.29 36.50 -104.89 5.29 27.16 0.52 29.45 11.21
Model3 93,154 -0.002 3.163 -0.586 0.038 0.174 -0.022 0.004 5.706 0.205
-3.41 36.15 -104.65 5.88 27.28 -0.04 31.10 30.53
Model4 94,523 -0.002 2.691 -0.581 0.041 0.208 -0.055 0.003 -0.001 0.267
-3.62 32.20 -109.28 6.56 34.32 -0.11 30.08 -99.36
ModelS 94,516 -0.002 3.829 -0.596 0.746 0.162 0.597 0.003 0.734 0.057
-3.26 14.90 -100.30 27.69 21.99 0.90 21.49 0.29
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Table 7.1: Estimation Results for Testing Selection Bias in the Mix Model
OBS BRATE RASSET SCORE AGE SOLV COL GEAR SVAR RZ
Modell 117,868 -0.006 3.513 -0.598 0.047 0.183 0.803 0.004 - 0.190
-2.30 43.05 -120.09 7.43 32.01 1.72 33.18
Model2 117,868 -0.007 3.318 -0.597 0.039 0.183 0.582 0.004 3.612 0.200
-2.85 40.16 -119.87 6.23 32.13 1.25 33.75 11.85
Model3 112,149 0.002 3.130 -0.592 0.042 0.178 0.070 0.004 5.624 0.208
0.81 38.09 -116.19 6.77 30.56 0.15 34.49 32.93
Model4 117,868 -0.012 2.794 -0.591 0.045 0.216 0.117 0.004 -0.001 0.270
-5.10 36.21 -123.94 7.56 39.60 0.27 34.69 -105.86
ModelS 117,859 0.028 3.185 -0.609 0.626 0.177 1.410 0.003 9.618 0.074
9.88 13.95 -116.29 27.74 27.70 2.46 26.43 3.78
Tight Period (1991-92l
Modell 23,345 -0.075 2.842 -0.712 0.010 0.300 2.349 0.005 - 0.231
-8.02 23.92 -62.15 1.24 23.69 2.70 21.84
Model2 23,345 -0.082 2.412 -0.709 0.002 0.311 1.529 0.006 6.648 0.248
-8.82 20.13 -62.27 0.25 24.76 1.77 23.27 17.77
Model3 18,995 -0.045 2.468 -0.693 0.011 0.282 0.719 0.006 4.883 0.231
-4.21 19.15 -54.38 1.27 20.17 0.75 19.60 11.35
Model4 23,345 -0.073 2.279 -0.686 0.014 0.331 1.662 0.005 -0.001 0.295
-8.02 19.96 -62.07 1.74 27.15 2.00 22.67 -42.36
ModelS 23,343 -0.085 5.549 -0.757 - 0.407 -0.466 0.004 -39.069 0.218
-7.76 4.30 -44.79 - 16.31 -0.20 10.92 -2.48
Loose Period (1993-99l
Modell 94,523 0.060 3.424 -0.588 0.037 0.172 0.585 0.004 - 0.185
13.30 38.73 -105.45 5.51 27.05 1.13 28.91
Model2 94,523 0.062 3.203 -0.587 0.029 0.173 0.348 0.004 3.707 0.194
13.64 35.67 -105.29 4.28 27.19 0.68 29.53 11.61
Model3 93,154 0.058 3.111 -0.588 0.033 0.174 0.056 0.004 5.683 0.206
12.69 35.55 -105.02 5.02 27.31 0.11 31.15 30.43
Model4 94,523 0.049 2.643 -0.582 0.036 0.208 0.016 0.003 -0.001 0.268
11.20 31.61 -109.60 5.77 34.32 0.03 30.12 -99.06
ModelS 94,516 0.009 3.909 -0.596 0.728 0.163 0.596 0.003 -0.433 0.059
1.79 14.97 -100.26 25.20 22.05 0.90 21.51 -0.16
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion
8.1. Introduction
The main objective of this thesis has been to investigate empirically how monetary
policy affects non-financial firms' real activity with a special emphasis on external
finance. We use a large panel of UK manufacturing firms to test various hypotheses
related to the credit channel of monetary transmission. The thesis contributes to the
empirical literature mainly by identifying the responses of firms to monetary policy
across policy regime periods and firm-groups where they are categorised according to
their financial positions and degree of informational asymmetries. We provide evidence
for the credit channel of monetary transmission by adopting a micro-level analysis. This
line of research may provide an alternative for solving the problems associated with the
generalisations and some other empirical issues.
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis in the context of its main findings
and contributions. It also discusses the limitations of the analysis and offers some
suggestions for further research in this area. The remainder of this chapter is organised as
follows. Section Two presents a summary of the main findings chapter by chapter.
Section Three assesses what this thesis adds to the literature and provides some further
study suggestions.
8.2. Summary of Main Findings
The literature survey that we have provided in Chapter Two shows that monetary policy
affects aggregate demand through a variety of channels. More attention has been recently
paid to the credit channels of monetary transmission that focus mainly on interactions
between policy and financial positions of firms. This approach recognizes the importance
of informational asymmetries and agency costs. The role of financial intenncdiaries and
firms' financial positions for macroeconomic performance can be discussed within this
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setting where the choice of finn finance among equity, bond, bank loans, internal finance
or any other finance is important for firms' real activity. Therefore, monetary policy and
the underlying transmission mechanism as well as information about the basic tendencies
in financial markets are crucial for macroeconomic stability and economic efficiency. In
fact, financial crises and their impacts on the redistribution of wealth and resources can be
understood well within this framework.
The monetary policy transmission is now a more complicated issue as innovations
in the financial markets set in, and it needs to be properly identified for an efficient
macroeconomic policy. There are some difficulties associated with identifying monetary
transmission channels empirically because of a simultaneity problem in the supply-
demand dynamics, the endogenous nature of policy actions, and the non-observable
nature of some critical variables such as the real interest rate. As finn level data have
become more available, these issues are less relevant. Before going into the empirical
results, we are going to discuss our main findings from the comparative statics of Chapter
Three.
Finns in the model have three different profiles. Firstly, high profile firms arc
expected to invest in good projects that are financed directly from the capital market at a
low cost because they are rich in collateral, highly profitable and have good reputation.
Secondly, firms with an intermediate profile are more likely to adopt good projects and to
get finance from the banks by paying a monitoring cost. Lastly, firms with a low profile
invest in risky projects and get high cost funds from the market to finance these projects.
There are many factors that determine the firms' profile and their financial positions such
as SIze, collateral level, profitability, probability of choosing a project type (the risk
factor), indebtedness, monitoring cost, and the interaction of these variables with
monetary policy shocks. In this chapter, we have derived some comparative statics that
provide important implications for the impact of monetary policy on the firms' choice of
finance and its interaction with firm characteristics.
As the market interest rate increases as a result of tight monetary policy, the
demand for bank finance increases. However, since we assume that bank loans shrink
during tight periods, firms who previously had access to bank loans are no longer able to
do it and thus they move to the low profile category where they are more likely to invest
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in bad projects. Similarly, since an increase in the market interest rate weakens the net
worth positions of some firms, they are no longer able to finance their investment from
the capital market at a low cost and therefore have to rely more on bank finance.
Therefore, firms that were initially in the intermediate profile will have lower bank
finance versus market finance and firms in the high profile now would have high bank
finance versus market finance. Since it is costly to shift among different sources of
finance, a shock that changes the composition of firm finance is likely to be influential
over the investment and production decisions of firms: Again, an increase in the market
interest rate would increase demand for bank finance more for those firms whose net-
worth ratios are more sensitive to changes in the interest rate. If the net worth ratios of
firms were not sensitive to the interest rate (those firms that hedge against policy
changes), the demand of these firms for intermediary or bank finance would be less
relative to those that are financially weak. This result confirms the financial accelerator
theory where credit market conditions amplify and propagate the impacts of monetary
shocks on the real activity of financially weak firms (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,
1996). We summarise the remaining predications of the model in the following
paragraph.
If the project size is proportional to total assets, an increase in finn size, ceteris
paribus, leads some firms in the lower profile to invest in good projects and finance these
projects by bank funds. In addition, low risk, ceteris paribus, increases the number of
firms that have access to the low-cost market finance. In an environment where risk is
substantial, firms tend to choose inefficient projects, which in turn impedes investment
and overall real activity. Moreover, as collateral assets increase firms are more likely to
have access to market finance and small firms are more sensitive to a change in the value
of their collateral assets. This prediction may explain the fact that in relatively rich
countries with developed financial markets where firms on average have large assets, the
share of bank finance gets smaller, as only constrained firms raise funds from
intermediary institutions.
IBased on these predictions and Kashyap, Stein, Wilcox (1993), we estimated the econometric models in
Chapter Five and Chapter Six.
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In Chapter Four, we have carried out a descriptive analysis of the UK
manufacturing sector and highlighted stylised facts of the data set employed in the
empirical analysis. Evidence shows that the recession in the early 1990s has been very
destructive for corporate economic activity. Monetary policy supported the upward
movement of real interest rates in this period, which in tum created harsh conditions for
financially weak firms. The closure rate increased very rapidly especially for small and
young non-financial firms. Young and small firms which could not pay their bank loans
back, in tum, increased bad debts. The recession was followed by a stable economic
environment where low and stable inflation led to a fall in the cost of external finance
premium through a decline in equity and the inflation risk premium during the second
half of the 1990s. We carried out our analysis considering two sub-periods reflecting the
recession in the early 1990s and the following recovery and stable period.
The distribution of firms' rating scores highlights the impact of the recession in the
early 1990s on the firms' financial reputation. While the share of unstable and high risky
firms are higher during the recession relative to the recovery period, the share of secure
and stable firms are higher during the upswing period. Large firms have relatively high
rating scores over the business cycle while the average rating during the recession is
lower than it is in the upswing period and the margin between periods becomes wider as
firm size declines.
Our sample contains rich information on variables that are important for our
empirical analysis even though there are some missing observations. Missing
observations are more frequent during the recession periods for small, young and risky
firms. We have cross-checked key variables of some quoted firms extracted from our
FAME sample with their corresponding figures in Datastream and aile Source data sets.
We have found some differences among data sets for some particular variables. The
differences are mainly due to definitions and missing observations. The FAME sample
fits our expectations concerning the data in the sense that a large number of firms with
rich variety allows us to test our hypotheses.
Chapter Five is one of the empirical chapters in this thesis. We have estimated our
empirical model using the fixed effects, the IV-2SLS procedures. However, we have
mainly focused on the estimations obtained from the fixed effects model that produced
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similar results with the IV-2SLS procedure. We have provided estimations for three
different versions of the mix to extract information about the impact of monetary policy,
firm characteristics and other control variables on the liabilities composition of firms. The
mix variables are regressed on a number of financial variables, the GDP growth,
monetary policy stance, and interaction terms that capture the impact of monetary policy
stance across firm characteristics and monetary policy regimes. The main findings for
MIXI and MIX2 do not differ significantly therefore we will summarise findings for the
former, which has implications for both the bank lending channel and the broad credit
channel as suggested by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Oliner and Rudebush
(1996). In addition, we have used two alternative monetary stance variables, namely the
cumulative base rate and the apparent interest rate. We will provide the results of
estimations where the former variable is used as an explanatory variable.
Estimations results show that MIXI is generally more sensitive to monetary policy
stance for small, risky, young, and highly indebted firms than their counterpart firm
groups, namely large, secure, old, and low indebted firms during the rccessionary period.
Firms in the former groups are assumed to be financially constrained and therefore are
more likely to be subject to a moral hazard problem. Evidence shows that financially
constrained and poorly collateralised firms are less likely to have access to low cost
market finance and therefore they depend on bank or equity finance. However, it is even
more difficult to get bank credits when monetary conditions tighten with an increase in
the interest rate. During tight periods, firms have to give up investment and production
activities, which is consistent with the broad credit channel.
We have observed an asymmetry concerning the impact of monetary policy stance.
By using dummy variables that capture two different monetary policy regimes as
components of interaction terms in addition to firm characteristic dummies, it is found
that financially weak firms had hardly any access to bank finance during the tight period.
Some financially strong firms who used to get finance directly from the market also faced
difficulties during the tight period and therefore they shifted towards bank finance. Since
the bank loan supply declines during a tight monetary policy period, some bank
dependent firms did not obtain bank finance either. However, during the recovery period,
relatively weak firms were more likely to get bank finance and some relatively strong
firms shifted from bank finance to low cost market finance. These results show us that
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monetary policy can affect the activity of firms asymmetrically over the business cycles.
Financially strong firms are more persistent to the negative shocks than financially weak
firms; therefore monetary policy shocks can affect the real activity of firms and thus the
distribution of wealth in the economy.
We also find evidence that MIXI decline for all firm groups during the tight period
conditioning on interaction terms for various firm characteristics. The decline in the share
of bank finance across firm groups implies a restrictive monetary policy on bank loans.
Evidence shows that less financially constrained firms are more likely to have access to
bank loans during the tight periods compared to more financially constrained firms
therefore we may expect an increase in MIX] for these firms. However, our findings
clearly show that the restrictive impact of the tight policy dominates the shift of bank
finance across firm types. This result indirectly confirms that monetary policy affects the
choice of finance also through the bank lending channel by reducing the overall supply of
bank loans.
We also found evidence that asset size, rating score, gearing ratio, the share of
tangible asset in total assets, and age have significant effects on the mix variables. As
firms' rating score increases they are more likely to get market finance while asset size,
and the age of the firm that capture firm reputation increase the likelihood of getting bank
finance. In addition, the ratio of short term debt to current liabilities increases with the
ratio of tangible to total assets in the fixed effects estimations but it declines with this
ratio in the IV-2SLS estimations. Only the results for the latter estimation method confirm
the theoretical predictions derived from the model in Chapter Three where firms tend to
get more non-bank finance as their collateral assets increase relatively. Similarly, the ratio
of short term debt to total debt decline with this ratio. This result confirms that firms with
high value collateral assets are more likely to get the long term debt. We also find out that
an increase in general economic activity (the increase in the GDP growth rate) reduces the
mix, that is, firms are more likely to have access to market finance as the economy grows.
We have already pointed out that monetary policy affects the choice of firm finance.
In Chapter Six we test whether the choice of finance is important for real activity. Our
empirical model is based on a cash flow-investment setting which hypothesises that the
lack of internal funds imposes a constraint on inventory investment and employment
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because the external finance is costlier than the internal finance. We use cash flow, the
share of short term debt to current liabilities, and cumulative base rate among the
explanatory variables of inventory investment and employment growth to test the
Modigliani and Miller theorem and the credit channel of monetary transmission. The
cumulative base rate, as a proxy of the user cost of capital, explains the interest rate
channel while the mix and cash flow capture the credit channel. Investments have been
mostly modelled within a dynamic framework. We use the lags of dependent variables to
explain inventory investment and employment growth rates using the difference GMM
procedure. Contrary to the empirical model in Chapter Five, we could not capture the
impact of the monetary policy regime periods because we lost observations for the tight
period in this estimation procedure. As in Chapter Five, we carry out estimations by using
interaction terms that capture the impact of financial variables across various firm types.
The coefficients of the ratio of short term debt to current liabilities are positive and
significant across firm groups for both the inventory investment and employment growth
models but they are relatively smaller in the employment growth model. In other words, a
contractionary monetary policy, which squeezes the bank loan supply, reduces both
inventory investment and employment by changing the cost and availability of bank
finance but the effect is limited for employment growth. This result implies that having
access to bank finance is special: it reduces the extent of informational problems and has a
positive impact on firms' real activity. The estimation results in Chapters Five and Six
confirm the bank lending channel. The coefficients of interaction terms do differ
significantly across firms groups implying that financial variables affect firms' activities
heterogeneously.
The coefficients of the cumulative base rate are negative and generally significant in
the inventory investment growth model but they are smaller and generally insignificant in
the employment growth model. These coefficients are larger when we do not control for
interaction terms. This result confirms the interest rate channel where high interest rates
reduce firms' investment. This finding also confirms that there is a credit channel that is
complementary to the interest rate channel.
Cash flow captures the impact of net worth on inventory and employment activity.
The coefficients for the first lag of cash flow are positive and they are generally
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significant across finn groups in both inventory the employment models. Although the
findings do not support the cash flow hypotheses forwarded by Fazzari et al. (1988)
directly, they imply that internal funds or net worth of firms are very important for their
investment and employment activity. The cash flow hypothesis is more likely to hold
when some firms are in financial difficulties but the sample that we use for our
estimations belongs to a period when macro and micro conditions have been supportive
for the finance of potentially constrained firms, therefore our results are not surprising.
Since our sample is truncated from below in terms of finn size and there are quite a
number of missing observations, we carried out preliminary selectivity tests in Chapter
Seven. We have found out that the FAME sample, to some extent, contains selectivity
bias. The quasi-Hausman test proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) supports the
selectivity bias. We got mixed evidence from variable addition tests for the hypothesis that
the selectivity bias can be ignored. However, our empirical results are robust after adding
artificial variables implying that our main findings in Chapter Five and Chapter Six are
still valid.
8.3. Contributions, Limitations and Further Study Suggestions
The main contribution of this thesis has been the empirical identification of the credit
channels of monetary policy transmission by using a large firm level panel sample. We
identify the broad credit channel, and the interest rate channel directly and the bank
lending channel indirectly using UK data. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) identified
the bank lending channel by using the mix and found evidence for US aggregate data
while Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) criticized this study and did not find evidence for the
bank lending channel for US data when they split the sample according to the size of
firms. Following this debate, we have carried out further estimation tests by considering
various finn characteristics. Therefore, in addition to size we split the sample according to
rating score, dividend, age, indebtedness, and sectors, and we have used panel data
techniques that control for finn specific effects over the business cycle.
We also employ a number of financial variables that explain the financial mix
based on an extended moral hazard model through which we test the impact of monetary
policy on the choice of bank versus market finance taking into account various firm
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characteristics. Therefore, we control for endogeneity problems sourced from the
interaction between the monetary policy stance and financial variables. We use a very
large firm level sample during the period 1990-1999 to test our empirical models (over
one hundred thousand firm year observations for some estimation). This sample allows us
to split data across the firm characteristics mentioned above and monetary policy regime
periods. Therefore, we could control for the structural change in the policy regime and for
firm heterogeneity. We also cross check some key variables used in the analysis with
other data sets. We think that our data set is suitable and rich enough for our analysis
although it includes some missing observations.
We also test how inventory investment and employment growth rates respond to
the monetary policy stance and variations in financial variables based on the framework
of cash flow hypothesis. We add the ratio of short term debt to current liabilities to test
the validity of the Modigliani and Miller theorem in this setting. We also confirm that
inventory investment has lower adjustment costs than employment because the former is
more sensitive to monetary policy and the choice of finance.
One limitation of the thesis is to find a better measure of the monetary policy
stance. We used the firm invariant cumulative base rate and the apparent interest rate,
which is an exogenous variable, to control for monetary policy stance, however, both of
them have some weaknesses. In fact, we overcome the problem of a firm invariant
monetary stance to some extent by using firm group dummies in the regressions. Future
work could make use of alternative measures of monetary stance by a variable resembling
Romer dates based on Monetary Policy Committee minutes for the UK.
Another limitation of the thesis is associated with difficulties III identifying a
selectivity rule that would allow us to do further statistical analyses including the
Heckman procedure, bootstrapping for testing the selectivity bias. Here we have carried
out only preliminary tests on whether this bias can be ignored or not.
The theoretical model that we discussed in Chapter Three considers only the
demand side dynamics thus it has a weakness in capturing the supply side of funds. In
addition, we could not capture the supply side effects when we interpret the sensitivity of
the mix variables to monetary policy. Therefore, further research may be carried out to
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study the reactions of bank credit to monetary policy controlling for other financial
variables, and to find out the determinants of variables that make up the mix variabels
separately by including supply side variables in the analysis. In fact, we have some
difficulties in identifying whether the changes in the mix variables are associated with
variations in the numerator or the denominator.
We suggest extending the research on the monetary policy transmission through
analysing the impact of monetary policy on firm exit and entry rates in the UK. We have
already discussed in Chapter Four that small firms are important for creating employment.
An adverse macroeconomic environment led the closure rate to increase sharply during
the recession in the early 1990s. In this context, it is worthwhile to answer the following
questions. To what extent do monetary policy shocks affect firm exit and entry rate, do
the choice of finance and financial factors that capture supply and demand dynamics have
any impact on exit and entry rates? There is already theoretical literature that investigated
the effects of financial market imperfections on entry and exit rates (See Cooley and
Quadrini; 2001, Gomes; 2001). Capturing issues related to the choice of external finance
would add value to this theoretical literature. Existing data sets allow access to
information on financial variables for already bankrupted or liquidated and newly-created
firms and thus to empirically test the role financial factors in firm exit and entry rates.
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DATA APPENDIX
Construction of Variables
We provide detailed information about the data set used in this thesis (the FAME) in
Chapter Four. We use finn level balance sheet, and profit-loss account information for 22
manufacturing industries in the UK over the period of 1990-1999. Initially, the sample
includes 16,356 manufacturing firms, Since some firms do not report most of the variables
used in the regressions, these firms have been removed from the sample. Therefore, we
start our empirical analysis with 15,996 firms in Chapter Five. The variables that have very
large dispersion (having very high maximum values and very low minimum values relative
to their means), have been trimmed from the upper and the lower tails of distribution to
remove outliers. For the regressions of Chapter Five, we trim 0.5 percent of observations
both from above and the below to remove the outliers for the apparent interest rates, the
gearing ratio, the age of firms and real tangible assets. The rest of variables are ratios and
take values in a certain range, that is, mix variables, rating score and the collateral ratio are
in the range of zero and one hundred therefore we did not trim these variables. The number
of firms actually used in the econometric estimations is further reduced after removing the
outliers in the sample. For example, in the Af/XI regression, the number of firms actually
used is 15,491.
In Chapter Six, we start from the original sample -untrimmed- in order to avoid loss of
observations originated from trimming that has been done for the empirical estimations in
Chapter Five. We trim all variables that are used for the empirical estimations of inventory
and employment growth equations in Chapter Six except for BRATE and MIX. The number
. of firms that are used in the inventory investment model is 8,609, while it is 8,594 for the
employment model. We define the individual variables used in the econometric
estimations in the following pages.
Data Appendix
Variables Used in Chapter Five
M/Xlit: The ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities in percentage. This variable
is used as dependent variable for econometric estimations to identify the credit channel.
The short-term debt is made up of bank overdraft and other short-term debt and thus it is
supposed to reflect bank finance. We also use MIX1 as an explanatory variable in the
models used in Chapter Six.
MIX2it: The ratio of total debt to total liabilities in percentage. This variable is also used as
a dependent variable in the econometric estimations. The MIX2it is a version of the MIXI it»
which considers also long-term liabilities. For our analysis, the MIX1 it is expected to be
more informative as it is made up of current liabilities that are more likely to be subject to
fluctuations for the constrained firms during tight periods. Therefore, it contains more
information in testing the credit channel.
MIX3it: The ratio of short-term debt to total debt in percentage. We use MIX3jt as a
dependent variable in our analysis in order to identify the impact of monetary policy on the
debt structure rather than identifying the credit channel directly. In other words, the credit
channel is identified more often by focusing on the relative variation of bank versus-non-
bank finance rather than short-term debt versus long-term debt.
BRATE,(Cumulative base rate): We create an index for the Bank of England base rate to
reflect the change in the monetary policy stance. Percentage changes in the base rate are
added to the previous year value starting from the base year, 1990==100. We adopt this
methodology to smooth the fluctuations in the base rate. This variable does not change
with firms but it does with time. We also use the cumulative base rate as an explanatory
variable in the models used in Chapter Six.
ARATEit(Apparent interest rate): The ratio of interest payment to total debt in percentage.
This variable varies across time and firms. It is supposed to capture the interest burden on
firms.
SCORE;t (Credit Rating Score): This rating score is produced by Qui Credit Assessment
Ltd. and measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the
date of calculation. The score is between zero and 100; a larger score implies a lower
probability of failure for firms.
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RASSETit (Real tangible assets in logarithm/: The nominal value of tangible assets for
each finn is deflated by a sectoral input price index that reflects the input costs for specific
sectors. This price index is calculated by the Office for National Statistics and is called the
MM17 (see on http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCIlSearchRes.asp?tenn=mm17). It contains
detailed indexes for revaluation of assets and stocks and it is a guide to capital replacement
costs. That is, it contains price indexes for specific types of assets, namely, plant and
machinery bought as fixed assets, stocks, stocks held as materials and fuel (excluding
electricity, gas and water) including imports, wholesale distribution (including imports),
road motor vehicles. Since these price indexes do not include all sub-sectors in the
manufacturing industry we fill the gap with another price index that is called the MM22.
This index also contains input and output prices on UK manufactured products at detailed
industry level.
AGEit (Age of Firms): This variable is supposed to capture the importance of track record
for financial and real activities. Only firms that are incorporated before 1990 are
considered in our analysis. We intend to use as much as possible active firms over the
estimation period in order to identify their reactions across policy regime periods (tight
versus loose periods) otherwise we could not identify the impact of tight policy in the early
1990s for the firms that were incorporated sometime after the recession.
GEARit (Gearing ratio): The ratio of short-term debt and long-term liabilities to
shareholders' equity in percentage. This variable captures the indebtedness position of
firms and thus their financial healthiness. In fact, even after trimming, there is a large gap
between maximum and minimum values of this variable.
COL/t (Collateral ratio): The ratio of tangible assets to total assets. This variable reflects
the collateral level of firms and thus it may capture the ability of firms getting finance with
relatively low cost external finance.
GDPt : The annual growth rate of real gross domestic product. This variable is used in the
estimations in order to control for general macroeconomic environment and aggr~gate
demand.
IW~ tend to use this va~iable as an explanatory variable in order to capture the activity level (size) of firms
and It does not necessanly reflect the capital stock of firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) and Bond and Mcghir
(1994) suggest methods for calculating replacement cost of capital. These methods entail information on the
age of capital. stock '.The price index t~at we used in the analysis reflects the weighted average of the past
cost of these industries and therefore It can be used to calculate the replacement cost of capital.
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Variables Used in Chapter Six
GINVit (Inventory growth): The change in the logarithm of the real inventory stocks. The
nominal values of inventory stock are deflated by the same index used for tangible assets.
We tend to use this variable to test the extent to which it is affected by financial variables
across various finn types.
GEMP it (Employment growth): The change in the logarithm of the number of employees.
The number of employees reflects the activity level of firms and it is less subject to
fluctuations compared to inventories and fixed investment.
GSt;(Sales growth): The change in the logarithm of the real sales. Real sales are calculated
by deflating the nominal sales by two-digit SIC producer price index (producer Prices-First
Release, PPI) that reflects mainly output prices and calculated by the Office of National
Statistics (see on http://www. statistics.gov.uk /STATBASElProduct.asp?vlnk=790).
RINVSjt (Adjustment term): The ratio of inventory investment to sales. This variable is an
adjustment term in the target adjustment model proposed by Lovell (1961) and employed
by Kashyap et a1.(1994) and others in their estimations.
CFjt (Logarithm of real cash flow): Nominal cash flow, profit after tax and interest
payment plus depreciation, is deflated by the input price index used for the tangible assets
and inventories. This variable is widely used in the financial constraints literature and it
reflects the net worth of firms.
GRTAit(Tangible assets growth): Change in RASSETit.
GWjt (Wage growth): Change in the logarithm of the real wage bill. The oominal value of
salary payment is normalized by sectoral producer price index (Producer Prices-First
Release, PPI) to calculate real wages. This variable captures the employment cost.
Dividend Payout Ratio: The ratio of dividend payment to total assets. This variable is
often used as criterion in order to split firms as more financially constrained and less
financially constrained in line of Fazzari et al. (1988) and Bond and Meghir (1994). The
first study uses the ratio dividend to income as a splitting criterion while the second uses
the ratio of dividend to capital stock.
We also use BRATE and M/Xl, which is denoted by MIX, as explanatory variables in the
empirical models in Chapter Six.
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Splitting Criteria According toFirm Type
Firm Type Definition
Small Small firms meet at least two out of three following criteria;
Turnover < £2.8 million, Total assets <£1.4 million, Number of
employee< 50
Large Large firms meet at least two out of three following criteria;
Turnover >£11.2 million, Total assets >£5.6 million, Number of
employee> 250
Risky Rating score (under 40 out of 100)
Secure Rating score (over 60 out of 100)
Young Lower 25% of age distribution (age<13 years)
Old Lower 25% of age distribution (age>43 years)
Low Dividend Upper 25% of dividend payout ratio distribution
High Dividend Lower 25% of dividend payout ratio distribution
Ilighly Indebted Upper 25% of gearing ratio distribution
Less Indebted Lower 25% of gearing ratio distribution
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Data Appendix
Table A. 6.1: Wald Statistics for the Joint Significance of Instrumental Variables
GINVit_1 os, MIXit CF1•t_1 RINVS-t_l MIX*TYPEit CF*TYPEIt_1
No Interaction Terms 62,402 1,172 16,170 7,433 6,118
TYPE=Small 60,997 1,206 16,154 7,717 6,248 1,239 1,377
TYPE=Large 61,142 1,208 16,180 8,547 6,245 5,454 658
TYPE=Risky 61,011 1,212 16,177 7,631 6,282 10,981 5,603
TYPE=Secure 61,087 1,219 16,220 7,542 6,346 3,389 17,800
TYPE=You"g 61,081 1,204 16,156 7,442 6,230 3,605 3,311
TYPE=Old 61,043 1,201 16,163 7,463 6,237 3,438 426
TYPE=IIigh Debt 35,319 1,202 16,189 7,459 6,259 9,476 3,418
TYPE=Low Debt 60,955 1,203 16,192 7,448 6,235 1,007 3,352
TYPE=L.Div. Ratio 60,956 1,206 16,157 7,542 6,231 1,281 352
TYPE=II.Div. Ratio 60,956 1,206 16,157 7,542 6,235 5,140 312
TYPE=PS 60,969 1,202 16,158 7,441 6,233 4,359 1,034
TYPE=PO 60,974 1,203 16,158 7,441 6,232 10,139 1,881
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